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SUMMARY 
 
Technical standardization in the field of information and computer technology 
becomes gradually prevalent in the high-tech era. Technical standard setting, 
which enables interoperability among diverse devices or equipments, has 
been proven to be efficient and effective in fostering technological 
development and benefiting end users.  As a standard setting process usually 
invites a group of competitors in the relevant industry to discuss future 
cooperation and even profit distribution arrangements, private standardization 
conducted on a voluntary basis has always been a concern in the eyes of 
antitrust and competition laws. Meanwhile, it has occurred to standardization 
promoters that patented technologies, which are inevitably involved in 
technical standardization nowadays, have posed a great threat to the wide 
adoption and the procompetitiveness of the standards formulated. 
 
The patent-related issues arise in private technical standardization, either 
conducted through formal standard setting organizations or by loose joint 
ventures, mainly in the following two aspects: first, the collusive interactions 
of patents included in a standard may preclude or restrict normal competition; 
second, the monopolistic exploitations of exclusive patent rights may prevent 
the wide adoption of the standard or may cause unreasonably high royalties 
to be charged to interested standard adopters. Both of these two types of 
patent-related issues will end up distorting market competition and ultimately 
depriving benefits from consumers. 
 
To address the above-identified issues, private standard setting organizations 
may apply a set of intellectual property policies inside the organizations to 
  viii 
regulate the relationship and the exercises of patents involved in a standard. 
For instance, to require only patents that are essential to the standard to be 
included in the proposed technical specifications so that competition will not 
be foreclosed within or beyond the standard. In addition, to impose early 
disclosure and reasonable and nondiscriminatory licensing obligations to 
prevent the standard setting and implementing process from being held up by 
manipulative patent holders for the purpose of realizing supra-competitive 
profits far out of proportion of their contributions.  
 
Such intellectual property policies in the private sector, although flexible and 
efficient in regulating the patent-related issues in standardization, need to rely 
on regulations in the public sector, e.g., official laws and legal principles, to 
realize their enforceability, especially when the policies themselves are in 
dispute.  First of all, the rules and principles of contract law could be applied 
as the noncompliance with an intellectual property policy in private sector 
could be construed as a breach of contract. Even when there is no policy at 
all, the manipulative exploitations of exclusive patent rights may still be 
captured by the doctrine of patent misuse or compulsory licensing under 
patent law.  Furthermore, as long as free and fair competition is affected by 
the exercises of patent rights in standardization, competition law could always 
be applied as a safety valve to protect and restore competition.  
 
Since China lacks of relevant experience in private technical standardization, 
a large portion of this paper is referring to the international standardization 
practice, especially from the US, hoping to explore advisable measures for 
China to adopt and apply in her own standardization practice. 
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GLOSSARY 
 
3C A joint venture among Philips, Sony and Pioneer, which 
holds some of the core technologies of manufacturing 
DVDs and DVD players 
 
6C A joint venture among Hitachi, Panasonic, JVC, 
Mitsubishi, Toshiba and Time Warner, which holds 
some of the core technologies of manufacturing DVDs 
and DVD players 
 
ADTB-T Advanced Digital Television Broadcast-Terrestrial 
 
A Chinese Digital Terrestrial Television standard 
proposal designed by Shanghai Jiaotong University of 
China 
 
ALJ  Administrative Law Judge 
 
An official in the United States who presides at an 
administrative trial-type hearing to resolve disputes 
between government agencies and someone affected 
by decisions of the agencies 
 
ANSI  American National Standards Institute 
 
  A standardization organization of the United States 
 
De facto standard A standard emerges spontaneously in the operation of 
market activities instead of being intentionally set up 
 
 (Defined in David S. Bloch and Scott S. Megregian, 
United States: The Antitrust Risks Associated With 
Manipulating The Standard-Setting Process, Mondaq 
database, Anti-trust/Competition column, 2004) 
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DMB-T  Digital Multimedia Broadcasting-Terrestrial 
 
A Chinese Digital Terrestrial Television standard 
proposal designed by Tsinghua University of China 
 
DOJ  Department of Justice 
 
A Cabinet department in the US government to enforce 
the law and defend the interests of the US according to 
the law and to ensure fair and impartial administration 
of justice for all Americans 
 
DRAM  Dynamic Random Access Memory  
 
A type of random access memory that stores each bit 
of data in a separate capacitor within an integrated 
circuit 
 
DTV  Digital Television 
 
DTT  Digital Terrestrial Television 
 
An implementation of a digital technology which 
provides more channels and better quality of pictures to 
a conventional television antenna 
 
DVD   Digital Versatile Disc 
 
An optical disc storage media format used for video 
and date storage 
 
DVD-ROM  Digital Versatile Disc-Read Only Memory 
 
The data stored on the disc can only be read and not 
written 
 
ECJ  European Court of Justice 
  xi 
 
The highest court of member states of the European 
Union 
 
EU/EC  European Union/European Community 
 
Used interchangeably in this paper as the political and 
economic union of 27 member states in Europe 
 
FTC  Federal Trade Commission 
 
An independent agency of the US government, whose 
principal mission is the promotion of consumer 
protection and the elimination and prevention of what 
regulators perceive to be harmfully anti-competitive 
business practices 
 
ICT  Information and Computer Technology 
 
IEC  International Electrotechnical Commission 
 
A non-governmental international standardization 
organization setting international standards for 
electrical, electronic and related technologies 
 
IEEE  Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
 
An international non-profit, professional organization for 
the advancement of technology related to electricity 
 
IETF  Internet Engineering Task Force 
 
An international standardization organization 
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Interoperability          A technical standard characterized of interoperability or  
or compatibility         compatibility that enables diverse systems and 
standard                     organizations to work together 
        
IP  Intellectual Property 
 
IPRs  Intellectual Property Rights 
 
ISO  International Organization for Standardization  
 
An international standard-setting organization 
composed of representatives from various national 
standardization organizations 
 
ITU  International Telecommunication Union 
 
An international standardization organization regulating 
and standardizing international radio and 
telecommunications 
 
JEDEC  Joint Electron Devices Engineering Council 
 
 A semiconductor engineering standardization body 
including some of the world’s largest computer 
companies as its members 
 
JMOL   Judgment as a Matter of Law   
 
A motion made by a party, during trial in the US, 
claiming the opposing party has insufficient evidence to 
reasonably support its case. It is similar to summary 
judgment, which is a motion made before trial 
 
NDRC  National Development and Reform Commission 
 
One of the most important governmental agencies 
under the State Council of China. Its major function is 
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to formulate and implement strategies of economic and 
social development in a national level  
 
NPC  National People’s Congress 
 
The highest state body and the only legislative house 
in China 
 
NSS  National Standards Strategy (of the United States) 
 
MPEG-2 A standard for the generic coding of moving pictures 
and associated audio information 
 
OASIS Organization for the Advancement of Structured 
Information Standards 
 
  An international standardization organization 
 
Patent holdup As far as standardization is concerned, it means the 
possibility that patent holders wait for others to make 
non-recoverable investments in a standard before 
demanding large royalties for use of their patents. It 
could be realized either by precluding competitors from 
using their essential patents in the standard through 
threat of injunctions, or by demanding supra-
competitive licensing royalties far out of proportion of 
the their true economic contributions 
 
Patent pool A patent pool is created by at least two companies 
agreeing to cross-license their patents within the pool 
and to issue license(s) for the pool as a whole to 
potential third-parties   
 
Patent portfolio A collection of patents owned by a single entity 
 
PTO  Patent and Trademark Office 
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RAM  Random Access Memory 
 
A form of computer data storage taking the form of 
integrated circuits that allow stored data to be accessed 
in any order 
 
Rambus A company engaged in high-speed interface 
technologies. It develops and licenses memory 
technologies to companies that manufacture 
semiconductor memory devices 
 
R&D  Research and Development 
 
RAND  Reasonable and Nondiscriminatory (licensing) 
 
RF  Royalty Free (licensing) 
 
SAC  Standardization Administration of China 
 
A standardization organization authorized by the State 
Council of China to exercise administrative 
responsibilities of managing, organizing, coordinating 
and supervising standardization work in China 
 
Standardization Generally means the process or the result of 
formulating a standard 
 
In this paper, it represents the corresponding 
processes of standard-setting, standard-revising and 
standard-implementing, either individually or 
collectively 
 
SARFT  State Administration of Radio, Film and Television 
 
An executive branch under the State Council of China. 
Its Standards Institute was designated to take charge of 
Chinese DTT standardization 
  xv 
 
SDRAM  Synchronous Dynamic Random Access Memory 
 
A form of computer data storage which increases the 
speed at which a central processing unit of a computer 
can read or write memory  
 
SIPO  State Intellectual Property Office (of China) 
 
A governmental agency directly subordinated to the 
State Council of China which is in charge of 
comprehensive intellectual property affairs arising in or 
in relation to China 
 
SSO(s)  Standard-Setting Organization(s) 
 
TRIPs The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights  
 
An international agreement administered by the World 
Trade Organization that sets down minimum standards 
for many forms of intellectual property regulation as 
applied to nationals of other WTO Members 
 
USPTO  Patent and Trademark Office of the United States 
 
VESA  Video Electronics Standards Association 
 
A non-profit, private SSO, including as members both 
computer hardware and software manufacturers 
 
VL-bus  VESA Local Bus  
 
A standard for a computer bus design 
 
W3C  World Wide Web Consortium 
 
  xvi 
A major international standardization organization for 
the World Wide Web 
 
WTO  World Trade Organization 
 
 
Note: the sources of the above definitions or descriptions can be found on the relevant pages 




Standards permeate through every corner of modern-day life. In the form of 
common specifications or requirements for products or services to comply 
with, standards provide the whole society with efficiency, safety as well as 
convenience. Among the various categories of standards, interoperability 
standards play important roles in this high-tech era, especially in the field of 
information and computer technology (“ICT”).  All countries in the world which 
are striving for international competitiveness, including China, are paying 
more and more attention to developing interoperability standardization in ICT 
section. 
 
Interoperability standardization is pursued for its technical significance and 
the benefits it would bring to consumers. However, there have always been 
concerns that standardization may end up functioning as a platform to 
eliminate competition or facilitate monopoly, especially when certain 
technologies underlying a standard are proprietary, that is, when the 
technologies involved in the technical specifications of a standard are 
protected by Intellectual Property (“IP”) law. Admittedly, patent laws 
effectively promote technical innovation and competition, by granting patent 
holders a certain period of exclusive rights to protect their innovative 
achievements and recoup their investments. In the context of interoperability 
standardization, however, the existence of exclusive patent rights poses a 
great threat to procompetitive standard-setting and the wide adoption of the 
proposed standards.  
 
The major object of this paper is to identify the most typical patent-related 
issues arising from private interoperability standardization in ICT section and 
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to explore a few applicable ways to resolve them. Regardless of the specific 
forms those patent-related issues may take, they can all be characterized 
either as compromising the wide adoption of the proposed standards or 
restricting free and fair competition, or both. Many of today’s prevalent 
interoperable standards are the results of collective co-operation between 
international participants. To some extent, that means basic principles and 
rules underlying interoperability standardization are universally applicable. 
This paper is trying to explore sophisticated rules accumulated from 
international practice and then to apply those rules in interoperability 
standardization, in which China would engage herself. It is not surprising at all 
that some standardization policies of the US also apply well to China’s 
domestic standardization. 
 
Chapter I begins by presenting a brief introduction of standards and 
standardization. The research target of this paper focuses on interoperability 
standardization, mostly conducted by Standard-Setting Organizations 
(“SSOs”) in the field of ICT. The reasons for choosing this target will be 
elaborated in the following text. Simply speaking, it is because such 
standardization comprises the most typical patent-related issue which raise 
the greatest legal concerns. At the end of Chapter I, the challenges facing 
Chinese ICT standardization are discussed with reference to the famous 
Digital Versatile Disc (“DVD”) patent case. 
 
Chapter II mainly identifies the three major patent-related issues in 
interoperability standardization and respectively explores appropriate rules to 
deal with those issues.  The applicable rules discussed in Chapter II are 
mainly regulations in private sectors in the form of SSO IP policies. The first 
part of Chapter II begins by analyzing the common features and the proper 
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interrelations of the patents included in a proposed interoperable standard. It 
is widely acknowledged in the antitrust field that collusion among competitors 
in the same industry would greatly harm market competition. Therefore, in 
order to avoid antitrust scrutiny, private standardization has to be very 
cautious in dealing with the relationship between participants who are also 
competitors in a certain industry. With respect to formulating a standard, that 
means the patented technologies included in the technical specifications of a 
standard need to be strictly restricted to ‘essential’ ones. The first part of 
Chapter II will discuss the characteristics of ‘essential patents’ and why 
‘essential patents’ are crucial to procompetitive standardization. The 
controversial Chinese Digital Television (“DTV”) Standardization will be 
discussed to illustrate the significance of ‘essential patents’. 
 
The second and third parts of Chapter II will discuss the unreasonable 
exploitations of the legally granted patent rights in standardization and more 
importantly the effective countermeasures the SSO IP policies could take.  
Generally speaking, ambitious patentees manipulate their patents on the 
platform of standardization in the following two ways: First, they conceal the 
patented attributes of the technologies they contribute to a standard and then 
attempt to exercise their patent rights after the standard has been officially 
agreed on and widely adopted; Second, they leverage on their legally granted 
patent rights to exclude other competitors from using the standard or charge 
unreasonably high royalties for adopting the standard covered by their 
patents. These are the ‘patent holdup’ problems in the context of 
standardization. For private-sector regulations to handle the ‘holdup’ 
problems, the SSO IP policies normally function as a precaution, which 
requires either patent disclosure at the early stage of standard-setting or 
obligatory patent licensing after the technical specification of the proposed 
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standard is formulated. The second and third parts of Chapter II will 
respectively discuss the appropriate requirements of the patent disclosure 
and patent licensing obligations that SSO IP policies may stipulate, by largely 
referring to the famous Rambus case in the US. 
 
Chapter III discusses the public-sector regulations—that is, the official laws—
on the patent-related issues in standardization. An SSO IP Policy as a sort of 
private-sector regulations requiring patent disclosure and licensing obligations, 
is effective only when they are binding on members of the SSO. Chapter III 
analyzes the legal enforceability of the SSO IP policies mainly in the context 
of Chinese law. When there is noncompliance with the obligations required by 
an SSO IP policy, which law should apply to enforce the policy? Is contract 
law appropriate to address this issue? Under what circumstances would 
contract law be incapable of dealing with the problem? What if there are 
disputes regarding the IP policy itself or if there is no clear policy at all, how 
should ‘patent holdup’ problems be curbed? Is patent misuse doctrine or 
compulsory licensing applicable to solve the problem? Moreover, if neither 
contract law nor patent law is applicable, is it possible for China to enforce the 
newly enacted antimonopoly law to prevent or regulate anticompetitive 
standardization, e.g., including ‘non-essential patents’ in a proposed standard? 
Chapter III will answer all these questions and also propose some solutions. It 
is highlighted that China does not have much private standardization 
experience and Chinese legislations applicable to standardization are either 
too outdated or incomprehensive. Therefore, the legal analysis in Chapter III 
tends to be normative. Other countries (especially the US) provide readily 
available experience and so they are discussed, hoping to provide guidance 
for Chinese standardization to be conducted within an appropriate legal 
framework. 
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Chapter I   The Significance of Standards and 
Chinese Standardization 
 
I.1  A Brief Introduction of Standards 
 
A standard, nowadays generally acknowledged either as a level or degree of 
quality that is considered proper or acceptable or something fixed as a rule for 
measuring weight, value, etc1, has existed since the beginning of recorded 
history. One of the earliest examples of standards is the ancient Egyptian 
calendar, which is a time measurement system of 365 days in a year, with 
three seasons, each made up of four months, with thirty days in each month.2 
The calendar was based upon the regular motions of the moon and 
corresponded with the cycles of the Nile. Back in 4241 BC, the ancient 
Egyptians began to use this calendar to remind themselves of the annual 
inundation of the Nile so as to decide the appropriate time to plant and 
harvest crops.3 This primitive calendar took on important functions especially 
in respect of the vital survival concerns of the ancient Egyptians. Qin Shi 
Huang, who was known as the first emperor of China, not only was famous 
for politically unifying China but also was highly praised for his contributions 
standardizing the Chinese units of measurements such as lengths, volumes 
and weights.4 As agriculture and commerce developed, varieties of plantation 
                                                
1
   See Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, the Commercial Press 1998, at 1498. 
2
   The beginning of a year was marked by five additional days, known as ‘the yearly five 
days’. It was the time of great feasting and celebration for the ancient Egyptians. See 
http://www.kingtutshop.com/freeinfo/Ancient-Egyptian-Calendar.htm. 
3
    For detailed information on the ancient Egyptian calendar, see   
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Egyptian_calendar. 
4
   Qin Shi Huang, personal name Ying Zheng, was the king of the Chinese State of Qin from 
247 BC to 221 BC and then the first emperor of a unified China from 221 BC to 210 BC. 
He was known for the unprecedented accomplishment of ending the political chaos of 
several independent states and absorbing them into the State of Qin as a unified China. 
He also unified China economically by standardizing the Chinese units of measurements 
such as weights and measures, the currency, the length of the axles of carts (so every cart 
6 
methods and trading rules began to emerge and to some extent formed the 
basis of modern standardization. 5  These seemingly pristine standards, 
although not derived for the exact same reason of standardization today—for 
example, some architecture standards in ancient China were merely set to 
show crowning respect to the royal emperor 6 —nonetheless surely had 
provided necessary order and convenience thus promoting the development 
of ancient society.  
 
With the advent of the Industrial Evolution in the early nineteenth century, the 
simple rule-like standards were far from meeting the ends of the burst of new 
industries. The absence of systematic standardization caused significant 
inefficiencies to industrial expansion and sometimes even endangered public 
safety. Take the railroad for example, this great invention was an economic, 
efficient and effective means of transporting raw materials and products to 
distant destinations, compared to other ways of transportation. However, the 
efficiency of railroad transportation would be greatly compromised if the 
widths of railway tracks in different regions varied from each other. Imagine 
the waste of energy if a train had to be unloaded halfway to the destination 
because the latter railroad track did not line up with the wheels of the current 
train, or the time delays due to the change of wheels at every connecting 
point. Realizing the obvious importance of the unification of the railroad 
gauge, no matter what purposes are sought for, economic or military, now 
                                                                                                                             
could run smoothly in the ruts of the new roads), the legal system, and so on.  
 For information on Qin Shi Huang, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qin_Shi_Huang. 
5
   Standardization, which generally means the process or result of formulating a standard, 
hereinafter represents the corresponding processes of standard-setting, standard-revising 
and standard-implementing, either individually or collectively.  
6 
   See e.g. Chen Yu, Yao Yuqin, Research on the Change Process of Curved Roof of 
Chinese Ancient Architecture by System Dynamics, Nanjing Academy Journal, China, 
2005, at: http://www.systemdynamics.org/conferences/2005/proceed/papers/CHEN205.pdf. 
7 
sixty percent of the world’s railroads use a gauge of 4 feet 8.5 inches 
(1435mm), which is known as the standard international gauge.7  
 
As time proceeds to the 21st century characterized as a globalization and 
information explosion era, standardization has sprung up like mushrooms 
catering to the increasing needs of the modern society. We are now actually 
living in a world built on standards. We can play DVDs bought from any video 
shop in our own DVD players because the DVD industry has adopted 
standardized encoding and decoding technologies enabling world-wide 
compatibility between different brands of discs and players. We can surf the 
Internet without difficulty to access information all around the world because 
we globally share a uniform Internet Protocol. We can trust the advice from 
doctors or lawyers with practice licenses because they have satisfied certain 
standards as qualified professionals. We can eat snacks and use cosmetics 
without worrying about getting poisoned because the wide range of safety 
standards preventing dangerous uncertified products from circulating in the 
market. The widespread adoptions of standards are so overwhelming that we 
can hardly imagine the chaos in our lives if standards did not exist. At 
present, standardization emerges in many fields far beyond simply in 
manufacturing industry. It ranges from products conformity to service 
requirements, from technical interoperability to consumer safety. Such 
diversity makes the meanings of standards vary among different industries. 
Nonetheless, the intrinsic attributes of a standard enable different standards 
in different contexts to share some common characteristics—uniform and 
instructional. One of the most influential standardization organizations, 
International Organization for Standardization (“ISO”), defines a standard as 
“a document, established by consensus and approved by a recognized body, 
                                                
7
    For more information, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Railroad_gauge. 
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that provides for common and repeated use, rules, guidelines or 
characteristics for activities or their results aimed at the achievement of the 
optimum degree of order in a given context”.8 Although not entirely inclusive, 
this definition manages to cover most of the prevalent standards in existence. 
Simply speaking, a standard sets out common specifications or requirements 
for a product or service to comply with in order to realize its intended use. 
 
I.2  The Classifications of Standards and Standard-
Setting Organizations  
 
Standards can be classified into several categories depending on their 
contexts. There are industrial, agricultural, medical, military standards, 
classified by the corresponding industries. There are local, national, regional 
and international standards, just as implied, classified by the areas in which 
the standards are adopted and implemented. Depending on whether the final 
standards are made public, standards can be open or proprietary. Among all 
these categories, standards can also be advisory or compulsory.  
 
Generally in this paper, industrial standards involving technical specifications 
in the field of ICT are the main target of the research. More specifically, the 
chosen target is usually conducted to realize technical interoperability or 
compatibility, either of which is a property referring to the ability for diverse 
systems and organizations to work together.9 As Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers (“IEEE”) defines, “Interoperability is the ability of two or 
more systems or components to exchange information and to use the 
                                                
8
    See ISO/IEC Guide 2: 2004 [2], definition 3.2. 
9
    See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interoperable. In the following text, ‘interoperability’ and 
‘compatibility’ will be used interchangeably in illustrating a certain kind of technical 
standards. 
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information that has been exchanged.”10 In many technology-related markets, 
there is a great need for standardization which provides a common framework 
or format to ensure interoperability among related products and to foster the 
development of ancillary or peripheral devices. 11  Although some safety 
standards may have technical components, their designated functions as 
safety valves should distinguish themselves from interoperability standards 
discussed in this paper.  
 
Interoperable standards generally come into being in three basic ways. 
Firstly, they may emerge spontaneously in the operation of market activities. 
A certain technology equipped with unparalleled advantages compared to 
other competing technologies often tends to succeed in the battle of market 
competition. As more and more consumers are attracted to use the winning 
technology, which is owned by a single company, the technical specification 
of the technology will become so dominant that it will gradually be regarded 
as a standard in the certain industry. Such a standard is called a ‘de facto 
standard’, which arises either because consumers recognize the standard’s 
superiority over competing systems or because the technology enjoys a ‘first 
move’ advantage.12  The Microsoft operating systems are great examples. 
There are no special standardization organizations ‘set’ them as the official 
operating systems, but the market itself obviously chose the Microsoft 
operating systems as the prevailing standard. A de facto standard does not 
have a formal standard-setting process and might sometimes even result in a 
better technical solution. However, it is neither efficient nor practical to rely 
                                                
10  
  See IEEE Standard Computer Dictionary: A Compilation of IEEE Standard Computer 
Glossaries.  New York, NY: 1990. IEEE, Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 
is an international non-profit, professional organization for the advancement of technology 
related to electricity. For detailed information on IEEE, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ieee. 
11
   See David S. Bloch and Scott S. Megregian, United States: The Antitrust Risks Associated 
With Manipulating The Standard-Setting Process, Mondaq database, Anti-
trust/Competition column, 2004, at: http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=28999. 
12
    Id. 
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totally on spontaneous market activities to develop a technical de facto 
standard. Simply because it generally takes years of market competition 
before a certain technology can be recognized as a de facto standard. 
Secondly, standards may be set and enforced by governments or government 
agencies with regulatory powers. For example, the Ministry of Information 
Industry of China enforced a compulsory universal mobile phone charger 
standard, which required all cell phones designed after 14 June 2007 to adopt 
universal charger interface, otherwise they would not be approved for sale in 
China. 13  Government-set standards, mostly compulsory ones, are often 
adopted to accommodate the needs of efficiency and effectiveness under 
necessary circumstances. They are beyond the scope of this paper due to 
their compulsory characteristic and their government-sponsored nature. Last 
but not least, standards may be formulated by a group of private entities 
through agreements and later adopted by any interested market participants 
on a voluntary basis. Such private standardization is often carried on by 
formal SSOs or by several pioneers in a certain industry.14 No matter who 
conducts the standardization process, due to the voluntary and consensus 
characteristics, standards that are privately and collectively set are obviously 
different from spontaneous de facto standards and compulsory government-
set standards. Since such private and voluntary standards are usually 
formulated based on coordination between competitors (whether through the 
platform of an SSO or not), they tend to raise the greatest legal concerns, 
especially in the aspect of competition law, as compared to the other two 
                                                
13
    See news release of Xin Jing Bao, Beijing, China, 16 June 2007, at: 
http://tech.sina.com.cn/it/2007-06-15/07191564384.shtml. 
14
   The SSOs or the groups of entities participating in standardization are also called 
‘standardization consortia’. A consortium is an association of two or more individuals, 
companies, organizations or governments (or any combination of these entities) with the 
objective of participating in a common activity or pooling their resources for achieving a 
common goal. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consortium.  
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kinds of standards. That is why such standardization is chosen to be the 
research target of this paper.  
 
As far as technical interoperability standards are concerned, a great part of 
them arises in the field of ICT, primarily but not exclusively including the 
Internet, telecommunications, computer hardware and software, 
semiconductors. It did not happen by accident. The aforementioned industries 
emerged and continued to develop at a striking speed in the high-tech era. 
The highly competitive market provides consumers with adequate choices 
and at the same time urges the compatibility of interfaces of products made 
by different technologies.15 Moreover, since new technologies change very 
quickly, technical interoperability standardization prospers and will continue to 
evolve intensely in the field of ICT.  
 
In the process of standardization, formal SSOs are playing significant roles in 
initiating, developing, interpreting, maintaining and revising standards. 
Generally speaking, any given SSO can be classified by its extent of influence 
on the local, national, regional and international standardization arena. 16 
There are thirty-three international SSOs 17 which have established tens of 
thousands of international standards 18  covering almost every conceivable 
area. 19  Among all the international SSOs, ISO, the International 
Electrotechnical Commission (“IEC”) and the International Telecommunication 
Union (“ITU”)20 have the highest international recognition; correspondingly the 
                                                
15
    See supra texts accompanying notes 9-11. 
16
    See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Standards_organization. 
17
    ISO and IEEE mentioned before are both international SSOs. For the full list of the 33 
international SSOs, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Standards_organization. 
18
   An international standard means a standard that is adopted by an international 
standardizing/standards organization and made available to the public. See ISO/IEC 
Guide 2:2004 [2], definition 3.2.1.1. 
19
    See supra note 16. 
20
    ISO, IEC and ITU have all existed for more than 50 years. They were respectively 
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standards developed by them enjoy the most prevalent adoptions worldwide. 
There are also some regional SSOs set up to promote and coordinate 
necessary regional standardizations, such as European Telecommunications 
Standards Institute (“ETSI”), ASEAN21 Consultative Committee for Standards 
and Quality (“ACCSQ”). Furthermore, each country has its national standards 
organization, which takes charge of developing national applicable standards 
as well as supervising its subsidiary or local standards bodies’ standardization 
process. Examples are like Standardization Administration of China (“SAC”), 
Japan Industrial Standards Committee (“JISC”) and American National 
Standards Institute (“ANSI”).  
 
These different levels of SSOs, established on different basis, composed of 
different members 22 , operated under different policies, yielding standards 
used in different areas and industries, all provide appropriate platforms 
facilitating voluntary and consensus standardization. The more sophisticated 
the SSO had evolved, the more reliable its standards turned out to be, thus 
the higher recognition the standards would receive from a wider range of 
adopters. Sometimes a standard is formulated by several technology 
companies without a formal SSO. These companies contribute their 
technologies and collectively figure out the technical specifications of the 
proposed standard and then try to promote the final standard to a larger 
application scope beyond themselves. They conduct standardization without 
officially setting up or joining an SSO.23 Standards set up through such kind of 
private standardization are not different from those set up by formal SSOs in 
                                                                                                                             
established in 1947, 1906 and 1865.  
21
   ASEAN, the abbreviation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, is a geo-political 
and economic organization of 10 countries located in Southeast Asia. For more information, 
see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ASEAN. 
22
   Some are merely composed of national standardization organizations, such as ISO. Some 
are composed of both organizations and individual technical experts, such as IEEE.   
23
    Examples are like ’3C’ and ‘6C’ which will be discussed later on page 25. 
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nature. Basic rules and principles are similarly applicable to all private 
standardization, whether conducted through SSOs or not.  
 
I.3  Benefits and Disadvantages of Standardization 
I.3.1  Benefits of Standardization 
 
Technical interoperability standardization emerges catering to the necessary 
needs of this high-tech era, meanwhile, benefits not only the rapid 
development of technology but also consumers welfare and the whole 
economy. From the perspective of technology development, standardization 
greatly reduces research and development (“R&D”) costs and facilitates the 
introduction of new technologies. During the process of proposing and 
selecting specific technologies to be included in a standard, those with 
superior performances tend to be chosen as the technical solutions in the 
final standard specification because standard setters are to the maximum 
extent informed of all available choices. Without the platform of 
standardization which gathers most of the relevant technologies in a certain 
industry, the best technical solution would never be reached in a more 
efficient and effective way. Furthermore, the wide adoption of a standard 
would bring more profits to a patent holder if his patent is included in the 
standard. Technology developers therefore are motivated to explore better 
technical solutions with their best efforts, which is a strong impetus for 
technology competition and innovation.  
 
Actually, consumers are the ultimate beneficiary in the process of 
standardization, especially interoperability standardization. First, consumers 
can enjoy a product’s better technical performance derived from the ‘best’ 
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technical solution of standardization. Second, consumers are provided with 
plenty of alternatives to choose from without worrying the compatibility among 
products of different brands, since the interfaces have been standardized to 
enable interoperability among different products. Especially in a network 
market, where the “value of a product to a particular consumer is a function of 
how many other consumers use the same (or a compatible) product” 24 , 
standardization allowing product compatibility among all users certainly 
carries substantial consumer benefits. The paradigmatic example is the 
telephone network, in which the value of the product is entirely driven by the 
number of other people on the same network.25 Besides compatibility among 
products adopting the same standard, standardization also guarantees 
availability and interchangeability with complementary or replaceable 
products. Standardization is an inevitable outcome of technology 
development. It serves as a positive stimulus for innovation and competition, 
which will ultimately enhance social welfare. In a report released by German 
Institute for Standardization in 2000, standards are claimed to have 
contributed more to economic growth than patents and licenses.26  Thanks to 
standards permeable in every aspect of the society, our life is becoming more 
and more convenient, comfortable and compatible.  
I.3.2  Disadvantages of Standardization 
In spite of all the appealing advantages of standardization, it can still be 
challenged in the following aspects: First, absent of network effects, 
                                                
24
    See Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 
California Law Review, December 2002, at 1896. 
25
    See Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark D. Janis, Mark A. Lemley, IP and antitrust: an analysis of 
antitrust principles applied to intellectual property law, Aspen Law & Business, 2002, at 
chapter 35-3. 
26
    See The Economic Benefits of Standardization, a report of a research project conducted in 
1997 by the German Institute for Standardization along with the German Federal Minister 




economists generally presume that consumers fare best when many 
companies compete to offer different sorts of products. 27  Standardization 
which uniforms competing technologies into one standard may be undesirable 
to some extent. It will unnecessarily restrict product diversity, especially in 
industries where standardization brings no significant benefit.  
 
Second, the organizational form of SSOs and the whole process of setting a 
standard have always been sensitive topics in the context of antitrust law. 
From a traditional view of antitrust law, the very existence of standardization 
might well be thought cause for concern. Most SSOs, after all, are composed 
of entities in the same or related industry, which sit together to exchange 
information, discuss technical cooperation and in many cases collaborate in 
deciding what kind of products to make and even how to distribute profits in 
future. The father of economics, Adam Smith has a famous view that “people 
of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment or diversion, but 
the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public or in some 
contrivance to raise prices.”28 The mere fact that competitors act collectively 
in standard-setting may be easily scrutinized under antitrust law. Moreover, 
antitrust law has historically been hostile to horizontal agreements in restraint 
of trade, which are per se illegal.29 In both the US and the EU, there are 
precedents in which SSOs were condemned to be per se illegal as they 
restrained trade.30 The Supreme Court of the US in one of its consideration of 
                                                
27
    See supra note 25, at chapter 35-4.  
28
    See Adam Smith, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Oxford 
University Press, 1976, at 128. 
29
    The condemnation of per se illegal requires no further inquiry into the practice's actual 
effect on the market or the intentions of those individuals who engaged in the practice. 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act of US characterizes certain business practices as a per se 
violation. It states that “every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or 
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign 
nations, is declared to be illegal.” 
30
    For example, in Radiant Burners v. People’s Gas Co., 364 U.S. 656, 659-660 (1961), the 
Court held an American Gas Association rule refusing to sell gas for use in non-approved 
burners as triggering the per se rule.  
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SSOs and antitrust set a discouraging precedent, which concluded that 
“because of its reputation and influence in the industry an SSO could have a 
significant effect on competition and can be rife with opportunities for 
anticompetitive activity.” 31 Even where an SSO itself is legitimate, such an 
organization does provide a platform for competitors exchanging detailed 
plans for future products in highly innovative industries (where product design 
is a significant determinant of competition), therefore, making collusion 
among competitors easier than it otherwise would be. Besides, an SSO acting 
like a cartel makes it possible for competitors to monitor the price and output 
decisions of rivals who also are members of the same organization.32 
 
Third, standardization may be manipulated in favor of some powerful entities 
pursuing market controls and unreasonable profits. If a small part of the SSO 
members collectively have a significant market share, a standard including 
their technologies which are essential could be easily manipulated or 
leveraged as a tool to gain market control. The wide adoption of a standard 
facilitates their attempts to control the relevant market, which is much more 
difficult if they act individually. Standardization provides existing dominant 
firms with more accessible market power for them to strategically use thereby 
disadvantaging other competitors or maintaining monopoly by raising costs 
and barriers to entry. The behaviors of deterring new entrants to offer 
alternative, sometimes superior technologies, would definitely depress the 
passion for technological participants to innovate.  
 
                                                
31
    See American Society of Mechanical Engineers v. Hydrolevel, 456 U.S. 556, 571 (1982). 
32
  See C-O-Two Fire Equip. Corp. v. United States, 197 F.2d 489 (9th 
Cir.1952), ”standardization of a product that is not naturally standardized facilitates the 
maintenance of price uniformity”, 13 Antitrust Law 2136b (1999); See also supra note 25, 
at Chapter 35-8. 
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In short, standardization has served the society well by its efficiency, better 
performance and other evident benefits. However, once wrongly manipulated, 
standardization could also do harms to competition and social welfare. It is a 
two-edged decision which has to be reached after fully balancing its 
advantages and disadvantages. 
 
I.4  The Relationship Between ICT Standards and 
Patents 
 
A crucial factor for a standard to realize interoperability among different 
products is its widespread adoption. Due to this consideration, 
standardization in the primary stage only included prior arts and universal 
technologies which were exploited for free. Excluding proprietary technologies 
in a standard guarantees the free access of applying the standard, which 
encourages its wide adoption to the maximum extent.  
 
With the rapid development of technology as well as the increasing 
awareness of protecting intellectual accomplishments, however, it is almost 
impossible for newly developed ICT standards to achieve their interoperable 
functions and at the same time avoid the interaction with proprietary 
technologies. Take the US as an example, there are over 1.3 million patents 
in force and a significant part of these patents are in the ICT sector. 33 The 
great amount of ICT patents is because of the nature of these technologies 
and the ways they interact. 34  Products in the ICT field often combine a 
number of components, sometimes tiny components. Each of these 
                                                
33
    See Mark A. Lemley, Ten Things To Do About Patent Holdup of Standards (And One Not 
To), 48 Boston College Law Review, 2007, at 150-151. 
34
    Id. 
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components is produced by a series of patentable technologies due to 
technical complication and precision. Take the computer industry for example, 
just Intel’s core microprocessor includes over 5,000 patents, not to mention 
other interfaces and protocols. Consequently, as the platform integrating the 
most advanced technologies in a certain industry, ICT standardization today 
would inevitably involve patented technologies. Without patented 
technologies, there won’t be interoperability standardization in this high-tech 
era. 
 
Patent law is enacted to promote innovation and competition. As the US 
constitution says, “to promote the progress of science and the useful arts by 
securing for limited times to inventors the exclusive right to their respective 
discoveries.” 35  A patent grants its owner a series of exclusive rights to 
prevent others from using it without the consent of the owner. A patent holder 
can recoup his investment and expect potential profits during the exploration 
of his patent. The legal monopoly awarded by patent law greatly encourages 
inventors and other technical researchers to compete to innovate, thus 
promoting the development of technology. 
 
Once a standard includes patented technologies in its specification, its 
widespread adoption might be compromised by the exercises of patent rights. 
Because in order to apply the final standard without infringing others’ patent 
rights, interested adopters have to seek consents from all patent holders 
whose patents are included in the standard. The patent holders in 
standardization therefore are put in an advantageous position, or what is 
worse, they are granted with the opportunity to exaggeratedly manipulate 
their exclusive rights to control the final standard covered by their patents.   
                                                
35
    See Article 1 Section 8 of the US constitution. 
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Firstly, patent holders may leverage their legally granted rights to recoup 
illegal benefits. Being fully aware of the significance of their patents to a 
certain standard, patent holders may try to deny any licenses to use unless 
their special terms are satisfied. Considering the essentiality of some patents, 
standard-setters have to compromise in favor of certain patentees. This offers 
higher profits to some patent owners than they would normally attain and will 
end up imposing unreasonable burdens on licensees and other standard 
adopters.   
 
Secondly, patent holders may manipulate their patent rights to gain market 
power and monopolize certain markets, which is prohibited by antitrust law. 
Although patent rights have no longer been presumed to necessarily confer 
market power upon their owners 36, they might do so under the circumstances 
of standardization. Once a patented technology is finally included in a 
standard, it would be applied as an inseparable part of the standard. That 
means the patent cannot be easily replaced as long as the standard is still in 
function. The more widely the standard is adopted, the stronger the market 
power of a patent included in the standard might be. The standard as a whole 
integrated specification shepherds the exercise of one single patent’s market 
power, which would be weakened by other close substitutes when it is 
exercised alone.  
 
Thirdly, in standardization, there are more than one patent which belongs to 
several patent owners. These patent owners sometimes are competitors, 
either horizontal or vertical. The platform of standardization thus provides a 
                                                
36
   See supra note 25, at chapter 4-3. See also US DOJ and FTC, Antitrust Guidelines for the 
licensing of Intellectual property, 1995. 
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great opportunity for these competitors to form a cartel. They could collude to 
deny new entries or raise rivals’ costs. Especially when licensing rights are 
concerned, these patentees could act collectively to exclude disfavored 
technologies and to avoid supposed competition among them.  
 
A technical interoperable standard is characterized as its proposed wide 
application, its collection of many patented technologies with no alternative 
non-proprietary technologies and its unparalleled technical advantages. Such 
characteristics tend to grant patentees whose patents cover the standard with 
stronger exclusive rights, as compared to when patents are individually 
exercised. In other words, when a patent covers a technical standard, a 
patentee’s refusal of license to use his patent actually denies the access of 
the whole standard, including the use of many other patents, which the 
patentee gets no chance to influence without the platform standardization. 
That is, the exclusive rights of a patent, when manipulated in the process of 
standardization, could incur much more serious consequences than 
manipulated alone.  
 
Admittedly, if it is technically feasible, standardization should include as few 
as possible proprietary technologies to ensure its universal adoption and 
avoid unnecessary disputes. Since we cannot completely avoid the 
involvement of patented technologies in standardization, it is necessary to 
explore applicable ways to prevent the exercise of patent rights from being 
manipulated in the process of standardization. The essential point is to 
properly limit the exclusive rights exercised by patent holders. Although it may 
seem to be a restriction of legal rights granted by patent law, it is the 
necessary sacrifice each patent holder has to make the moment he decides 
21 
to participate in the process and at the same time enjoy the benefits of 
standardization. 
 
I.5  The Current Standardization in China and the 
Challenges It Is Facing 
I.5.1  Current Standardization Environment in China 
 
There is a popular saying in the business world: “third-class enterprises sell 
labor; second-class enterprises sell products; first-class enterprises sell 
technologies; supra-first-class enterprises sell standards.” 37  Whoever 
possessing the power of controlling a standard in a certain industry wins in 
the technological competition and correspondingly obtains considerable 
profits. Moreover, the compatibility requirements between different 
generations of technologies undoubtedly enable owners of a standard to 
compete preponderantly in the follow-up development of new technologies, 
which is a virtuous cycle. Nowadays, standardization is not merely a tool for 
enterprises to pursue economic profits and technological competitiveness. Its 
significance has been promoted to the altitude of a national strategy. Some 
developed and developing countries have formulated their ambitious 
standardization strategies in the 21st century, for the purpose of grasping the 
preemptive opportunities in the battle of technical competition.  
 
China realized the immediacy of competitive standardization especially after 
becoming a member of World Trade Organization (“WTO”) in 2001. Economic 
globalization promoted frequent trade between different countries. 
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   See Zhang Ping, Ma Yao, Standardization and Intellectual Property Strategy, Intellectual 
Property Press, 2002, at 1. 
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Abandonment of tariff barriers to trade as well as other WTO rules 
encouraging free trade attracted multinational enterprises pouring into China. 
Everyone tries to enjoy a piece of the cake in China’s giant market. Under the 
current circumstances, technologies and standards are often leveraged as 
non-tariff barriers to trade. As a technology-importing country, China is in a 
disadvantaged position compared to other technologically developed 
countries. There have been series of discussions regarding how to increase 
technological competitiveness and further China’s emerging economy. On 20 
July 2004, a nongovernmental ‘High-Tech Standards Strategy Symposium’ 
was held in Beijing. Through the coordinated efforts of a diverse group of ICT 
experts, economists, company representatives and academic researchers, 
the first report as regards Chinese technical standardization strategy named 
as “New Globalization: A Report of China’s High-Tech Standards” was 
published. The 75-page report analyzes the challenges faced by China’s 
high-tech industry and points out China’s lack of standardization awareness 
and related policies. It also emphasizes the significance of a national 
standardization strategy for developing countries like China. Although there 
are no binding effects of the suggestions proposed in the report, it surely 
provided valuable guidance for China’s future official standardization strategy. 
In April 2006, ‘National Standardization Development Guidelines’ (hereinafter 
called “the Guidelines”) mainly drafted by China National Institute of 
Standardization was approved by the State Council. One of the most 
important guiding principles is to actively participate in international 
standardization processes, meanwhile developing independently self-
proprietary technical standards. A transformation from ‘nationalize 
international standards’ to ‘internationalize national standards’ was proposed, 
so as to improve China’s international competitiveness and therefore increase 
the international market share of Chinese products. Specifically, the 
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Guidelines set up a goal to upgrade the overall technological level of China’s 
standardization in certain key areas to the internationally advanced level in 
the following 10 to 15 years. 38 During this goal-pursuing process, the Report 
said that China not only needs to increase her competence in technical R&D 
but also needs to formulate reasonable and specific rules and policies guiding 
standardization, covering the spectrum from formulation to implementation. 
One of the foremost key issues is how to appropriately deal with proprietary 
patented technologies in technical interoperability standardization.  
 
I.5.2  Challenges Chinese Standardization Is Facing 
 
China has not much relevant experience in dealing with technology 
standardization and the patent-related issues discussed in this paper. 
Chinese legislations that might be applicable in standardization are either 
blank or too outdated. 39 In fact, China was not paying enough attention until 
she paid a very expensive lesson in the DVD industry.  
 
China is the world's biggest DVD production and export base.40 Due to the 
cheap workforce and massive assembly lines, Chinese DVD players are 
competitive in price and are popularly sold all over the world. In 2003, DVD 
players manufactured by Chinese enterprises accounted for 70 percent of the 
world's total production volume of about 100 million sets.41 The dominant 
sales of Chinese DVD players soon attracted great attention from overseas 
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    See news release, Re Proposals of Amending the Standardization Law of China, 12 March 
2009, at: http://www.caijing.com.cn/2009-03-12/110119695.html. 
39
   Chapter III will focus on discussing existing Chinese laws and proper new rules that may 
be introduced in future, to regulate standardization where patent-related issues often arise.  
40
    See news release of People’s Daily Online: Patent fees drag down DVD player exports, at:   
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200408/03/eng20040803_151685.html. 
41
    Id. 
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enterprises of the relevant industry. Since tariff barriers to trade had been 
abolished, they had to resort to other non-tariff barriers—technical barriers—
in order to change China’s dominance in international DVD players market.  
 
There are mainly two joint ventures holding the core technologies of 
manufacturing DVDs and DVD players. One is called ‘6C’ consisted of 
Hitachi, Panasonic, JVC, Mitsubishi, Toshiba, Time Warner, the other is ‘3C’ 
consisted of Philips, Sony, Pioneer. The companies in the two joint ventures 
are also DVDs and DVD player producers. Chinese manufacturers have to 
apply standards developed by 6C or 3C in order to produce DVD players, 
either sold in domestic market or overseas. It is worth mentioning that 
Chinese DVD industry was aware of the patents in DVD standards owned by 
foreign companies before they adopted the technologies to produce DVD 
players in large-scale. Few people had bothered to inquire exactly how much 
they should pay for using others’ proprietary technologies. Interestingly, the 
foreign patent holders (6C and 3C) in the meantime were also aware that 
their patents had been used by Chinese producers without paying royalties. 
They chose not to take any actions against the infringements. Several years 
later, it was not until the Chinese DVD manufacturing industry had developed 
sophisticated enough and DVD players made in China began to gain a large 
international market share that 6C and 3C jumped in front of the stage 
starting to allege their patent rights. A smart strategy. 
 
In 2002, 6C and 3C began to charge Chinese DVD player manufacturers 
patent fees (about US$27.45 per unit, which is nearly 20 to 30 percent of the 
production cost) for using core technologies in DVD players made in China 
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and exported to overseas markets.42  It was a backlash for Chinese DVD 
industry. The number of DVD producers in China sharply decreased after 
patent royalties were charged. In the first five months, nearly 30 DVD player 
producers had gone bankrupt in Shenzhen's Baoan District where many DVD 
player producers are gathered, according to an interview with a spokesman 
from Shinco, China’s largest DVD player producer. 43  The high patent 
royalties charged by foreign patent holders had made it profitless for Chinese 
producers if they continued to sell their DVD players at the attractive prices 
like old times.  
 
From 2002 to 2006, there were a series of negotiations and lawsuits 
regarding DVD patent fees. Chinese DVD producers and academic research 
scholars started to seek for legal counterattacks trying to lower down the high 
royalties. Some argued that the patent fees charged by foreign patent holders 
were unreasonably high therefore should be reevaluated. 44  Some argued 
that the foreign patent holders bundled both core technologies for 
manufacturing DVD players and many irrelevant technologies in their DVD 
standards, the latter of which should not be charged for royalties. 45 Some 
further argued that it was anticompetitive for the foreign patent holders to pool 
their patents (including relevant and irrelevant technologies) and license them 
together, which had deprived the rights of Chinese licensees to choose only 
essential technologies to produce DVD players. 46   
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    See supra note 40.  
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   Id. 
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   See news release of People’s Daily Online, DVD Patent Problem to be Solved in One Year, 
9 October 2001, at: http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200110/09/eng20011009_81840.html. 
See also news release of China Daily Online, Chinese Firms File Lawsuit on DVD Patent, 
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Whether the above arguments are right or wrong, or should be supported or 
not, will be discussed in the subsequent texts of this paper. If there is one 
good outcome the DVD patent fees incident had brought, that is, it aroused 
the awareness of China to start to pay attention to technology standardization 
in which patents are extensively involved.  China still gets much homework to 
do in order to avoid things like the DVD patent fees to happen again in the 
future. Learning from readily available experience might be the first move to 
fill the blanks in Chinese standardization. The following chapters will 
consequently explore feasible experience accumulated through decades of 
international standardization practices, especially in the US, hoping to provide 
useful guidance for China.   
 
 
Chapter II    The Patent-related Issues in 
Interoperability Standardization and the Private-
sector Regulations in the Form of SSO IP Policies 
– Lessons Mainly from the US and International 
SSOs 
 
Interoperability ICT standardization studied in this paper will inevitably involve 
patented technologies. 47 For those patents being parts of a final standard, 
each one of them has its unique technological merit and contribution; 
meanwhile, all of them have to be combined and applied collectively in order 
to realize the ultimate function of a standard as a whole. The patent-related 
                                                
47
    As previously discussed in this paper in Chapter I.4 on page 17.  
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issues discussed here, therefore, generally emerge in the whole process of 
standardization in two different respects: the individual exercise of one single 
patent and the interaction of more than two patents. In other words, the 
patent-related issues in standardization can be categorized either as a 
monopoly or a collusive exploitation of patent rights, both of which are 
anticompetitive.  
 
The aim of Chapter II is to identify the major patent-related issues that may 
arise in standardization. Generally speaking, they can all be characterized 
either as compromising the wide adoption of the proposed standards or 
restricting free and fair competition, or both. Chapter II is more importantly 
dedicated to explore appropriate rules and regulations in private sectors, for 
the purpose of preventing or solving the identified patent-related issues. Since 
SSOs organize the procedures of standard-setting, they are in a convenient 
position to make requirements to relevant patent holders regarding the 
exercises of their exclusive patent rights.  Such requirements often appear as 
SSOs’ internal IP policies, aiming at ensuring the efficiency and effectiveness 
of standardization and avoiding unnecessary troubles brought by patents. For 
small-scaled standardization conducted without a formal SSO, some of the 
underlying principles derived from the requirements also apply, even when 
there are no IP policies. 48  It is highlighted that the cases and examples 
referred to in this Chapter are mostly from the US and the SSOs IP policies 
examined and analyzed are all existing policies of well-established 
international SSOs. The reason  lies in the fact that the US and those 
selected international SSOs are relatively experienced in dealing with 
standardization and patent-related issues involved. China would find their 
experience useful too. 
                                                
48
    See detailed discussions in the following sections of Chapter II.  
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II.1  The Horizontal Relationship of Patents Included in 
A Standard 
II.1.1  The Concept of ‘Essential Patents’ 
 
In the initial stage of standard-setting, there will be an important process 
formulating the technical framework of the targeted standard. A group of 
technical experts gather to discuss the technical proposals, sometimes for 
years, with regard to which technologies should be included in the final 
standard. Both formal SSOs and small-scale joint ventures have their special 
technical committees or experts in charge of examining the eligibility of the 
proposed technologies. In the sense that private cooperative standard-setting 
often involves horizontal competitors agreeing on certain specifications of the 
products they plan to market, core antitrust concerns could be aroused 
regarding the boundary between cooperation and collusion.49  Restrictively 
choosing patents that are ‘essential’ to a standard is one good way to 
guarantee that standard-setting falls into procompetitive cooperation instead 
of anticompetitive collusion.  
 
‘Essential patents’ in many existing SSOs IP policies are defined as “patents 
that would be necessarily infringed by using or implementing the normative 
portions of the standard”.50 As to ‘necessarily infringed’, it means it is not 
                                                
49
    See Joseph Farrell, John Hayes, Carl Shapiro and Theresa Sullivan, Standard Setting, 
Patents, and Hold-up, 74 Antitrust Law Journal, No. 3, 2007, at 603. 
50
    This definition is included in many SSOs patent policies. For example, see W3C’s patent 
policy, at: http://www.w3.org/Consortium/Patent-Policy-20040205/#def-essential. W3C, the 
World Wide Web Consortium, is the main international standards organization for the 
World Wide Web. It is arranged as a consortium where member organizations maintain 
full-time staff for the purpose of working together in the development of standards for the 
World Wide Web. For detailed information on W3C, see Wikipedia at: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/W3c#cite_note-List-0.   
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possible to avoid infringement because there is no non-infringing alternative51, 
whether commercially plausible or technically realistic. This definition was 
concluded from years of international technology standardization practice. In 
particular, the business review letters issued by the US Department of Justice 
(“DOJ”) 52  stating whether the standards requested for examinations were 
subject to antitrust scrutiny, provided valuable guidance for the definition of 
‘essential patents’ in standardization.  
 
In 1997, Trustees of Columbia University, Fujitsu Limited, General Instrument 
Corp., Lucent Technologies Inc., Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd., 
Mitsubishi Electric Corp., Philips Electronics N.V., Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 
Sony Corp., Cable Television Laboratories, Inc., MPEG LA, L.L.C. and their 
affiliates (hereinafter called the “Requester”) collectively requested a 
statement of the DOJ’s antitrust enforcement intentions with respect to a 
proposed MPEG-2 compression technology standard. 53  In the MPEG-2 
                                                                                                                             
       See also Patent Group, American National Standards Institute, Intellectual Property Rights 
Policies in Standards Development Organizations and the Impact on Trade Issues with the 
People’s Republic of China, 10 June 2004, at: http://www.law-
gun.com/Article_Show.asp?ArticleID=3450. 
51
    See W3C’s patent policy. There are similar interpretations in many private joint ventures’ or 
individual enterprises’ patent licenses, such as MPEG-2, DVD 6C, Sun Microsystems Inc.  
52
   The United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) is a Cabinet department in the US 
government to enforce the law and defend the interests of the US according to the law and 
to ensure fair and impartial administration of justice for all Americans. It is administered by 
the US Attorney General. See 28 U.S.C. § 501 and 503. 
       The Antitrust Division of DOJ is responsible for enforcing the antitrust laws of the US. It 
shares jurisdiction over civil antitrust cases with the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) 
and often works jointly with the FTC to provide regulatory guidance to businesses. For 
detailed information on the Antitrust Division of DOJ, see: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Department_of_Justice_Antitrust_Division. 
Companies or other organizations in the US may submit a proposed action and receive a 
statement (the business review letter) as to whether the DOJ currently intends to challenge 
the action under the US antitrust laws.  
53
   MPEG-2 standard could be applied in many different products and services in which video 
information is stored and/or transmitted, including cable, satellite and broadcast television, 
digital video disks, and telecommunications. MPEG-2 video compression allows 
considerable savings in the amount of data, and thus storage and transmission space, 
required to reproduce video sequences, by eliminating redundant information both within a 
particular image, as where a background is of all the same color, and between images, as 
where particular figures remain unmoved from one moment to the next. See details at: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MPEG-2.  
       See also http://www.chiariglione.org/mpeg/standards/mpeg-2/mpeg-2.htm. 
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Patent Portfolio License 54 submitted by the Requester, an essential patent 
was defined as “any patent claiming an apparatus and/or a method necessary 
for compliance with the MPEG-2 standard under the laws of the country which 
issued or published the patent.”55 According to the Requester, patents in the 
MPEG-2 standard were determined by an independent expert to be essential 
to comply with the standard; and there was no technical alternative to any of 
the patents within the standard. 56 DOJ thus concluded that “the limitation of 
technically essential patents, as opposed to merely advantageous ones, 
helped ensure that the proposed standard did not, by bundling in non-
essential patents, foreclose the competitive implementation options.” 57 DOJ 
finally recognized the procompetitive nature of the proposed MPEG-2 
standard and was not inclined to initiate antitrust enforcement action against 
it.  
 
In 1998, a similar business review letter issued in response to the request of 
Philips, Sony and Pioneer (the aforementioned “3C”) on their proposed DVD 
patent pools58 clarified ‘essential patents’ further. This time DOJ explored the 
should-be relationship of different patents included in a single standard more 
specifically. In 3C’s proposal, ‘essential’ is defined as “necessary (as a 
                                                
54
    A patent portfolio is a collection of patents owned by a single entity. A patent portfolio 
license is to license all the patents in the portfolio as a whole. See 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patent_portfolio, for more information. 
55
    See the US Department of Justice’s Business Review letters in response to Trustees of 
Columbia University, Fujitsu Limited, General Instrument Corp., Lucent Technologies Inc., 
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd., Mitsubishi Electric Corp., Philips Electronics N.V., 
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., Sony Corp., Cable Television Laboratories, Inc. and MPEG LA, 
L.L.C., 26 June 1997 at: http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/215742.htm. 
56
    Id. 
57
    See the US Department of Justice’s Business Review letters of MPEG-2 standards (supra 
note 55). 
58
    A patent pool is created by at least two companies agreeing to cross-license their patents 
within the pool and to issue license for the pool as a whole to potential third-parties. A 
patent pool can save both the licensor and the licensee time and money as regards patent 
licensing, however, it may create a risk of facilitating collusion among pool members or of 
excluding non-members. For further information on patent pools, see 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patent_pool. See also: William F. Dolan and Geoffrey D. Oliver, 
United States: Department Of Justice Issues First Patent-Pool Business Review Letter 
Since Issuing 2007 Antitrust & IP Report, 30 October 2008, at: 
http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=68770. 
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practical matter) for compliance with the DVD (-Video or DVD-ROM) Standard 
Specifications”.59 DOJ interpreted this definition to encompass patents that 
are technically essential—i.e., inevitably infringed by compliance with the 
specifications—and those for which existing alternatives are economically 
unfeasible. 60  Moreover, DOJ particularly indicated in its analysis that 
standards should only integrate ‘complementary’ essential patents. In the 
MPEG-2 review letter, DOJ roughly mentioned that a standard that 
aggregates competitive technologies and set a single price for them would 
raise serious competitive concerns. 61  In the ‘3C’ DVD review letter, DOJ 
further introduced another concept—‘substitute patents’—as opposed to 
‘complementary patents’. If the patents are substitutes for each other, the final 
standard including both those patents may negatively act as a price-fixing 
mechanism. Since substitute patents holders are often competitors, the 
platform integrating their patents into one standard could help them avoid the 
fierce competition they are supposed to face. The implementation or license 
of a standard as a whole would also assist them to monitor their competitors’ 
activities such as price decisions. These are strictly intolerable behaviors in 
view of antitrust laws. Therefore, DOJ pointed out in its analysis that the 
inclusion of ‘substitute patents’ would unreasonably foreclose the competing 
patents from being used and would ultimately raise the price of products and 
services utilizing the standard. 62  Correspondingly, DOJ defined ‘essential 
patents’ more strictly with the additional requirement that they have no 
substitutes; in other words, they have to be complementary to each other. 
Including only ‘essential patents’ as defined above in a standard would 
                                                
59
   See the US Department of Justice’s Business Review letters in response to Koninklijke 
Philips   Electronics, N.V., Sony Corporation of Japan and Pioneer Electronic Corporation 
of Japan, 16 December 1998, at: http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/2121.htm. 
60
    Id. 
61
    See supra note 55. 
62
    See the US Department of Justice’s Business Review letters of DVD Patent Pools (supra 
note 59). 
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ensure neither of the anticompetitive concerns aforementioned will arise; 
rivalry is foreclosed neither among patents within the standard nor between 
patents in the standard and patents outside it.63 Besides, a combination of 
complementary patents that are jointly licensed can be an efficient and 
procompetitive method of disseminating those technologies to would-be 
users. 64  DOJ also expressed its concerns about the 3C’s definition of 
‘essential’ as ‘necessary (as a practical matter)’. Unlike the MPEG-2 
standard, which required actual technical essentiality for eligibility, 3C’s 
definition was inherently more susceptible to subjective interpretation, which 
could lead to the inclusion of substitute patents and injure competition.65 
Although DOJ finally did not condemn 3C’s proposed standard to be 
anticompetitive, it was obvious that a clearer and more objective definition of 
‘essential patents’ was necessary to avoid antitrust scrutiny. 
 
In 1999, DOJ issued another business review letter in response to the request 
of Hitachi, Matsushita, Mitsubishi, Time Warner, Toshiba and JVC regarding 
their DVD-ROM and DVD-Video formats standard. 66 The requester defined 
‘essential’ in their standard as ‘no realistic alternative’, which could be further 
interpreted as ‘no economically feasible alternative’. DOJ believed that this 
definition would preclude substitute patents from being included and the 
proposed standard would not be challenged by antitrust laws.67  
 
Based on DOJ’s analysis in those business review letters, an ‘essential 
patent’ in a standard should be defined as the patent that would be inevitably 
                                                
63
    See the US Department of Justice’s Business Review letters in response to Hitachi, Ltd., 
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd., Mitsubishi Electric Corporation, Time Warner Inc., 
Toshiba Corporation, and Victor Company of Japan, Ltd., 10 June 1999, at: 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/2485.htm. 
64
    See supra note 55. 
65
    See supra note 59. 
66
    See supra note 63. 
67
    Id. 
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infringed implementing the standard and there is no substitute alternative of it. 
‘Substitute alternative’ here could be interpreted either as ‘technically feasible’ 
or ‘economically feasible’. I personally consider the latter is more advisable. 
Since a standard is set to a large extent for the considerable economic profits 
it will generate, it will greatly compromise the benefits of a standard if we 
waste unrealistic economic resources using substitute alternatives despite 
they are technically feasible.  
 
II.1.2  The Legal Implications behind ‘Essential Patents’ – A 
Normative Analysis 
 
The concept of ‘essential patents’, simply speaking, derives from the antitrust 
concern of the collusion of competitors. Antitrust laws have always been very 
sensitive to the agreements or activities between competitors. In 1890, the 
first antitrust law of America—the Sherman Act—provided that “every 
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in 
restraint of trade or commerce…is declared to be illegal.” 68 Many competition 
laws of other jurisdictions modeled on the US laws also impose strict 
prohibitions on collusive or concerted behaviors between competitors. The 
EU competition law prohibits all agreements between undertakings, decisions 
by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect 
trade and competition. 69  Japanese Antimonopoly Act prohibits business 
activities by which entrepreneurs by contract, agreement, or any other 
concerted activities substantially restraining competition.70 The newly enacted 
Chinese Antimonopoly Law also prohibits monopolistic agreements and 
                                                
68
    See U.S. Sherman Act, section 1, Trusts, etc., in restraint of trade illegal; penalty. 
69
    See Article 81 of the EC Treaty. 
70
    See Article 2, 3 of the Antimonopoly Act of Japan. 
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concerted behaviors among undertakings that may eliminate or restrict 
competition. 71 These prohibitions stipulated by laws of different jurisdictions 
are more or less the same in nature. They apply not only to formal cartels but 
also to any agreement between competitors to fix price, limit output, divide 
market or exclude competition, all of which are misconducts most enterprises 
intend to do by colluding with other competitors. It is stressed that the 
analysis here as regards the legal implications behind ‘essential patents’ in 
standardization applies to most countries regardless of their different legal 
systems. Simply because the principles of standardization and the relevant 
laws do not vary much among different jurisdictions in general. For countries 
like China having zero experience in conducting antitrust analysis on 
standardization and the ‘essential patents’ involved, they may find that the 
implications below (mostly US experience) are readily applicable to them too. 
 
As far as standardization is concerned, it is obviously a result of concerted 
agreements among competitors. The ordinary process of standard-setting 
necessarily involves competitors meeting together to discuss their technical 
proposals and their future licensing or managing plan. Antitrust laws 
historically had been very hostile to this form of information exchange among 
competitors. 72  As the technical and economic significance of R&D 
cooperation as well as IP licensing is gradually acknowledged, 
standardization is now generally considered to be procompetitive. Unless the 
standard is set merely for anticompetitive aims, such as naked price fixing, 
antitrust authorities usually compare both the anticompetitive and 
procompetitive aspects of a standard if there is a potential antitrust concern. 
Standardization would only be prohibited when its anticompetitive effects 
                                                
71
    See Article 3 and Article 13 of the Antimonopoly Law of China. For detailed discussions of 
Chinese  Antimonopoly Law, see Chapter III.3.1 from page 116 onwards. 
72
    See supra note 25, at Chapter 35-16. 
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overweigh the procompetitive ones, correspondingly restricting or impeding 
competition to a certain extent. Standardization, therefore, as long as 
appropriately conducted, will not trigger antitrust attention. And the 
appropriate way to conduct standardization is to restrict the patents involved 
only to essential ones. 73 
 
Compared to other obligations stipulated in respect of patent exploitations,74 
the requirement of ‘essential patent’ in standardization does not seem to take 
many spaces in some of the current international SSOs IP policies. Take 
W3C’s patent policy for example, the concept of ‘essential claim’ which 
equals to the abovementioned ‘essential patent’ is actually introduced for the 
purpose of clarifying the target of the patent disclosure and licensing rules, 
which form the main part of the whole patent policy of the SSO. 75 IEEE, 
another influential SSO, also merely defines what is an ‘essential patent 
claim’ in one of its standards board bylaws and explicitly claims that it takes 
no responsibility identifying essential patents.76 I believe there are mainly two 
reasons for such kind of arrangements, neither of which is because the 
requirement of ‘essential patents’ is less important than any other rules in an 
SSO IP policy. 
 
First, the identification of an ‘essential patent’ needs more than the mere 
efforts of technology experts. Sometimes the questions of including which 
patent in a standard and what is the reason for doing so are more inclined to 
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    The reason has been previously discussed in Chapter II.1.1 regarding the business review 
letters of DOJ of the US. 
74
    Other obligations will be subsequently discussed in the rest sections of Chapter II. 
75
    ‘Essential Claims’ are defined in W3C’s patent policy as “all claims in any patent or patent 
application in any jurisdiction in the world that would necessarily be infringed by 
implementation of the Recommendation”. See W3C Patent Policy, § 8.1, 5 February 2004, 
at: http://www.w3.org/Consortium/Patent-Policy-20040205/. 
76




be legal judgments than technical choices, especially when a huge patent 
portfolio is involved in the technical specifications of a standard. Second, as 
the organizer in formulating the final technical frame of a standard, an SSO is 
in no position of evaluating whether the ultimate standard is a consequence of 
anticompetitive collusion or procompetitive cooperation. It is the job of legal 
authorities to examine whether the technical specifications of a standard 
include non-essential patents which may affect competition.  
 
The definition of ‘essential patents’ in SSO IP policies, therefore, is a 
precautionary stipulation for an SSO to avoid antitrust scrutiny in the first 
place. The requirement of including only ‘essential patents’ in a standard 
precludes the per se condemnation of an SSO to be a platform of 
anticompetitive collusion. Besides, it will also guarantee that the final standard 
is procompetitive in the sense that it does not foreclose or eliminate 
competition. As for complicated identification of massive ‘essential patents’, 
an SSO may submit its standard-setting proposal to antitrust authorities 
asking their antitrust enforcement intentions and then decide how to re-
choose the final essential patents according to the antitrust authorities’ 
feedbacks, as the aforementioned business review request in the US. 77 
 
Unfortunately, not every country has a legal authority as sophisticated as the 
US DOJ, the Antitrust Division of which is capable of conducting thorough 
antitrust examinations. Standardization conducted without the supervision of 
antitrust laws, in particular, without the requirement of ‘essential patents’, may 
end up facilitating collusive behaviors between competitors. Below an 
example from China is discussed to illustrate anticompetitive standardization 
incurred by failure to require ‘essential patents’ when formulating a standard.  
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    See supra note 52 and the texts accompanying it. 
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II.1.3  China’s DTV Standardization and Its ‘Essential Patents’ 
Analysis 
 
On 18 August 2006, after years of rivalry and delays, China finally announced 
the nation’s technical standard for Digital Terrestrial Television (“DTT”). It was 
a great encouragement for Chinese DTV industry. Globally, the first DTV 
broadcasting for commercial purpose appeared in France in 1996 and then it 
rapidly spread all over the world. 78  The economic opportunities and the 
revolutionary new performance of DTV appealed both TV broadcasting 
business and consumer electronics industries. Realizing the huge market 
potential of DTV, in the late 1990s, several technologically developed 
countries began to formulate uniform DTV transmission standards and then 
tried to promote their national standards to other countries. The number of 
global DTV users had reached 220 million in 2006, and the average 
penetration rate of DTV came to 20%, among which Europe, US and Japan 
took high shares. 79  Countries without the ability of developing their own 
standards have to adopt others’ and pay considerable patent royalties. With 
the expanding development of DTV industry, regions or countries like EU, US 
and Japan will enjoy more economic benefits brought by their first move in 
technical standardization.  
 
China has the largest number of television users in the world. As far as the 
developing trend is concerned, digital television will certainly replace analog 
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    See China Digital TV Market Operation Report, 2006-2007, Research in China, at:    
http://www.hdcmr.com/article/english/03/8629.html. 
79
    Id. 
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television in the near future.80 The transformation of hundreds of millions of 
consumers would boost the Chinese TV industry to a remarkable extent. 
Meanwhile, markets of electronic chips, set-top boxes, pre-paid DTV services 
and other business in the inseparable chain of TV industry will be stimulated 
altogether. It has been estimated that by 2010, the value of the whole DTV 
industry of China will reach around 1500 billion Yuan (over US$ 200 billion).81 
Since 2001, Chinese standardization administration began to collect DTT 
standard proposals nationally. After five years of discussion, comparison, 
demonstration and contention, China finally owned its independently 
developed DTT standard with self-proprietary intellectual property. As far as 
digital terrestrial transmission is concerned82 , China will possess absolute 
control of her national market once the mandatory standard is implemented. 
Foreign enterprises in DTV industry have to apply the standard and pay 
patent licensing fees to Chinese patentees if they try to explore Chinese DTV 
market. If the standard later could be successfully promoted to other 
countries, the benefits would be inestimable. It is a thrilling news for Chinese 
people since for decades, China has lagged behind in technical development 
and has always been in the position of a licensee asking permission to use 
others’ technologies. While most of people are looking forward to the bright 
future of Chinese DTV industry, few of them have noticed that there are 
serious antitrust concerns in the DTT standard.  
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    See Michael Starks, Report of the Digital TV Project, UK Digital Television, at: 
http://www.digitaltelevision.gov.uk/pdf_documents/publications/digitaltv_project_report.pdf. 
81
    See the Introduction of China DTV Industry Analysis and Investment Consultation Report, 
2007-2008, China Investment Consultation, at: 
http://www.ocn.com.cn/reports/2006124shuzids.htm.  
82
    There are a number of different ways to receive digital television. Besides digital terrestrial 
transmission, there are also digital cable and digital satellite transmission. TV signals can 
also be received via the open internet infrastructure, which is usually referred to as Internet 
TV. Among these methods, digital terrestrial transmission is the most important aspect of 
DTV industry. China adopted Europe’s digital cable transmission standard, DVB-C, and 
digital satellite transmission standard, DVB-S, while developing its own DTT standard of 
DTV industry.  
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In the primary stage of Chinese DTT standardization, there were several sets 
of standard proposals submitted in response to Chinese government’s plan to 
roll out its own DTT standard. The proposals were submitted to the Standards 
Institute of the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television (“SARFT”), 
which was designated to take charge of Chinese DTT standardization. These 
DTT proposals were respectively Digital Multimedia Broadcasting-Terrestrial 
(“DMB-T”), designed by Tsinghua University; Advanced Digital Television 
Broadcast-Terrestrial (“ADTB-T”), designed by Shanghai Jiaotong University; 
Terrestrial Interactive Multiservice Infrastructure (“TiMi”), designed by the 
Academy of Broadcasting Science affiliated to SARFT and another one 
developed by Sichuan University of Electronic Science and Technology.83 
After a series of evaluation by authorized technical experts, Tsinghua 
University’s DMB-T and Shanghai Jiaotong University’s ADTB-T were 
selected as the final proposals of Chinese DTT standard. In 2003, the 
National Development and Reform Commission (“NDRC”) of China 84 
authorized Chinese Academy of Engineering to conduct a thorough technical 
evaluation of the two universities’ schemes. According to NDRC’s public 
release on the result of the evaluation and comparison, both of the schemes 
had their unique technical characteristics and could basically satisfy the 
requirements of digital television terrestrial transmission. 85 The dilemma of 
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    NDRC is one of the most important governmental agencies under the State Council of 
China. The major functions of NDRC in China is to “formulate and implement strategies of 
national economic and social development, annual plans, medium and long-term 
development plans; to coordinate economic and social development; to carry out research 
and analysis on domestic and international economic situation; to put forward targets and 
policies concerning the development of the national economy, the regulation of the overall 
price level and the optimization of major economic structures, and to make 
recommendations on the employment of various economic instruments and policies; to 
submit the plan for national economic and social development to the National People's 
Congress on behalf of the State Council of China.” For more information on NDRC, see: 
http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/. 
85
   See news release: Uncover the Inside Story of Chinese DTT Standard’s Dilemma, 9 
December 2004, at: http://news.chinabyte.com/347/1885847.shtml.  
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determining which scheme would finally succeed induced a fierce debate 
between the two universities, each of which tried to convince the DTV 
industry that its scheme was superior so that it should be chosen as the sole 
set of technologies of Chinese DTT standard. Here I have no intention to 
explore their proposals’ technical functions and merits any further. To sum up, 
they both have incomparably technical advantages their opponents do not 
have. Although their technologies are based on different principles, they can 
both fulfill the DTT mission individually. Moreover, they both totally own self-
proprietary IP rights (“IPRs”) of their proposals. 86  Since both Tsinghua 
University and Shanghai Jiaotong University have spent considerable time 
and money developing their schemes, neither of them would give up their 
insistence easily. Besides, there are many other interest groups involved in 
this proposal-selecting process in addition to the two universities. Take the 
downstream DTV product manufacturers for example, some of them have 
noticed the market needs of Chinese DTV and started their business years 
before the implementation of the formal national standard. They either applied 
the mature DTV standard of Europe or started up in a small scale applying 
Tsinghua’s or Jiaotong University’s technology in trial. It is important for them 
which proposal is finally adopted since it will determine whether they can 
continue their businesses without wasting previous investment or they have to 
abandon what they have grasped and start all over again applying a different 
set of technologies. Even government agencies were involved in the battle. 
The aforementioned Academy of Broadcasting Science affiliated to SARFT 
was resentful that its proposal was not considered and wanted to add a part 
of its scheme into the final standard. They all knew the huge profits they 
would receive once their proposals were selected, even just a portion. The 
persuasion and evaluation went on for months, still none of the proposal 
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providers had the technical and political muscle to enable their technologies 
to be solely selected.87 In the end, under the supervision of Chinese Academy 
of Engineering, three different proposals were combined together to form the 
final standard, in which Tsinghua’s technology took a large part, followed by 
Jiaotong University’s and only a tiny fraction of Academy of Broadcasting 
Science’s coding method. The combination was said to have adopted each 
technology’s strength and will improve the performance of the standard. It 
seemed to be the best way for standard setters then to solve the contention 
among different technology providers and interest groups without totally 
hurting anyone. Actually, through technical analysis, the final standard as a 
result of compromise is less a combination than a coexistence of different 
schemes. The vice dean of the Academy of Broadcasting Science, Feng Zou 
once pointed out in an interview in 2006 that there will be great difficulties 
combining Tsinghua’s multi-carrier modulation and Jiaotong University’s 
single-carrier modulation methods into one system. Even there is technically 
feasible way to combine the two inherently incompatible technologies, the 
cost will be remarkably high. 88 According to Mr. Zou, the alleged technical 
advantages of the combined standard are difficult to be realized in practice, 
moreover, it will increase by over 30% the cost to downstream producers to 
follow the mandatory combined standard manufacturing products. This 
outcome is so not the initial dream of DTV standardization.  
 
Chinese standardization administration encourages technical competition. 
That is why in the beginning of DTV standardization it called for competent 
entities all over the country to submit their technical proposals and planned to 
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    Id.  
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    See news release of enet.com.cn, at: 
http://www.enet.com.cn/article/2007/0601/A20070601630540.shtml.  
 See also http://digi.it.sohu.com/20070601/n250336745.shtml.  
42 
choose from the competing technologies the best one. It successfully 
collected qualified choices, however, failed to decide the final version among 
the candidates. Whether it is due to the consideration of balancing 
complicated relationships among different interest groups, or because 
Chinese government tried not to reduce the innovation enthusiasm of self-
proprietary IP developers by accepting their proposals, the combined 
standard could not be justified in the context of competition law.  
 
As the aforementioned ‘essential patents’ concept implies 89, standards that 
include substitute patents could pose antitrust risks. Competition is foreclosed 
between technologies within and outside the standard. The substitute patents 
holders could easily use the standard to collude fixing price or rejecting new 
entries. Ultimately consumers would pay higher prices and competition would 
be harmed in the related industry. From the Chinese DTV standardization 
process described above, it is obvious that the combined technologies in the 
final standard are not all ‘essential patents’. Although it is not precise to say 
that Tsinghua’s technology and Jiaotong University’s technology are 
substitutable for each other—they both have their respective strengths—the 
two technologies are surely not complementary.   
 
China’s DTV standard is a compulsory technological standard. It was 
formulated by several independent entities (e.g., universities, academies, 
institutions, technology companies) under the guidance of Chinese 
government affiliates in charge. There is no formal SSO conducting the 
standard-setting process. Not to mention a set of comprehensive IP policy 
guiding the standardization. The Chinese DTV standard actually belongs to 
                                                
89
    See Chapter II.1.2 from page 33 onwards. 
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government-set standards90, which is different from voluntary and consensus 
private standardization conducted by SSOs or formal standard-setting joint 
ventures. The reason why I discuss China’s DTV standard, even though it is 
not the research target of this paper, is because the great referential values it 
brought to private standardization conducted by SSOs. As far as China’s 
national standardization is concerned, if government-set standards even fail 
to comply with the requirement of ‘essential patents’ to ensure procompetitive 
standardization, how can private standardization in China be expected to 
have such kind of awareness?  The idea of ‘essential patents’ in 
standardization is not unfamiliar with Chinese standardization participants. 
After all, China (as a country member) and many of her affiliates have actively 
participated in international standardizations in recent years. When it comes 
to national practice in China, however, there seems to lack the environment to 
actually implement the ‘essential patents’ requirement in standardization. 
There is no special agency or legal department in China like the US DOJ, of 
which the Antitrust Division is capable of conducting comprehensive antitrust 
examination, to ensure a healthy market competition. For China, even the 
antitrust legislation is quite new, not to mention its legal application in 
standardization. Luckily there are sophisticated rules and experience from 
other countries for China to learn from and apply, taking into consideration of 
China’s local circumstances. 
 
II.2  The Monopolistic Patent Exploitations in 
Standardization and the Proper SSO IP Policies 
 
                                                
90
    See Chapter I.2 from page 10 for government-set standards. 
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Restricting proprietary technologies in a standard only to ‘essential’ ones is 
just a premise of procompetitive standardization. As long as patents are 
involved, extra measures should be taken to restrict the exercise of exclusive 
patent rights. During private standardization conducted on a voluntary and 
consensus basis, interested participants try to get their patents included in the 
final standard to the utmost extent, since they are all aware of the benefits 
brought by the wide adoption of the final standard to their patents. Once a 
patent covers a settled standard, the patent holder would soon change from a 
person who is eager to get his patent included in the standard to a powerful 
‘licensor’ who can decide who else can use his patent and claim his exclusive 
rights against any standard adopters. The reason is very simple: before a 
standard is adopted, there is often vigorous competition among different 
technologies for incorporation into that standard; after standardization, 
however, the dynamic typically shifts, as industry members begin adhering to 
the standard and the standardized features start to dominate. 91  As a 
Chairman of Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) 92 of the US has put it, “After 
the standard is chosen, industry participants likely will start designing, testing, 
and producing goods that conform to the standard – that is, after all, the 
whole idea of engaging in standard setting. Early in the standardization 
process, industry members might easily be able to abandon one technology 
in favor of another. But once the level of resources committed to the standard 
rises and the costs of switching to a new technology mount, industry 
members may find themselves locked into using the chosen technology.”93 
                                                
91
    See Rambus Incorporated v. Federal Trade Commission, US Court of Appeals for the 
district of Columbia circuit, 22 April 2008. 
92
    FTC is an independent agency of the US government, whose principal mission is the 
promotion of consumer protection and the elimination and prevention of what regulators 
perceive to be harmfully anti-competitive business practices. It shares enforcement of 
antitrust laws with DOJ (see supra note 52) in the US. For more information on FTC, see: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Trade_Commission.   
93
    See Deborah Platt Majoras, Chairman, FTC, Recognizing the Procompetitive Potential of 
Royalty Discussions in Standard Setting, Remarks at Conference on Standardization and 
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The patented technologies included in a standard therefore would enjoy 
certain market power or perhaps dominance over their rivals.  
 
The exercise of exclusive patent rights could lead to the ‘patent holdup’ 
problem, which is the possibility that patent holders wait for companies to 
make non-recoverable investments in a standard before demanding large 
royalties for use of their patents.94 As an economic term, ‘holdup’ arises when 
a gap between economic commitments and subsequent commercial 
negotiations enables one party to capture part of the fruits of another’s 
investments. 95  In particular, ‘holdup’ arises when one party makes 
investments specific to a relationship before all the terms and conditions of 
the relationship are agreed.96 As far as standardization is concerned, that 
means the patent holders are able to ‘hold up’ other potential standard 
adopters, either by precluding competitors from using their essential patents 
in the standard through threat of injunctions 97 , or by demanding supra-
competitive licensing royalties far out of proportion of the their true economic 
contribution. Patent holders are aware of the dramatic impetus a standard 
could grant to their patented technologies. It has become the business model 
of technological enterprises in the new millennium – to insert their proprietary 
technologies into a technical standard by all means. ‘Holdup’ always causes 
economic inefficiency; in addition, the unreasonable royalty changes will 
discourage the passion of potential standard adopters. Ultimately, 
                                                                                                                             
the Law: Developing the Golden Mean for Global Trade, Stanford University, 23 
September 2005. The full speech is downloadable at: 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/majoras/050923standord.pdf. 
94
    See Timothy S. Simcoe, Explaining the Increase in Intellectual Property Disclosure, 8 
December 2005, at: 
http://www.rotman.utoronto.ca/timothy.simcoe/papers/SSO_IPR_Disclosures.pdf. 
95
    See supra note 49, at 603. 
96
   Id. 
97
   An injunction is one of the remedies available to a patent owner against an alleged 
infringer to prevent future infringement of his patent by the alleged infringer.  
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technological innovation will be impeded and the high royalties will be passed 
on to consumers in form of higher prices.98  
 
Chapter II.2 mainly discusses the monopolistic patent exploitations in 
standardization, which may lead to ‘patent holdup’ problems. More 
importantly, the following parts of Chapter II focus on exploring the applicable 
mechanisms private-sector SSOs could take, in order to avoid or resolve the 
‘patent holdup’ problems in standardization. It is highlighted that the ‘patent 
holdup’ could happen in any technical standardization, whether it is national 
or international. The existing rules of influential SSOs IP policies analyzed 
and the normative SSOs IP policies proposed in Chapter II apply similarly in 
different countries, including countries like China with no such private-sector 
policies in standardization.    
 
II.2.1  Typical Cases and Examples from the US 
 
A typical strategy for a patent holder to manipulate standardization is to 
conceal the fact that he owns a patent covered by the ongoing standard, and 
then allege his exclusive rights after the standard has been settled and widely 
adopted. The following cases happened in the US are the two representative 
ones, from which we may figure out under what circumstances 
standardization may be held up by exclusive patent rights and how SSO IP 
policies can prevent the same from happening. 
 
                                                
98
   See supra note 93 on page 5.   
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The first one is known as In re Dell.99 In 1991 and 1992, the Video Electronics 
Standards Association (“VESA”)100 developed a standard for a computer bus 
design, called the VESA Local Bus (“VL-bus”). The bus carries information 
and instructions between the computer's central processing unit and 
peripheral devices.101 In August 1992, VESA conducted a vote to approve its 
VL-bus standard and required each member's authorized voting 
representative to sign a statement that the proposed standard did not infringe 
the member company's intellectual property rights.102  On 6 August 1992, 
Dell, a leading US computer manufacturer as a member of VESA, gave final 
approval to the VL-bus design standard, which is certified in writing as “this 
proposal does not infringe on any trademarks, copyrights, or patents” that Dell 
possessed.103 After VESA's VL-bus design standard became very successful, 
Dell informed some VESA members who were applying the new design 
standard that their “implementation of the VL-bus is a violation of Dell's 
exclusive rights.” 104  The FTC of the US thus charged that Dell restricted 
competition in the personal computer industry and undermined the standard-
setting process by threatening to exercise undisclosed patent rights against 
computer companies adopting the VL-bus standard.105 This is the first time 
the US federal law enforcement authorities have taken action against a 
company for unilaterally seeking to impose costs on its rivals through abuse 
of the standard-setting process.106 
                                                
99
   See In re Dell Computer Corp., 121 F.T.C 616 (1996). 
100
   VESA is a non-profit, private SSO, including as members both computer hardware and 
software manufacturers.  
101
   See supra note 99.  
102
   Id. at footnote 2.  
      The statement contained the following certification: “I certify that I am the VESA member 
listed at the top of this ballot, or am authorized by such member to submit this ballot. By 
casting this vote I also certify that, to the best of my knowledge, this proposal does not 
infringe on any trademarks, copyrights, or patents, with the exception of any listed on the 
comment page. I understand that my vote and any comments will become public”. 
103
   Id. 
104
   See supra note 99 at 617-618. 
105
   See FTC’s news release at: http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1995/11/dell.shtm. 
106
   According to William J. Baer, Director of the FTC’s Bureau of Competition. See FTC’s 
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To settle the charges, Dell accepted a consent agreement 107 with FTC not to 
enforce its patent against computer manufacturers incorporating the VL-bus 
design in their products.108 In addition, Dell was prohibited from enforcing any 
of its patent rights that it intentionally failed to disclose upon request of any 
standard-setting organization during the standard-setting process. 109  This 
settlement makes it clear that patentees cannot commit to a standard, and 
then after it is widely adopted, assert exclusive patent rights trying to block 
use of the standard or drive up the price through royalty payments. 110 
Although the way of reaching a consent agreement with administrative 
agency to settle the problem had been criticized, several major SSOs surely 
experienced a large and rather sudden increase in IP disclosure during the 
early 1990s, just around the period of the Dell case.111 
 
Another much more complicated case is Rambus v. Infineon112, which had 
considerably shed lights on the should-be patent policies in the process of 
standardization.   
 
Rambus develops and licenses memory technologies to companies that 
manufacture semiconductor memory devices.113 In April 1990, Rambus filed a 
                                                                                                                             
news release at: http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1995/11/dell.shtm. 
107
   A consent agreement is for settlement purposes only and does not constitute an admission 
of a law   violation. When the FTC issues a consent order on a final basis, it carries the 
force of law with respect to future actions. See FTC’s news release, at: 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2008/01/ethernet.shtm. 
108
   See FTC’s news release at: http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1995/11/dell.shtm. 
109
   Id. 
110
   Id. 
111
   According to a study examining the increase of formal intellectual property disclosures in 
nine SSOs between 1981 and 2004. These SSOs are ANSI, ATM Forum, Alliance for 
Telecommunications Industry Solutions (“ATIS”), European Telecommunications Standards 
Institute (“ETSI”), IEEE, Internet Engineering Task Force (“IETF”), ITU, Open Mobile 
Alliance and the Telecommunications Industry Association. See Timothy S. Simcoe, 
Explaining the Increase in Intellectual Property Disclosure, 8 December 2005, at:  
http://www.rotman.utoronto.ca/timothy.simcoe/papers/SSO_IPR_Disclosures.pdf. 
112
   See Rambus. Inc. v. Infineon Techs, AG. 318 F.3d 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
113
   See Matthew F. Weil, Misstatement in Prosecution? No Matter; Silence During Standard-
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US patent application (hereinafter called the “898 application”) with claims 
directed to a computer memory technology known as dynamic random 
access memory (“DRAM”). 114  Many of these patents claim aspects of a 
memory technology known as Rambus DRAM (“RDRAM”).115  In February 
1992, Rambus officially joined Joint Electron Devices Engineering Council 
(“JEDEC”), an SSO associated with the Electronic Industries Association 
(“EIA”) 116 that develops standards for semiconductor technologies, including 
standards for random access memory (“RAM”). By 1993, the EIA/JEDEC 
patent policy required members to disclose patents and patent applications 
“related to” the standardization work of the committees.117 
 
In September 1993, Rambus disclosed its first issued RDRAM patent 
(hereinafter called the “703 patent”), a divisional of the 898 application, to 
JEDEC during a committee meeting. 118  In early 1993, during Rambus's 
membership on committee JC-42.3 119 , JEDEC adopted and published a 
standard for synchronous dynamic random access memory (“SDRAM”)120 
before Rambus disclosed the 703 patent.121 Rambus officially withdrew from 
JEDEC in June 1996. After leaving JEDEC, Rambus filed more divisional and 
continuation applications and one of four patents concerning SDRAM and 
Double Data Rate (“DDR”)-SDRAM was issued in 1999. 122  In December 
1996, JEDEC began to work on a standard for DDR-SDRAM and ultimately 
                                                                                                                             




   See supra note 112, at 1084. 
115
   Id. 
116
   See supra note 112 at footnote 1. Since 1991, both JEDEC and EIA have changed their 
names. JEDEC now is known as the JEDEC Solid State Technology Association. EIA is 
known as the Electronic Industries Alliance. 
117
   See supra note 112 at 1085.  
118
   Id. 
119
   Committee JC-42.3 drafts standards for RAM, id. 
120
   SDRAM increases the speed at which a central processing unit (“CPU”) can read or write 
memory by synchronizing itself with the CPU's clock speed. Id.  
121
   Id. 
122
   See supra note 112 at 1086. 
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incorporated four technologies that had been discussed in general before 
Rambus' withdrawal in 1996.123 
 
In late 2000, Rambus sued Infineon, a manufacturer of semiconductor 
memory devices (including SDRAM and DDR-SDRAM) and a member of 
JEDEC, for infringement of the patents-in-suit. Rambus alleged infringement 
of fifty-seven claims in the four SDRAM and DDR-SDRAM patents.124 Infineon 
claimed that Rambus, not disclosing to JEDEC its patents and patent 
applications “related to” the SDRAM and DDR-SDRAM standards, committed 
fraud by seeking to patent the technology being standardized at JEDEC while 
participating as a member and not disclosing its patents to JEDEC so that it 
could later bring the infringement suits against implementers of the 
standard.125  
 
After construing the claims, the district court granted judgment as a matter of 
law (“JMOL”) 126  of non-infringement in favor of Infineon. Infineon's fraud 
counterclaims were tried to a jury, which ruled against Rambus.127 Rambus 
moved for JMOL of no fraud on both the SDRAM and DDR-SDRAM verdicts. 
Alternatively, Rambus requested a new trial. The district court denied JMOL 
on the SDRAM fraud verdict while granted JMOL on the DDR-SDRAM fraud 
verdict, holding that substantial evidence did not support the jury's verdict 
                                                
123
   Those technologies include: source-synchronous clocking, low-voltage swing signaling, 
dual clock edge, and on-chip phase locked loop/delay locked loop. See supra note 112 at 
1086. 
124
   Id. 
125
    Id. 
126
   JMOL is a motion made by a party, during trial in the US, claiming the opposing party has 
insufficient evidence to reasonably support its case. JMOL is similar to summary judgment, 
which is a motion made before trial. See: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Judgment_as_a_matter_of_law.   
127
    Id. 
51 
because Rambus left JEDEC before work officially began on the DDR-
SDRAM standard.128 
 
Both parties appealed to the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. On 
appeal, the Federal Circuit upheld the district court’s grant of JMOL of no 
fraud on the DDR-SDRAM verdict because Rambus had no duty to disclose 
before the JEDEC began formal balloting on the DDR-SDRAM standard.129 
Furthermore, the Federal Circuit ruled that the district court erred in its 
interpretation of the Rambus patent claims, specifically in the construction of 
certain critical terms in the patents.130 The majority also held that the district 
court erred in denying JMOL of no fraud on the SDRAM verdict because the 
policy only required Rambus to disclose patent applications that read on the 
final proposed standard, not those applications that disclosed the proposed 
standard.131  
 
The result that Rambus did not commit fraud in JEDEC standardization, 
which was held by the Federal circuit, prompted the FTC to file an 
independent administrative complaint against Rambus.132 A great part of the 
FTC’s complaint is the same as the Rambus civil litigation cases regarding 
Rambus’ potential abuse of the standard-setting process through deliberate 
concealment of patents. By its own admission the FTC’s goal was more 
ambitious than simply punishing Rambus for fraud on behalf of its alleged 
victims. Instead, the FTC wanted to protect standard-setting processes 
                                                
128
    See Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 164 F.Supp.2d at 767.  
129
    Id. at 1105. 
130
    See Nicos L. Tsilas, Toward Greater Clarity and Consistency in Patent Disclosure Policies 
in a Post-Rambus World , 17 Harvard Journal of Law &Technology 2004, at 485. 
131
   See supra note 112 at 1104, 1105. 
132
   FTC administrative law judges are independent, but work for the commission. Decisions by 
the administrative law judge may be appealed by either side to the full Commission and 
the Commission's decision can then be appealed at the federal court level. See generally 
Complaint, In re Rambus, Inc., 18 June 2002, (No. 9302),  
 at: http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9302/020618admincmp.pdf. 
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across the technology industry from bad faith participants. “The conduct at 
issue here has done substantial harm to important technology markets, and 
threatens to undermine participation in industry standard-setting activities 
more generally…If you are going to take part in a standards process, be 
mindful to abide by the ground rules and to participate in good faith.”133 
 
On 24 February 2004, Chief administrative law judge (“ALJ”) Stephen J. 
McGuire issued his initial decision ruling in favor of Rambus and dismissing 
the complaint. The ALJ found that FTC had failed to sustain its burden of 
proof for the violations alleged in the complaint.134 It is worth noting that the 
ALJ—unlike the Federal Circuit—found that Rambus did not have a duty to 
disclose under the JEDEC patent policy, which was limited to encouraging 
early voluntary disclosure of any known patents.135 
 
On 1 March 2004, FTC counsel filed its motion for an appeal to the full 
Commission.136 On 31 July 2006, FTC overturned the ALJ’s decision and 
determined that Rambus unlawfully obtained monopoly power. The 
Commission’s unanimous opinion stated that “We find that Rambus’ course of 
conduct constituted deception under Section 5 of the FTC Act…”.137 The acts 
of deception were also held to have constituted exclusionary conduct under 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act and contributed significantly to Rambus’ 
                                                
133
  See FTC Press Release, FTC Issues Complaint Against Rambus, Inc.: Deception of 
Standard-setting-organization Violated Federal Law, 19 June 2002, (quoting Joseph J. 
Simons, Director of the FTC Bureau of Competition), at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/06/rambus.htm. 
134
   See Press Release, FTC, Initial Decision Released in Rambus Case: Judge Dismiss 
Complaint Alleging Company Violated Antitrust Laws, 24 February 2004, at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/02/ramusid.shtm. 
135
   Id. 
136
   See Complaint Counsel’s Notice of Appeal, In the Matter of Rambus, Inc., 1 March 2004 
(No. 9302), at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9302/040301noticeofappeal.pdf. The Judge's 
initial decision is subject to review by the full Commission, either on its own motion or at 
the request of either party. 
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acquisition of monopoly power in the four relevant markets.138 On 5 February 
2007, FTC issued a final opinion and order against Rambus, which bars 
Rambus from making misrepresentations or omissions to SSOs and imposes 
price control on Rambus patents used in certain computer memory 
standards.139  
 
On 4 April 2007, Rambus filed a petition in front of the nation’s second-
highest court, the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 
asking the court to review FTC’s final order on remedies and the 31 July 
2006, orders and opinion reversing ALJ’s initial decision.140 On 22 April 2008, 
it was decided by the court that the respondent, FTC, failed to sustain its 
allegation of monopolization, on the grounds that the SSO IP policy is not 
clear about the patent disclosure obligations and there is no substantial 
evidence that Rambus engaged in deceptive conducts which assist them in 
achieving illegal monopolization.141 
 
The Rambus case sparked heated discussion on how to deal with the patent 
issues in standardization. An undisputable answer is not easy to reach, as 
shown from the rounds of litigations and the different conclusions reached. 
The Rambus case also aroused considerable attention from both SSOs and 
patent holders. For SSOs, their primary job is to set standards with the best 
                                                
138
   See Press Release, FTC, FTC Finds Rambus Unlawfully Obtained Monopoly Power: 
Deceptive Conduct Fostered “Hold-Up” of Computer Memory Industry, 2 August 2006, at: 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2006/08/rambus.shtm. 
139
   See Press Release, FTC Issues Final Opinion and Order in Rambus Matter: Remedy 
Seeks to Restore Ongoing Competition in Computer Memory Technologies Markets, 5 
February 2007, at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/02/070502rambus.htm. The order requires 
Rambus to license its SDRAM and DDR SDRAM technology and sets maximum allowable 
royalty rates it can collect for the licensing, bars Rambus from collecting or attempting to 
collect more than the maximum allowable royalty rates from companies that may already 
have incorporated its DRAM technology.  
140
    See FTC: Rambus appeals FTC decision to D.C. Circuit at: 
http://voluntarytrade.org/newsite/modules/news/article.php?storyid=141. 
141
   See Rambus Incorporated v. Federal Trade Commission, US Court of Appeals for the 
district of   Columbia circuit, 22 April 2008. 
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performance in the certain industry efficiently and effectively. Besides a sound 
organizational mechanism, adequate technical experts and qualified staff, it is 
specifically necessary for well-established SSOs to create clear, consistent 
and enforceable patent policies to restrict the exclusive power of patents in 
the process of technical standardization. As for patent holders, they should be 
fully aware of every detail of the standardization they participate in, especially 
to what extent they have to give up their patent rights once they become the 
patent contributors to the standard. Moreover, they should be informed of the 
legal consequences if they fail to act in good faith in the standardization 
process. 
 
The judgment of whether Rambus has engaged in deception or unlawful 
monopolization depends greatly on what does the SSO IP policy require in 
the standardization in question. The several rounds of litigations described 
above provided relatively comprehensive guidance on how to interpret the 
rules of an SSO IP policy and what obligations should the IP policy require in 
relation to the exercise of exclusive patent rights.  The rest parts of Chapter II 
will discuss two of the most important obligations required or should be 
required by SSO IP policies regulating the patent-related issues. 
 
II.2.2  Patent Disclosure Obligations in Standardization as 
Required by SSOs IP Policies 
 
Due to the technical complexity of standards, it is difficult for standard 
adopters to figure out themselves exactly how many patents are involved in 
the standard. Even for formal SSOs consisted of qualified technical experts, 
the number of patents owned by different individuals could still be 
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overwhelming if they try to search them one by one. That is why it is 
necessary for patent holders participating the standardization to disclose their 
patents involved in the proposed standard, especially the essential ones. It 
would save considerable time for both SSOs and individuals to completely 
understand the proprietary extent of the standard they are going to develop or 
adopt. The following sections will discuss specifically what the patent 
disclosure obligations in an SSO IP policy require or should require, i.e., what 
has to be disclosed, when, how and to whom the disclosure has to be made.  
 
II.2.2.1 Justifications of Patent Disclosure in SSOs IP Policies 
 
The benefits brought by patent disclosure to private ICT standardization are 
obvious. SSOs could be more efficient in evaluating the proprietary extent of 
the standards they are developing without having to search all related 
patented technologies by themselves. All the members of SSOs and potential 
standard-adopters could be clearly informed of how many patents are exactly 
involved in the standardization they participate in so they can be prepared 
when patent holders exert their exclusive rights. This would greatly reduce the 
possibility of patent holdup, which is common in absence of disclosure 
requirements.   
 
People in favor of strong IP rights might argue that a duty to disclose 
discourages patent holders to take part in standardization since it 
compromises their legally granted exclusive rights. From my point of view, the 
compromise is necessary. Patent holders involved in voluntary 
standardization must have participated in the standard-setting process based 
on their freewill. Those who are unwilling to reveal their patents to other 
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potential competitors may choose not to join in standardization at all. They 
have their free rights to decide whether they want to contribute their patents in 
a standard and enjoy the corresponding benefits, or they want to explore their 
patents individually. An SSO IP policy is in no position to impose a patent 
disclosure obligation on someone who is not interested in participating in 
standardization. However, once a patent holder has decided to participate in 
standardization, he should realize that one of the most important purposes of 
standardization is that the standard developed by joint efforts could be 
adopted as widely as possible. To realize such wide adoption, exclusive rights 
of certain people have to be restricted to the extent that no one could easily 
capture the standard and manipulate it. The patent disclosure obligation is to 
restrain those patent holders who participate actively in standardization from 
holding up 142  the wide adoption of the final standard by concealing their 
patent rights in the first place.  
 
Actually, the economic loss of patent holders due to the duty to disclose in 
standardization, if any, is totally retrievable from the wide adoption of 
standards. Besides, patent holders could enjoy the benefits brought by 
standards including their patents and at the same time explore their patents 
individually. The incentives to innovate would not be affected since patent 
disclosure does not necessarily mean that patentees have to give up their 
exclusive rights. They still have patent licensing rights to recoup their 
innovative investments.  
 
Now back to the discussion of SSO IP policies. If there is one thing learned 
from the Rambus case, that is the necessity of a set of clear IP policies in 
standardization. The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit unabashedly 
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   See previous discussions regarding ‘patent holdup’ on pages 45 and 46. 
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criticized the SSO at issue, JEDEC, for a “staggering lack of defining details” 
in its patent policy and failure to define clearly “what, when, how, and to 
whom the members must disclose patent information.” 143 From 1999 to 2002, 
more SSOs developed IP policies in their bylaws, reflecting the increased 
salience of the issue.144 Until now, among the eighteen international SSOs 
developing standards in the field of ICT I examined, the majority of them 
(fifteen) have formal IP policies which can be easily found on their 
websites. 145  Almost all of their IP policies include patent disclosure 
requirements and licensing terms.146 There is no and shouldn’t be a one-size-
fits-all IP policy for all SSOs because of the significant diversity among 
different SSOs aiming at divergent standardizations. However, there are 
certain essential requirements in relation to patent disclosure that all SSOs 
should consistently adopt. After all, all SSOs acting in good faith would like to 
have policies encouraging participation and facilitating the widespread 
adoption of their standards, at the same time preventing bad actors from 
leveraging the process of standardization.  
 
II.2.2.2 The Scope of Patent Disclosure in Standardization 
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   See supra note 130, at 476. 
144
   See supra note 24, at 1904.  
145
   The collection of SSOs is not comprehensive, however, includes most of the influential 
international SSOs within the ICT industry. They are International Organization for 
Standardization (“ISO”), The International Telecommunication Union (“ITU”), International 
Electrotechnical Commission (“IEC”), Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
(“IEEE”), W3C, Internet Engineering Task Force (“IETF”), 3rd Generation Partnership 
Project, 3rd Generation Partnership Project 2, Accellera Organization, Association for 
Information and Image Management (“AIIM”), American Society for Testing and Materials, 
Cable Television Laboratories, European Computer Manufacturers Association, Media Grid 
Standards Organization, Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information 
Standards (“OASIS”), Open Grid Forum, Telemanagement Forum and Website Standards 
Association. Except Accellera, AIIM and WSA, all of the above SSOs have clear IP policies 
posted on their websites.  
146
   The IP policy of Mediagrid was not found since membership is required to access the 
same. It was noted that Mediagrid has formed a special legal group to deal with the IP 
policy. 
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In the Rambus case, the Federal Circuit analyzed the scope of Rambus’ duty 
to disclose by interpreting the language of the JEDEC patent policy, which 
stipulated that information “covered by” patents or pending patents are 
encouraged to be disclosed. The court interpreted this language to indicate 
that JEDEC defined the duty to disclose “based on the scope of claimed 
inventions that would cover any standard and cause those who use the 
standard to infringe.”147 Based largely on JEDEC members’ testimony, the 
court found that disclosure was required for patents and patent applications 
related to the standardization work of a JEDEC committee. Whether a patent 
or a patent application is related to the standard depends on the actual patent 
claims of the patent or the application, rather than on the description of the 
patent or application.148 Finally, the majority of the Federal Circuit concluded 
that a JEDEC member was required to disclose a patent or a patent 
application only when a claim “reasonably might be necessary to practice a 
standard.” 149  In other words, the duty to disclose operates “when a 
reasonable competitor would not expect to practice the standard without a 
license under the undisclosed claims.”150 The conclusion of ‘necessary claim’ 
is to some extent comparable to the concept of ‘essential patent’151, both of 
which would be necessarily infringed implementing the standard without 
licenses from the owners. By contrast, the dissenting opinion held that 
evidence supported a broader duty to disclose than that applied by the 
majority. The dissent defined the duty to disclose stipulated by the patent 
policy as requiring disclosure not only of patents and pending applications 
containing ‘necessary claims’ but also all of the relevant patents and 
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applications. 152  The different interpretations of the same policy could be 
attributed to, on the one hand, the unclear policy itself and on the other hand, 
different understandings of different people on ‘covered’ or ‘related’. 
Regardless of what the JEDEC policy stipulated then, I personally believe that 
the patent disclosure obligation should not be so broadly interpreted that 
requires all patents related to the standard, no matter necessary or not (as 
the dissenting opinion of the Federal Circuit). The aforementioned Dell 
case153 was criticized by commentators for creating an impractical duty, due 
to the numerous and random participation in SSOs by company employees 
and companies’ potentially large, diverse IP portfolios.154 Such an extensive 
duty to disclose may discourage certain patent holders from getting involved 
in standardization. For example, some patent holders may want to keep a low 
profile as regards their patent portfolios, especially those newly developed 
patents or patent applications. Besides, an extensive duty to disclose would 
impose unnecessary costs while bring little benefit to standardization. Patent 
holders would have to spend more time and money to arduously search in 
their patent portfolios in order to fulfill their disclosure missions. The technical 
committees or working groups of SSOs would be inundated with more patent 
declarations, which require extra resources to examine them individually. It 
will inevitably stall the progress and compromise the efficiency of 
standardization. More importantly, many of the disclosed patents under such 
a broad disclosure obligation would be inapplicable in the end due to their 
irrelevance. It is a huge waste of research resources. Actually, the only 
disclosures that matter are the ones relating to necessary claims because 
typically only necessary claims are subject to licensing for purposes of 
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implementing the standard. 155  In conclusion, it is advisable for SSOs to 
restrict their patent disclosure requirements to ‘necessary claims’ which would 
be necessarily infringed to implement the standards.  
 
II.2.2.3 Disclosure Obligations Regarding Pending Patent 
Applications 
 
There is little doubt that the patent disclosure obligation covers issued 
patents. Whether the obligation should cover pending patent applications is 
subject to debate. Several SSOs, such as ISO, IEC, ITU, IETF explicitly 
require or encourage both issued patents and pending patent applications to 
be disclosed while some SSOs do not mention patent applications in their 
policies at all. The difference is understandable since disclosure of patent 
applications, particularly unpublished ones, is an especially complicated and 
sensitive issue.  
 
One factor causing the complexity of disclosing patent applications in 
standardization is that the claims or specifications of a patent application may 
change throughout the patenting process. It is quite possible that the claims 
or technical specifications in the final issued patent greatly differ from the 
ones originally set out in the patent application. The fact that the claims in an 
application cannot be fixed until after grant of a patent makes it difficult to 
decide whether the application includes ‘necessary claims’ that may cover the 
standard and whether it should be disclosed or not. For example, a company 
may disclose its original patent application to an SSO since it believes that 
there are ‘necessary claims’ in its application. However, the claims in the 
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patent application may be amended as required by relevant patent office 
during pre-grant examinations to narrow or expand their scope. 156  Therefore 
the final patent granted to the company may be totally different from the 
originally disclosed patent application and there may be no ‘necessary claims’ 
covering the standard at all. Situations like this will waste resources on 
examinations of unnecessary information for SSOs and standardization 
participants. The negative effect will be significant once we consider the 
aggregate possibility of changes and uncertainties caused by hundreds of 
participants with their thousands of patent applications. An even worse 
scenario would be that a patent applicant in bad faith may disclose his patent 
application and then change his patent claims or add new claims before grant 
of a patent, so that the new claims would cover the final standard. By doing 
so, the patent applicant may be able to capture the final standard without 
breaching the patent disclosure obligation. This is the last situation people 
would expect in standardization—the standard is hold by a single IP owner an 
entire industry hostage.  
 
Another reason why disclosure obligation in relation to patent applications 
should be treated cautiously is the traditional concern about the confidentiality 
protection of patent applications especially in their early stage. Many 
countries’ patent laws require publication of patent applications after a period 
of time (usually 18 months since the filing date) before patents are finally 
granted. Some patent systems only require publications of patents after they 
are granted. For example, until 2000, pending patent applications in the US 
were still maintained in confidence by the USPTO. The valid interest for 
patent applicants to maintain confidentiality is completely understandable. 
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Unlike traditional property, which could be exclusively controlled by 
possession, intellectual property is much more difficult to master due to its 
invisible characteristic. That is why intellectual property laws were enacted to 
set up a series of special mechanisms different from traditional property laws’ 
to protect intellectual accomplishments. The exclusive rights entitled by patent 
laws could prevent others from free-riding on patentees’ innovative 
accomplishments. Since knowledge or ideas could be obtained at a 
surprisingly fast speed, the last thing a patent applicant wants to do in his 
patent development is to disclose his innovative ideas to the public before his 
ideas are acknowledged and protected by law. If a patent is ultimately granted 
based completely on its published application, the applicant should be less 
worried since the rule of ‘priority date’ 157  in patent laws could preclude 
followers from imitating the published application. However, if the published 
application is denied to grant a patent because of unclear claims or other 
minor disqualifications, the unsuccessful application might inspire other 
competitors taking advantage of the applicant’s innovative ideas to file their 
‘newly developed’ patent applications. The fear of such possibilities also 
justifies the reluctance of patent applicants to disclose pending applications to 
SSOs and other competitors during standardization.  
 
The variations among issued patents, published pending applications and 
unpublished patent applications definitely call for different disclosure 
obligations in standardization. The disclosure obligation for issued patents is 
relatively simple, which should require all issued patents with ‘necessary 
claims’ to the standard to be disclosed. The specific contents of disclosure 
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are suggested by some scholars to include, at a minimum: the name of the 
patent rights holder; contact information; the patent number and the draft 
standard to which the disclosure relates. 158  When it comes to published 
pending applications, the minimum disclosure contents should not differ from 
that of issued patents’. Since the application has been published, the 
disclosure obligation will not compromise its confidentiality. Actually, more 
information might be required as regards disclosure of pending applications. 
As discussed previously, there are a lot of uncertainties during the process of 
a patent application. Therefore, it is necessary to update the status of the 
patent application disclosed in standardization. If a patent is granted in 
response to its application, the original patent applicant should submit another 
disclosure declaring the newly granted patent. If the patent application is 
abandoned or rejected to be granted as a patent, the patent applicant should 
explicitly inform the SSO to withdraw the earlier disclosure made based on 
the abandoned or rejected application. Only in this way can SSOs always be 
appropriately informed to make wise decisions.  
 
The disclosure of unpublished patent applications is the most controversial. 
On the one hand, forcing patent applicants to disclose their unpublished 
applications is strongly contradicted with their interests to safeguard the 
confidentiality of their innovative developments, especially when none of the 
disclosed unpublished claims turns out to cover the settled standard. On the 
other hand, however, it is unwise to totally immune unpublished patent 
applications from disclosure disregarding the possibility of potential patent 
holdups. To address this dilemma, it is suggested that a comparably limited 
disclosure obligation be applied to at least require a statement from the patent 
applicant that his unpublished pending application(s) contain ‘necessary 
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claims’ of the proposed standard. It might not be feasible to identify the exact 
claims, however, it is advisable to require identification of the portions of the 
proposed standard on which the asserted ‘necessary claims’ of the 
unpublished patent application read.159 In this way, SSOs would be provided 
with useful information to determine which areas of the proposed standard 
need to be reconsidered to avoid infringements. Such a limited disclosure 
obligation will not harm the legally supported confidentiality of an unpublished 
patent application and at the same time appropriately inform the SSO the 
proprietary status of the proposed standard. Of course, disclosure of 
unpublished patent applications in standardization on a voluntary basis is 
encouraged to reduce potential risks. 
 
II.2.2.4  When and Based on Whose Knowledge to Disclose 
 
The timing of patent disclosure is critical to efficient standardization. In 
Rambus, an important clue determining whether there was a breach of duty to 
disclose was subject to specific timing. There were conflicting opinions in 
Federal Circuit’s final decisions about when did the duty of disclosure arise. 
As the JEDEC policy itself did not state when a committee member’s duty will 
arise, the majority relied on trial testimony from, among others, the 
committee’s chairman, who testified that the duty arose at formal balloting of 
a proposed standard. 160  Finally, the majority concluded that the duty to 
disclose did not arise until the beginning of the formal standard-setting 
process.161 The dissent, however, criticized the majority for narrowly reading 
the duty of disclosure. The dissent found that JEDEC’s patent policy required 
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disclosure based on “work they are undertaking”, which should be interpreted 
more broadly than simply referring to the final, completed standard.162 I fully 
agree with the dissenting opinion on this point. An obligation only requiring 
late disclosure could offer opportunities for participants in standardization to 
strategically add claims in the last minute before final voting, for the purpose 
of covering the proposed standard. If the new claim is demonstrated to be 
‘essential’ and the patent holder refuses any licensing agreement, there is a 
great chance that all the standard-setting efforts prior to the final voting are in 
vain. What’s worse, such a disclosure obligation allows patentees to capture 
standards undermining the effectiveness of SSOs’ IP policies as contractual 
safe harbor mechanisms.163  
 
As a matter of fact, many SSOs have realized the significance of early 
disclosure obligation in the process of standardization. As the Guidelines for 
Implementation of the ANSI Patent Policy clearly state, “Experience has 
indicated that early disclosure of patents is likely to enhance the efficiency of 
the process used to finalize and approve standards. Early disclosure permits 
notice of the patent to the standards developer and ANSI in a timely manner, 
provides participants the greatest opportunity to evaluate the propriety of 
standardizing the patented technology, and allows patent holders and 
prospective licensees ample time to negotiate the terms and conditions of 
licenses outside the standard development process itself.”164 In Guidelines for 
Implementation of ITU-T Patent Policy, it is also acknowledged that early 
disclosure of asserted patent rights is desirable, since early disclosure will 
contribute to the efficiency of the process and tend to minimize any possible 
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disagreements with respect to patent rights or their applicability to proposed 
standards.165 For these reasons, patent disclosure in standardization should 
be an ongoing obligation that applies throughout the standards development 
process.166  
 
Various existing patent policies differ on the precise timing of when the actual 
disclosure statement must be submitted to SSOs. 167  Some still require 
disclosure to be made just prior to the date upon which a final vote is taken to 
adopt the proposed standard. 168  More and more SSOs stipulate in their 
policies indicating that disclosure obligation starts from the outset of standard-
setting and disclosure statements should be submitted as early as reasonably 
possible. 169  Although these SSOs may not use the same words in their 
policies, clearly they all try to implement early disclosure obligation to obtain 
adequate information promptly to evaluate alternative solutions and avoid 
unnecessary troubles. When deciding the exact timing of disclosure required 
by patent policies, it is necessary to first define what knowledge could trigger 
disclosure obligations.  
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In Rambus, the majority of the Federal Circuit found that the JEDEC policy, 
though vague, did not create a duty premised on subjective beliefs.170 The 
duty to disclose at issue was based on an ‘objective standard’, i.e., whether in 
fact a patent claim “reasonably might be necessary to practice the standard.” 
171
 Therefore, Rambus’ JEDEC representatives’ personal and subjective 
beliefs on whether the SDRAM standard likely infringed Rambus’ patent 
claims were irrelevant to Rambus’ duty to disclose.172 The dissent criticized 
the majority’s judgment since such a purely objective standard would make it 
difficult to see when the duty to disclose could ever be triggered.173 In defense 
of its position, the majority pointed out that a purely subjective standard of 
patent disclosure “would exempt a member from disclosure if it truly, but 
unreasonably, believes its claims do not cover the standard.”174  
 
Actually, both purely objective and purely subjective standard seem a bit 
extreme to appropriately determine what should trigger the duty to disclose. A 
purely objective standard actually provides little guidance for SSOs to 
examine whether participants have fulfilled their disclosure obligations as per 
the IP policies stipulate. Especially when there are disputes after the standard 
has been adopted, a purely objective standard would make it difficult to prove 
intentional misconducts during the standard-setting process. A purely 
subjective standard, although more applicable than the purely objective one, 
would invite inevitable controversy due to its total reliance on uncatchable 
minds of different people. What’s worse, if a representative was intentionally 
kept ignorant of the knowledge of necessary claims by his employer, the 
purely subjective standard would preclude non-disclosure liabilities on such 
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an obvious misconduct since disclosure obligation was triggered by personal 
knowledge.  
 
The optimal knowledge standard for disclosure obligation is more inclined to 
be a subjective standard, with extra stipulations and reasonable expectations. 
Under such rule, the disclosure obligation is mainly based on the personal 
and actual knowledge of the representatives who participate in the SSO 
working group that is developing the draft standard. 175  The disclosure 
obligation is triggered as soon as an individual representative becomes aware 
of patents or patent applications that he believes contain necessary claims 
covering the draft standard under consideration. In addition, members 
participating in SSOs should be strictly prohibited from intentionally isolating 
their representatives from their patent information, especially the necessary 
ones, to avoid the disclosure obligation. A good example of the optimal 
knowledge standard for the disclosure obligation is IETF’s IP policy, which 
introduces a ‘reasonable and personal knowledge’ standard. The policy 
stipulates in its definition part that ‘reasonably and personally known’ means 
“something an individual knows personally or, because of the job the 
individual holds, would reasonably be expected to know.” 176 It is indicated 
that an organization cannot purposely keep an individual in the dark about 
patents or patent applications just to avoid the disclosure requirement. 
Meanwhile, it is important to restrict ‘reasonably and personally known’ in a 
practical scope. As IETF’s IP policy continues to define, the disclosure 
requirement “should not be interpreted as requiring the IETF Contributor or 
participant (or his or her represented organization, if any) to perform a patent 
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search to find applicable IPR.”177 That means no comprehensive search of 
patent portfolios is mandated to comply with the disclosure obligation. It is 
also reasonably to imply that no collective or aggregate knowledge of the 
participants regarding patent information will be imputed to their 
representatives.178 As ANSI once pointed out:  
 
“As a practical matter, many companies would find such an 
affirmative duty to identify all applicable patents virtually impossible 
to fulfill. Many US participants, at any given moment, have literally 
hundreds of employees participating in as many standards 
development activities and in excess of 10,000 patents in their 
intellectual property portfolios. Patent searches are expensive, time-
consuming and not dispositive. They also require a potentially 
complex legal analysis in addition to a technical one. Often the 
implication of a specific patent in connection with a particular 
standard is not easy to determine or evaluate. This problem is 
exacerbated by the fact that the standard under development 
usually is evolving and its technical specifications are subject to 
change up until the final consensus ballot.” 179  
 
Therefore, by practically focusing on representatives’ personal knowledge 
instead of the collective knowledge of the participants, costs and burdens 
derived from disclosure obligations are greatly minimized while early 
disclosure is promoted. At the same time, interested entities would not be 
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discouraged from participating in standard-setting process by strict disclosure 
obligations, which may be beyond their capabilities to fulfill.  
 
II.2.2.5 Disclosure Obligations Concerning Withdrawals 
 
Another aspect a disclosure obligation should address appropriately is in 
relation to members’ withdrawals from an SSO. In Rambus, whether there 
was a breach of duty greatly depends on whether a disclosure obligation 
should apply when a member withdraws from an SSO. The SSO, JEDEC, 
officially began to develop DDR-SDRAM standard in December 1996 and 
adopted it in 2000. The final standard incorporated four technologies that 
were covered by Rambus’ patents or patent applications. Rambus alleged 
patent infringement based on the fact that Rambus had withdrew from JEDEC 
in June 1996 before formal standard-setting started, therefore, cutting both 
disclosure and licensing obligations. Infineon argued that because some 
technologies that ultimately made their way into the DDR-SDRAM standard 
were discussed before Rambus’ withdrawal, Rambus had a duty to disclose 
patents and applications ‘related to’ the DDR-SDRAM standard. 180  The 
majority of the Federal Circuit held that there was no breach of duty in favor of 
Rambus because they interpreted JEDEC policy as indicating that disclosure 
duty did not arise before legitimate proposals were directed to and formal 
consideration began on the DDR-SDRAM standard.181  Consequently, it is 
consistent for the Federal Circuit to conclude that Rambus did not breach the 
disclosure obligation since it had withdrew from JEDEC before formal 
standard-setting of DDR-SDRAM started. As discussed previously 182, it is 
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unwise for the Federal Circuit to interpret JEDEC patent policy as supporting 
late disclosure obligation, which would not only compromise the efficiency of 
standardization but also increase the possibility of patent holdups. Therefore, 
the Federal Circuit’s conclusion based on the inappropriate policy 
interpretation that a withdrawal before final ballot should cut off disclosure and 
licensing obligations needs to be reconsidered. Meanwhile, such disputes call 
for SSOs to set up clearer policies dealing with withdrawal-related issues. 
 
It seems understandable for participants to expect that a withdrawal from an 
SSO would preclude any subsequent obligations. Since an SSO policy is 
designed specifically for its members, there shouldn’t be binding effects 
outside the organization. In practice, most SSOs’ patent policies allow 
members to withdraw from particular technical committees or from SSOs as a 
whole. 183 Due to the ‘building-block’ nature of standardization, however, free 
withdrawal from SSOs does not necessarily mean total avoidance of 
disclosure obligations. In fact, stricter disclosure obligations should be 
required in relation to withdrawals.  
 
Instead of requiring a member to promptly disclose the ‘necessary claims’ 
reasonably known to its representative, an SSO IP policy should require 
members who is about to withdraw to disclose all the patents or applications 
that are ‘related to’ the standard under consideration. Here ‘related to’ should 
be broadly interpreted to include not only the claims that reasonably might be 
necessary to implement the standard but also any claims that are relevant, or 
discussed, even rejected in the process of standardization, as the dissent of 
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the Federal Circuit used to interpret the broad scope of disclosure. 184 
Moreover, the knowledge standard triggering the disclosure obligation should 
not be restricted to ‘personally known’; instead, it should go beyond the 
personal knowledge of the member’s representative when the member is 
withdrawing. To sum up, a member of an SSO is required to disclose all the 
relevant claims of the proposed standard, especially those that he does not 
wish to license, prior to his withdrawal. Such a strict disclosure obligation 
which discourages patent holdups could prevent evil members from capturing 
a standard by intentionally withdrawing from the SSO to avoid licensing 
obligations.  
 
II.2.3 Patent Licensing Obligations in Standardization as 
Required by SSOs IP Policies 
 
II.2.3.1  The Relationship Between Patent Disclosure and Patent 
Licensing  obligations in SSOs IP Policies 
 
Patent disclosure provides SSOs with information on what proprietary rights 
are involved and what are the consequences of adopting the standard. Such 
information, however, is notably incomplete.185 A disclosure obligation alone 
would not help the SSO members or other standard adopters to avoid the 
exclusive exploitation of patents. Since there is hardly cost to disclosure, 
patent holders might even be encouraged to over-disclose. Without having to 
indicate how much they would charge for license fees or even if they would 
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grant licenses at all, patent holders probably would disclose hundreds of 
patents they own regardless of patent essentialities, which will be 
burdensome for SSOs in the preliminary process of formulating the technical 
framework of standards. Even patents or patent applications are completely 
disclosed as required, the lack of licensing commitments still would not 
prevent ambitious patentees from capturing the standard by refusing any 
unauthorized use or by charging unreasonably high price of the patents they 
hold. What is worse, the standard adopters would more easily be proved as 
willful infringers if they apply the standard without first attaining licenses since 
they have been on notice that there are patent rights covering the standard. 
Not only will these ‘willful infringers’ face the threat of injunction relief 186 of the 
patents they are using to implement the standard, but also they may be 
alleged to pay punitive damages to the patentees. Therefore, a clear set of 
appropriate licensing rules is truly necessary for SSOs to avoid patent 
holdups and guarantee procompetitive standardization. As a matter of fact, 
almost all SSOs with certain extent of scale today have more or less licensing 
requirements expressed in their patent policies. 
 
Since licensing obligations are the effective way to practically prevent patent 
holdups, does this mean disclosure obligations are less required? The answer 
is no. As far as private standardization is concerned, a standard should avoid 
the involvement of proprietary technologies to the greatest extent as long as it 
is economically and technically feasible. After all, the tension between 
exclusive control of patents and free access of standards has always existed. 
Although licensing terms could serve as a balanced tool fixing the tension, it 
is better to avoid it in the first place. Merely imposing mandatory licensing 
obligations will not inform SSOs the proprietary extent of the standards they 
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are developing. The disclosure obligations could help SSOs avoid the 
unnecessarily excessive inclusion of patents in standardization, since SSOs 
clearly aware of what proprietary technologies are involved in their proposed 
standards could then try to develop workarounds of the less essential patents 
and eventually replace the nonessential patents with other available 
nonproprietary alternatives. This would greatly reduce the unnecessary 
licensing burdens on standard adopters and the possibility of patent disputes. 
To sum up, it is advisable for SSOs to write both disclosure and licensing 
obligations in their patent policies. The two obligations could complement with 
each other enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of SSOs IP policies.  
 
It is unrealistic to always expect that all essential claims in a standard would 
be promptly disclosed. Even the most experienced technical representative of 
a company could not guarantee that he is aware of all the patents and patent 
applications in his company’s complicated patent portfolios. As discussed 
previously187, the knowledge triggers disclosure obligations should apply the 
‘personally known’ standard. So when an oversight happens due to individual 
representative’s limited knowledge, it is unfair to impose liabilities of 
nondisclosure. Under such circumstances, a default licensing obligation is 
advisable to deal with the unintentional failure to disclose. For example, an 
SSO might adopt a rule that caps the royalties that can be charged on 
undisclosed IP rights.188 Any unintentional undisclosed patents emerging after 
the standard’s adoption would be licensed on the same condition as the 
disclosed ones. In order to promote complete disclosure or punish intentional 
failure to disclose, an SSO IP policy might even try to impose royalty free 
licensing obligations. It seems a little extreme, however, could totally resolve 
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the potential patent holdups problems. Besides, when a royalty-free licensing 
obligation is required, it is less important to impose disclosure obligations. 
 
II.2.3.2 Royalty Free (“RF”) Licensing Obligations 
 
RF licensing obligations, although effective in handling patent holdups, are 
obviously unfavorable for patent holders. Currently only a handful of SSOs 
require RF licensing obligations which are gradually facing more doubts 
concerning their reasonableness. According to an empirical study of patent 
policies among telecommunications and computer-networking SSOs 
conducted by Professor Lemley, in 2002, only four out of forty-three SSOs 
studied require RF licensing.189 Some of these SSOs impose RF licensing 
obligations to obviate the need for disclosure obligations. Some do this due to 
the organizations’ traditional discouragement of proprietary technologies. 
Take the Internet industry for example, software consortiums working in open 
source managed the Internet to run on a set of open, non-proprietary 
protocols for a long time. As the Internet technologies develop, the SSOs 
gradually realized the inevitable involvement of proprietary technologies in 
Internet standards and began to consider changing the open nature of the 
Internet. These SSOs have changed their policies definitely acknowledging 
the importance of proprietary patents. Due to their historical attitudes towards 
proprietary technologies, however, they tend to impose stricter obligations to 
restrict the exclusive exploitation of patents in their standard-setting 
processes. Take W3C for example, its patent policy applicable in the process 
of developing web standards is designed to assure that standards produced 
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under the policy can be implemented on a RF basis.190 The RF licensing 
requirements mandate each participant to license his essential claims without 
obligations of payment or other considerations to an unrelated third party.191 
Moreover, the RF licensing obligations in W3C policy are binding on 
participants for the life of the patents in question and encumber the patents 
containing essential claims, regardless of changes in participation status or 
W3C membership.192 Such strict RF licensing requirements may be justified in 
a specific industry, e.g., the Internet, which used to operate on open protocols 
and non-proprietary standards. But by and large, an SSO that attempts to 
avoid paying inventors anything for their technology is going too far.193 The 
fundamental right legally granted to patentees is the right to exclusively 
exploit their patents thus recouping the forgoing investments. Although 
standardization calls for compromise of patent rights’ exclusivity, it is not fair 
for an SSO to compel participating patentees to forego all royalties for the 
technologies they contribute. In the US, both DOJ and FTC have taken the 
position in individual cases that an SSO rule that prohibits members from 
owning IP rights in a standard may violate antitrust laws. 194  While RF 
licensing obligations may not be exactly the same as denying all patented 
technologies in standardization, the sacrifices undertaken by patentees 
interested in standardization are almost the same. Besides, there are 
precedents that condemned unreasonably low licensing royalty rates 
obligated by SSOs as a violation of antitrust laws, which naturally makes RF 
licensing obligations face more antitrust challenges. 195  In addition, RF 
                                                
190
    See W3C Patent Policy, Abstract, 5 February 2004,  
        at: http://www.w3.org/Consortium/Patent-Policy-20040205/. 
191
   See W3C Patent Policy, § 3.1, 5 February 2004, at: http://www.w3.org/Consortium/Patent-
Policy 20040205/. The RF licensing obligations have a few exceptions. See W3C Patent 
Policy, § 4, 5 February 2004. 
192
   Id. 
193
   See supra note 33, at 156. 
194
   See supra note 24, at 1944. 
195
   See Sony Elecs., Inc. v. Souncdview Techs., Inc., 157 F.Supp. 2d 172, 183 (D. Conn. 
77 
licensing obligations would also reduce the incentives for potential 
participants holding useful patented technologies to join in SSOs, therefore, 
denying actually suitable resources for developing standards with better 
performances.  
 
II.2.3.3  Reasonable and Nondiscriminatory (“RAND”) Licensing 
Obligations 
 
II.2.3.3.1  Nondiscriminatory in RAND Licensing 
 
Various SSOs patent policies fall in the middle of the continuum from no 
licensing requirements at all to mandatory RF licensing of all the necessary 
patents, most of which require licensing of essential claims on RAND terms. 
Such policies permit SSOs members to own proprietary technologies, 
meanwhile, guarantee the use of any interested standard adopters by 
requiring these members to commit in advance to licensing their patents on 
specific terms. This intermediate approach is a way of valuing IP while at the 
same time reducing the risk that IP rights may impede standardization and 
hold up innovation.196 According to Professor Lemley’s study in 2002, eighty-
one percent of the SSOs with patent policies require RAND licensing.197 
However, relatively few of these SSOs clearly explain what is ‘reasonable’ 
and ‘nondiscriminatory’ and how these terms should be implemented in 
practice. 
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The nondiscrimination part of RAND licensing is relatively straightforward, at 
least in circumstances in which the IP owner has already licensed to 
others. 198  Basically speaking, ‘nondiscriminatory’ requires patentees to 
license their technologies on equally the same condition to all. It actually 
shares the essential meaning with the widely acknowledged ‘Most Favored 
Nation’ clause in international treaties. Charging different licensing royalties or 
negotiating into license agreements on different conditions should be 
forbidden for similarly situated standard adopters. Furthermore, an SSO 
participant who competes downstream with other adopters in the market for 
the standardized technology is supposed to treat its adopter-licensees no less 
favorably than it treats itself under ‘nondiscriminatory’ policies.199 Due to the 
straightforwardness of the meaning of ‘nondiscriminatory’, it is relatively easy 
to examine the compliance status of the obligation. SSOs could require 
members who assert patents to make available to others a copy of all their 
licenses involving the patent.200 On the one hand, potential licensees will be 
given the opportunity to make sure that the proffered licenses really were 
nondiscriminatory; on the other hand, when there is a dispute concerning 
discriminatory licensing, it is easier for either arbitrators or judges to prove 
and decide whether there is a violation or not by comparing the alleged 
discriminatory licenses.   
 
II.2.3.3.2 Reasonable in RAND Licensing Obligations 
 
The ‘reasonable’ part of RAND licensing is far from straightforward. It is 
probably because ‘reasonable’ is inherently flexible to interpret. There is no 
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one-size-fits-all policy that can specifically define the scope of 
reasonableness. The ‘reasonable’ requirements change all the time in 
response to different facts of different cases. Therefore, it is not at all 
surprising that virtually no SSO specifies the terms on which licenses must be 
granted beyond the vague requirement that they be ‘reasonable’.201  
 
It appears well accepted in the literature that the meaning of a RAND 
licensing requirement is ill-defined by SSOs which fail to explain it in more 
detail.202 The materially unspecified obligations are considered to be useless 
in providing guidelines for appropriate licensing, even worse, may bring 
unnecessary disputes due to the potentially broad scope of interpretations. 
Some scholars point out that without the idea of what the term is, reasonable 
licensing loses much of its meaning and the uncertainty over the cost and 
scope of patent licenses may not prove much better that having no policy at 
all.203 Some opine that a RAND commitment is of limited value in the absence 
of objective benchmarks that make clear the concrete terms or range of terms 
that are deemed to be reasonable.204 Some commentators go so far as to 
argue that the vague RAND promise is a tool for misuse and SSOs should be 
held to possess an antitrust duty to implement inappropriate policies without 
clearly requiring licensing terms.205 Admittedly, it is advisable for SSOs to set 
their RAND licensing policies as clearly as possible. When SSOs fail to 
elaborate upon the full meaning, however, it does not necessarily mean that 
RAND licensing obligations would definitely be applied confusingly and 
disorderly. We could always base on RAND licensing’s underlying function 
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and purpose to infer what the proper meaning of ‘reasonable’ is and how it 
should be applied. 
 
A fundamental principle underlying the consensus approach to standards is 
that they should be ‘open’, with no one or few firms controlling the 
standard.206 Once a standard is picked, any patents necessary to comply with 
that standard become truly essential and the standard itself is subject to 
holdup if these patent holders are not somehow obligated to license their 
patents. 207  Enjoining or threatening to enjoin would-be adopters from 
implementing the standard is totally against standardization’s basic purpose 
of wide adoption. Potential implementers would not want to adopt a standard 
and invest in complying with it while facing the risk of patent injunctions.  A 
licensing obligation thus is designed to ensure interested standard adopters 
to access standard-essential patent licenses. Furthermore, in order to prevent 
ambitious patentees from charging royalties unfairly higher than their 
contributions, a ‘reasonable’ restriction is added to the licensing obligations, 
which now could more effectively control patent holders’ exclusive 
exploitations of their proprietary technologies. Therefore, a RAND licensing 
obligation is supposed to function as a safety valve to ultimately prevent 
patent holdups and guarantee procompetitive standardization. It reallocates 
an appropriate portion of patentees’ exclusive rights to adopters’ access 
rights and “ensures that a participant will not significantly hinder the 
proliferation of the standard by threatening to unduly interfere (e.g., attempt to 
license at an overvalued royalty rate) or enjoining others (e.g., via an 
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injunction) from practicing the standard because of its patent.” 208 As long as 
the RAND promise is construed according to its underlying function, it is hard 
to know what more the SSOs that rely on it should be required to say to make 
it an effective means to eliminate post-adoption holdup.209  
 
It seems unwise for SSOs spending fewer efforts than they should on spelling 
out the RAND promise’s details. Actually, there is little the SSOs can do, even 
they wish, to literally elaborate the meaning of ‘reasonable’ or to set some test 
standards for it. Moreover, SSOs might face antitrust challenges if they 
explain ‘reasonable’ too specifically. In practice, some SSOs expressly forbid 
discussions of detailed licensing issues when a standard is under 
consideration, presumably for fear of antitrust liability.210 For example, IEEE 
clearly states in its policy that it takes no position on, and has no responsibility 
for determining, the reasonableness of disclosed royalty rates or other 
licensing terms and conditions.211 Such SSOs deliberately leave the RAND 
promise vague in an effort to avoid the appearance of illegal buyers’ cartels. 
Besides the fear of violating antitrust laws by obligating ‘unreasonably low’ 
royalty rates, SSOs should avoid enunciating ‘reasonable’ royalty rates due to 
their organizational restrictions. An SSO primarily serves as a platform 
gathering related entities to formulate the technical specifications and other 
general plans such as implementations, managements or modifications with 
regard to standards. As an organizer and a coordinator in standardization, an 
SSO would put itself in a weird position if it also deals with individual 
agreements of specific licensing terms, which is supposed to be negotiated 
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restrictedly between the licensing parties. Furthermore, it is also inappropriate 
for an SSO to stipulate uniformly specific licensing rates in its patent policy. 
Obviously because, patents differ in their likely validity, their importance to the 
standard, and the ease with which they can be designed around.212 A ‘one-
size-fits-all’ royalty rate won’t be able to work well for patent licenses. 
 
II.2.4  Conclusions 
 
Patent disclosure and patent licensing obligations are the most important 
policies for a private SSO to adopt to restrict the exclusive exploitations of 
patents essential to the proposed standard. Patent disclosure requires that all 
essential patents, either issued patents or pending patent applications, as 
long as they will be necessarily infringed by implementing the final standard, 
be disclosed as soon as reasonably possible in the process of 
standardization. This obligation makes it possible that the proprietary 
characteristic of a proposed standard be fully realized by the standard-setting 
participants. Patent licensing requires that all patents included in the technical 
specifications of a standard are available for use with the price of non-
discriminatory and reasonable royalties. Patent licensing obligation makes 
sure that the ultimate standard is widely adopted and is not subject to any 
individual manipulation; meanwhile, it protects the patent holders’ legal patent 
rights by rewarding them with reasonable royalty charges. Patent disclosure 
and patent licensing assist each other in preventing and resolving ‘patent 
holdup’ problems in standardization. The combination of these two obligations 
constitutes the most effective private-sector regulations that an SSO IP policy 
could adopt, for the purpose of regulating ‘patent holdup’ and ensuring 
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procompetitive standardization. It is reiterated that the patent disclosure and 
patent licensing obligations discussed in II.2.2 and II.2.3 are applicable in 
private technical standardization regardless of different jurisdictions. The 
essential principles and requirements of the two obligations as discussed 
above should constitute the most important portions of private-sector 
regulations in relation to patent-related issues in standardization, even if there 
are no written SSOs IP policies.  Meanwhile, some specific requirements in 
relation to patent disclosure and patent licensing as discussed apply similarly 
when the public-sector patent laws (as discussed in Chapter III.2) are 
enforced. For example, RAND licensing is advisable to be adopted by courts 
when deciding licensing royalties involved in disputes in standardization. The 
interpretations of RAND licensing herein can be referred when the patent law 
lacks of detailed provisions on royalty amounts. 
 
Chapter III The Public-sector Regulations on the 
Patent-related Issues in Standardization and the 
Legal Enforceability of SSOs IP Policies – Mainly 
in the Context of Chinese Law 
 
Chapter II discusses private-sector regulations for standardization mostly in 
the form of SSOs IP policies. An SSO IP policy is a part of the bylaws of the 
organization, the patent disclosure and patent licensing obligations of which 
play important roles in curbing the patent holdup problems. However, such 
private-sector regulations, no matter how effective and specific, are still not 
formal legislations. When there is noncompliance with such private-sector 
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policies, it is necessary to turn to official laws to ultimately enforce the private 
policies.  Besides, it is impossible for an SSO IP policy to be sufficiently 
comprehensive to cover every aspect of patent-related issues and to stipulate 
every detail of potential rights and obligations. Moreover, due to the inherent 
vagueness of certain terms, e.g., ‘reasonable’, it is not practical for an SSO 
mainly as a technological joint venture to specifically define those terms in its 
IP policy. When it comes to blank areas an SSO IP policy fails to elaborate, or 
there are disputable interpretations as regards the policy itself, it is even more 
important to rely on applicable laws and legal principles to interpret the IP 
policy and to clarify the rights and obligations in standardization. These laws 
and legal principles are public-sector regulations, which are characterized as 
formal, sophisticated and effective when dealing with the patent-related 
issues in standardization. Chapter III will respectively discuss the applicable 
laws and legal principles, which may assist in enforcing the SSO IP policies or 
perform the same function to prevent or resolve the abovementioned patent-
related issues in the absence of private-sector policies. It is highlighted that 
the following discussions, unless specified otherwise, are in the context of 
relevant Chinese laws. Available doctrines and principles from other 
jurisdictions, especially from the US, are referred with the view of providing 
applicable guidance for Chinese legislation and practice in standardization. 
Since there are no well-established private SSOs and private SSOs IP 
policies in China, the analysis below in relation to the applicability of SSOs IP 
policies tends to be normative. In other words, the said analysis pertains to 
how should Chinese laws be applied to enforce or interpret Chinese private 
SSOs IP policies in the near future. 
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III.1  The Application of Contract Law as regards SSOs IP 
Policies and Patent-related Issues in 
Standardization 
III.1.1 The Nature of SSOs IP Policies  
 
In China, the bylaws of private organizations do not belong to the formal 
legislation system, which generally includes laws, administrative regulations 
and local (autonomy) regulations. 213  The nature of the bylaws of private 
associations or organizations has always been a controversial topic in legal 
academia. There are mainly two theories regarding the nature of private 
organizations’ bylaws 214 , which are also the two different theories 
respectively held by civil law countries and common law countries. The 
autonomy theory supported by civil law countries provides that the bylaws of 
private organizations are usually considered to be set up and enforced by the 
organizations.215 As long as the content of the private bylaws do no violate 
official laws and regulations, the organizations themselves have the 
autonomy to implement their bylaws within the organizations. Many scholars 
of common law systems, however, hold the contract theory that the bylaws of 
private organizations have contractual binding effects within the 
organizations. That is, a bylaw is actually a contract agreed between the 
organization and the members of it.216 In practice, a US court once noted, 
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“…the members of voluntary associations and the associations themselves 
are contractually bound to follow the bylaws, rules, and regulations of the 
association…”. 217 The following text will respectively discuss the autonomy 
theory and the contract theory, so as to figure out which one of them is more 
appropriate in deciding the nature of an SSO IP policy.  
 
III.1.1.1 The Autonomy Theory in Analyzing SSOs IP Policies 
 
In China, the autonomy theory is widely supported, while mostly in analyzing 
the nature of memorandum and articles of association of companies. For a 
company incorporated under the Chinese company law, its memorandum and 
articles of association govern the relationship between shareholders and 
directors and also the relationship between the company and the outside 
world. The enforceability of a company’s memorandum and articles of 
association is guaranteed by well-established company laws and principles.  
 
As far as SSOs IP policies are concerned, the autonomy theory cannot be 
simply applied. First of all, an SSO is different from a company set up under 
the company law. According to the General Principles of the Civil Law of 
China, an SSO as a private organization specifically set up for standardization 
could be categorized as a ‘social organization’. 218 Unlike companies, there is 
no settled conclusion that an SSO will be recognized as a ‘legal person’ that 
can enjoy civil rights and assume civil obligations, especially for the small-
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scaled SSOs or some joint ventures set up very informally to conduct 
standardization. Correspondingly, the internal bylaws of an SSO cannot be 
treated similarly as a company’s memorandum and articles of association, 
which could be implemented autonomously by the company itself and 
guaranteed by company laws. Secondly, a private SSO as an organization 
aiming at technological standardization lacks necessary legal competency to 
autonomously enforce its internal policy without resorting to laws and legal 
authorities, especially when there are disputes or noncompliance involved in 
the implementation of its IP policy. Thirdly, it seems that the existing SSOs 
have no intention to enforce their IP policies by themselves at all. From the 
SSOs I examined in this paper 219, their IP policies, if any, usually do not 
include the consequences of noncompliance. These policies merely 
enunciate the disclosure and licensing obligations while do not further clarify 
what should be done if the patentees fail to fulfill the stipulated obligations.220 
Even if those SSOs are recognized legal entities and possess the ability to 
enforce their policies by themselves, there are no specific provisions in their 
IP policies for them to rely on. It is obvious that we cannot apply the 
autonomy theory in analyzing the nature of an SSO IP policy. 221 
 
III.1.1.2 The Contract Theory in Analyzing SSOs IP Policies 
 
A patentee’s failure to disclose his essential patent or to license his patent on 
RAND terms according to the IP policy of the SSO he joined in bears great 
resemblance to a breach of agreement. Besides, it has been a long-standing 
argument in common law systems that the bylaws of private organizations are 
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in nature contracts between the organizations themselves and their 
members.222 However, it does not necessarily mean that the contract theory is 
completely applicable in analyzing SSOs IP policies.  
 
An SSO IP policy is usually drafted either by members of the SSO or a group 
of experts invited by the SSO, or both.223 It does not matter whether the IP 
policy is drafted by people independent from the SSO and whether there are 
specific procedures for drafting the IP policy or not.  Ultimately, an SSO IP 
policy governing the exploitation of patent rights is unilaterally drawn up in the 
name of the SSO.  Although the SSO IP policy is designed to clarify rights 
and obligations, it still lacks some basic features of a traditional contract. 
Generally speaking, a contract is an agreement as a result of mutual 
negotiations between two or more parties on a voluntary basis. In China, a 
contract is defined as an agreement establishing, modifying and terminating 
the civil rights and obligations between subjects with equal status. 224 
Obviously, an SSO IP policy involves no bargain or negotiation in relation to 
rights and obligations. Neither is there an explicit meet of minds. Not to 
mention the commonly known offer and acceptance when concluding a 
contract.  
 
Some people may resort to the idea of ‘standard form contracts’ in order to 
enforce SSO IP policies in the context of contract law. 225  In China, the 
corresponding concept refers to ‘standard terms’ in a contract, which are 
clauses prepared in advance for general and repeated use by one party and 
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not negotiated with the other party in concluding a contract.226 Admittedly, an 
SSO IP policy does share common ideas with standard form contracts, e.g., 
lack of negotiations, unequal bargaining power of parties, the purpose of 
repeated use, etc. However, once taking into consideration of the special role 
an SSO is playing in standardization, it would be perplexing to treat an SSO 
IP policy as a kind of standard form contract and the SSO to be one party of 
the contract.   
 
Generally speaking, an SSO merely is a platform gathering interested 
participants to develop standards. Although the proposed standard is set up 
and published in the name of the SSO, the organization itself will not 
economically benefit from the final adoption of the standard. The exploitation 
of the patents in the standard will not affect the vital interest of the 
organization either. It is the individual participants who engage in 
standardization that will be affected by the proposed standard, technically and 
economically. Whether or not the participants own essential patents of the 
proposed standard, they unanimously care about what the SSO IP policy has 
specifically stipulated. On the one hand, as to participants holding essential 
patents, they attempt to explore their exclusive rights to the maximum extent 
within the permissible range of the IP policy. On the other hand, all 
participants are concerned about whether the IP policy is effective enough to 
ensure them to use the proposed standard without being manipulated by 
essential patents holders. The SSO itself actually has no major interest in 
relation to the implementation of its IP policy. In other words, the 
noncompliance with the SSO IP policy would not cause critical loss to the 
organization. In practice, disputes in standardization often arise in the course 
of patent litigations between standardization participants, not in litigation to 
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which the SSO is a party.227 Therefore, it is inappropriate to consider an SSO 
IP policy as a standard form contract with the SSO being one of the parties.  
 
The requirements of essential patents, patent disclosure and patent licensing 
in an SSO IP policy, as specifically discussed in the last chapter, provide 
major rights and obligations for all standardization participants. Such rights 
and obligations are restrictedly interrelated among participants of the 
standardization. Therefore, the specific part of an SSO IP policy which 
clarifies rights and obligations as regards patent rights could be reasonably 
regarded as a contract between participants of the SSO. Unlike ordinary 
contracts reached through the process of negotiations between the two 
parties, such a contract is considered to be concluded based on the parties’ 
specific conducts. That is, once interested entities decide to join in the SSO to 
develop standards together, they will enter into a contract with other 
participants in standardization and are obliged to fulfill the patent disclosure 
and licensing obligations, which are stipulated in the SSO IP policy.  
 
In this regard, we may refer to the ‘implied-in-fact contract’ theory in the US to 
explain the conclusion of a contract. ‘Implied-in-fact contract’ is a common law 
term, which means “an agreement…founded upon a meeting of minds, which, 
although not embodied in an express contract, is inferred, as a fact, from 
conduct of the parties showing, in the light of the surrounding circumstances, 
their tacit understanding.”228 When it comes to an SSO IP policy, it means that 
a contract is concluded between participants of standardization the moment 
they officially join in the SSO. Instead of being negotiated by related parties, 
such a contract is special in the sense that it has already been drafted in 
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advance by an unrelated third-party—the SSO. Currently, there are no such 
stipulations or adopted principles in Chinese contract laws as regards 
‘implied-in-fact contract’ theory. It is strongly suggested that the said theory 
be introduced to Chinese contract laws so that the nature of an SSO IP policy 
would be well identified to be a contract between the standardization 
participants.  
 
After we identify an SSO IP policy to be a special kind of contract, members 
or participants of the SSO may correspondingly resort to liabilities for breach 
of contract when others fail to fulfill the obligations stipulated by the policy. In 
this sense, there should not be many differences applying contract law to 
SSO IP policies as to traditional contracts. However, due to the uniqueness of 
an SSO IP policy as a contract, special considerations have to be taken 
applying contract law. Besides, the contract law itself has limited scope of 
applications, which makes it incapable on some occasions to fully enforce an 
SSO IP policy. 
 
III.1.2  A Few Noteworthy Aspects Applying Contract Law to 
Enforce SSOs IP Policies 
 
First and foremost, in order to apply contract law to interpret and enforce an 
SSO IP policy, the policy should be clearly notified to the members or 
participants of the SSO. It is worth mentioning that an SSO IP policy as the 
bylaw of the organization at most would bind its members or other 
participants who join in the ongoing standardization. The policy only clarifies 
rights and obligations in relation to the exercises of patent rights within the 
organization. In addition, it is also fair and reasonable to expect that joining an 
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SSO or participating the standardization conducted by an SSO would 
sufficiently constitute a commitment to abiding by the bylaw of the 
organization. The consent of standardization participants to comply with an 
SSO IP policy actually means that a special contract is reached among those 
participants. Therefore, it is particularly important for the SSO IP policy to be 
clear and explicit in order to function as a contract.  
 
Some existing SSOs IP policies state in the very beginning that their 
members or interested participants should be aware of the obligations and 
comply with the policies. Take W3C for example, “the following obligations 
shall apply to all participants in W3C working groups” is clearly stated in the 
first few lines of its patent policy. 229 ANSI also declares that “every ANSI-
Accredited Standards Developer shall comply with the normative policies 
contained in this section” in an obvious way in its patent policy.230 Some 
SSOs may not emphasize the obligations of compliance as obviously as W3C 
or ANSI does. They tend to incorporate similar statements in their policies 
regarding the importance of obligations. As the IPRs in IETF Technology 
points out: “The IETF policies about the Intellectual Property Rights…are 
designed to ensure that IETF working groups and participants have as much 
information about any IPR constraints on a technical proposal as possible”.231 
So long as the member is on notice of the rules with which it must comply, 
those rules properly can be deemed part of the contract.232 Even the SSO IP 
policy is never brought to the attention of SSO members, it is customary to 
assume that mere membership in the SSO or engagement in the 
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standardization would suffice an agreement to the terms of the policy.233 
Since members of an SSO usually have no bargaining power as regards the 
IP policy (unless the policy is drafted collectively by them), it is more 
important to clearly inform these members the specific stipulations of the 
policy, which is actually a contract concerning their major rights and 
obligations. Especially when the SSO IP policy is changed, the amendments 
to the IP policy should be promptly notified to the members or participants of 
the SSO. Only in this way can the parties be well-informed of the contract 
they enter into, thus ensuring the implementation of the policy.  
 
Secondly, pertinent principles or customary rules of contract law should be 
applicable when there are different interpretations or understandings of an 
SSO IP policy. Obviously it is preferable for an SSO to clearly and 
comprehensively set out all obligations for its members. As a matter of fact, 
however, it is very difficult for an SSO IP policy to cover every aspect and 
detail of the obligations within limited space. Moreover, as every participant 
attempts to interpret the wording of the SSO IP policy in the way that favors 
himself the most, it is unavoidable that there will always be different 
understandings with regard to the same regulations of the policy. For 
example, in the famous Rambus case, disputes arose in almost every aspect 
as regards ‘what, when, how, and to whom the members must disclose patent 
information’ due to the patent policy’s lack of defining details.234 Even if the 
SSO IP policy is further specified, there will still be some important terms that 
cannot be materially explained in writing, such as ‘reasonable’ in RAND 
licensing. Under such circumstances, the customary practice of contract law 
may be applied to consistently interpret an SSO IP policy. Take Chinese 
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   Id. 
234
   See supra note 130, at 476. 
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contract law for example, for contract parties’ disputes arising from different 
understandings of any clause of the contract, it is stipulated that the true 
intention of the clause in question shall be determined according to the terms 
and expressions used in the contract, the contents of the relevant clauses of 
the contract, the purpose for concluding the contract, the transaction practices 
and the principle of good faith.235 Therefore, if participants of an SSO could 
not reach a unanimous understanding of what exactly does the IP policy 
obligate and file litigations in front of courts for breach of contract, the 
Chinese courts could clarify the obligations in the SSO IP policy applying 
appropriate principles of Chinese contract law, e.g., analyzing the genuine 
purpose of the IP policy. SSOs IP policies are drafted mainly aiming at 
preventing the involved patents from being exclusively manipulated by their 
owners. Therefore, in interpreting the detailed obligations of the IP policy 
when the policy is unclear or disputable, we could first analyze the aims which 
the policy is to achieve. If the policy explicitly or implicitly advocates early and 
complete disclosure, we could infer the meaning of ‘as soon as possible’ or 
patents ‘related to’ standardization in absence of the policy’s specifications. 
The purpose of the IP policy is also referable when we define the 
requirements of ‘reasonable’ licensing terms. Besides, courts could also 
interpret the detailed requirements of an SSO IP policy by referring to the 
industry custom, the common knowledge or the particular course of dealing of 
the participants in standardization. In Rambus, for example, the plaintiff 
argued that the IP owner should be bound not only by JEDEC’s express IP 
policy, which covered issued patents, but also by the unwritten understanding 
of all members that pending patent applications should also be disclosed.236 
Thus, if it is customary in standardization to consider that a duty to disclose in 
                                                
235
   See Contract Law of China, Article 125. 
236
   See supra note 24, at 1911. 
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an SSO IP policy should require disclosure of both issued patents and patent 
applications, it may be implied that Rambus and Infineon have agreed to 
disclose both their issued patents and pending patent applications. In a word, 
when an SSO IP policy is not specific enough as regards its obligations, it 
does not necessarily mean that we cannot implement such a policy.  
 
III.1.3 Limitations of Enforcing SSOs IP Policies as Contracts 
 
Contract laws have superiority in interpreting and enforcing an SSO IP policy, 
especially when there are disputes as regards noncompliance of the policy 
between members or participants of the SSO. However, due to limited areas 
of application or loopholes in contract laws, it is not advisable to completely 
rely on contract laws to enforce an SSO IP policy.  
 
First of all, if there is no contract at all, it would be impossible to apply 
contract laws. Not all SSOs IP policies are comprehensively drafted as 
regards every detail of the exploitation of patent rights. Especially for small-
scale SSOs or joint ventures set up for standardization, they lack the 
awareness and experience of appropriately regulating patent rights in 
standardization. Therefore, there will always be some areas that SSOs IP 
policies, if any, fail to cover. For example, some SSOs may just encourage 
patent disclosure instead of requiring it in their IP policies. In such cases, 
there won’t be a binding contract. Although sometimes contract laws could fill 
in certain blanks as regards ambiguous terms of a contract by referring to 
actual circumstances, industry norms, actions of parties, purposes of the 
contract, etc., it does not mean that we can totally rely on contract laws to 
create an IP policy out of nothing. Besides, there are occasions that SSOs 
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deliberately ignore to mention specific obligations, such as licensing royalties, 
in order to avoid antitrust or the like liabilities. Under such circumstances, it 
would be inappropriate to enforce the IP policy as a contract since there is no 
intention to conclude a contract at all.  
 
Another limitation of enforcing an SSO IP policy as a contract results from the 
privity of contracts.  The doctrine of privity in contract law is generally 
acknowledged in both civil and common law systems. Simply speaking, it 
means that a contract has no binding effects on others except the parties to it. 
Only parties to contracts should be able to enforce their rights or claim 
damages as such. 237  There is no meet of minds for third parties during 
conclusion of a contract, therefore, such third parties will not undertake the 
contractual obligations and also cannot claim contractual rights. However, this 
doctrine has been criticized to be problematic in recent times, especially as 
regards contracts made for the benefit of third parties. In the US, not only 
parties to a contract but also a third party have the standing to enforce the 
contract, as long as the third party is the intended beneficiary of the 
contract.238 In UK, the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 also sets 
out the circumstances in which a third party would have the right to enforce a 
term of the contract. 239  In China, whether a third party would have the 
standing to enforce a contract is still in dispute. The controversy arises as a 
result of different understandings of Articles 64 and 65 of Chinese contract 
                                                
237
   See Wang Liming, The Research of Civil and Commercial Law, Law Press China, 1999, at 
437. See also Rebecca Lim, The Doctrine of Privity of Contract, 2 October 2008, at: 
http://www.articlealley.com/article_655389_18.html. 
238
   The principle of third party beneficiaries in contract law has been recognized by many 
states in the US. For example, for a third-party beneficiary to succeed on a breach of 
contract claim under New York law, the party "must establish (1) existence of a valid and 
binding contract between other parties, (2) that the contract was intended for his or her 
benefit, and (3) that the benefit to him or her is sufficiently immediate, rather than 
incidental, to indicate the assumption by the contracting parties of a duty to compensate 
him if the benefit is lost." See Synovus Bank of Tampa Bay v. Valley National Bank, 487 
F.Supp.2d 360, 368 (S.D.N.Y.2007) (quoting BDG Oceanside, LLC v. RAD Terminal Corp., 
14 A.D.3d 472, 473, 787 N.Y.S.2d 388, 390 (2d Dep't 2005)). 
239
   See Section 1of UK Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999. 
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law. Take Article 64 for example, it stipulates that “where the parties agree 
that the obligor performs the obligations to a third party, and the obligor fails 
to perform the obligations to the third party or the performance does not meet 
the terms of the contract, the obligor shall be liable to the obligee for the 
breach of contract”. Some scholars believe that it is actually the legal 
recognition of ‘contracts for the benefit of third parties’, which is similar with 
the corresponding theory of ‘third party beneficiary’ in the US contract law. 
Scholars with different viewpoints, however, consider Article 64 of Chinese 
contract law as a rule merely recognizing a different way to perform the 
contractual obligations. The third party mentioned in Article 64 lacks 
independent right of claim based on the contract, therefore, can not enforce 
the contract as a party. In this regard, the ‘third party’ in Article 64 differs from 
‘third party beneficiary’ recognized in other legal systems and the contract 
described in this article is not drafted for the benefit of the ‘third party’. 
Currently, there is no explicit stipulation of ‘contracts for the benefit of third 
parties’ in Chinese contract laws. Amendments to Contract Law of China in 
relation to acknowledgment of such contracts have been put in legislation 
agenda.  
 
Broadly speaking, an SSO IP policy has binding effects on both its members 
and non-members who participate in ongoing standardization conducted by 
the SSO. Therefore, when we enforce the SSO IP policy as a binding 
contract, the parties to the contract should be strictly restricted within the 
boundary of members and participants of the SSO. That means only 
members and participants of the SSO could claim their rights against other 
members’ or participants’ noncompliance with the IP policy. As for entities 
which are neither members nor participants of the SSO, theyare not obliged 
to abide by the SSO IP policy, therefore, no contracts exist between those 
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outside entities and the members or the participants. Consequently, outsiders 
have no such standing to require members or participants of the SSO to fulfill 
obligations even if these members or participants have contractually 
committed themselves to the SSO IP policy. When these nonmembers are 
denied applying the final standard because an essential patentee refuses to 
grant a license as the SSO IP policy required, they cannot sue for breach of 
contract since in the first place they are not parties to the contract. It is 
troubling for all members of the public outside the SSO. Besides, it is also 
against the genuine purpose an SSO IP policy, which is to restrict the 
exercise of exclusive patent rights so that the standard developed by the SSO 
will be adopted as widely as possible. When an SSO requires its members or 
participants to disclose or license their patents in its IP policy, it is supposed 
to require them to fulfill their obligations to everyone who is interested in 
applying the final standard, not just to other members or participants of the 
SSO. Here is the area where contract laws seem to be helpless. Due to the 
nature of privity, contract laws cannot regulate rights and obligations beyond 
parties to a contract. Since there is no binding contract between members or 
participants of the SSO and the rest of the whole society, members of the 
public outside the SSO presumably have no contractual rights in relation to 
the SSO IP policy. Some people may resort to the idea of ‘third party 
beneficiary’ or ‘contracts for the benefit of third parties’ supporting 
nonmembers’ contractual rights based on the SSO IP policy. Not to mention 
that China hasn’t officially acknowledged ‘contracts for the benefit of third 
parties’, even in other legal systems which have explicit rules of ‘third party 
beneficiary’ in contract laws, it is a little far-fetched to consider members of 
the public as third parties to SSOs’ contract-like policies. In the US, only when 
the third party is the intended beneficiary of the contract could he enforce the 
99 
contract in his own right.240 In UK, the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 
1999 stipulates that in order for a third party to enforce a term of the contract, 
the third party has to be expressly identified that he may enforce the contract 
or he is conferred a benefit by the contract.241 As far as the existing SSOs IP 
policies are concerned, those SSOs do not identify the general public as the 
beneficiaries of their IP policies. Even though SSOs may actually hope that all 
members of the public could benefit from standards developed and promoted, 
hardly any of them express their hope in writing in their IP policies. Besides, 
courts generally would not interpret a contract to render the public at large a 
beneficiary.  
 
In conclusion, members of the public outside the SSO lack the standing of 
enforcing its IP policy by applying contract laws. This is the major limitation of 
considering an SSO IP policy as a contract between members or participants 
of the organization. In order to assure that members or participants of an SSO 
would fulfill their commitments to reasonably exploiting their patent rights 
within the whole society, alternative ways apart from contract laws have to be 
sought to empower the general public to enforce the SSO IP policy.  
 
III.2  The Application of IP Law as regards SSOs IP 
Policies and Patent Holdups in Standardization 
 
An SSO IP policy governs the exercises of patent rights. Since contract law 
has its limitation enforcing the IP policy, we may consider applying IP law 
directly to regulate the exploitations of patent rights in standardization. After 
                                                
240
   See supra note 238. 
241
   See UK Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, § 1(1) (2) (3), at: 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/ACTS/acts1999/ukpga_19990031_en_1.htm. 
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all, patent law specializes in coping with patent licensing, patent infringement 
and the like patent-related disputes. In general, patent-related disputes in 
technical standardization arise in mainly two aspects: patent disclosure and 
patent licensing, which are also the major obligations required by SSOs IP 
policies. When an SSO member holding essential patent fails to disclose his 
patent as the SSO IP policy requires, is there any applicable principle of 
patent law dealing with the nondisclosure? When a patentee refuses to 
license his essential patent to other standard adopters or charges 
unreasonably high royalties for using his patents in standardization, which 
rule of patent law could potential licensees rely on in order to obtain a 
reasonable license?  
 
III.2.1 An Introduction of Chinese Patent Laws 
 
At present, the Patent Law of China in force is the third revised version of the 
first Patent Law adopted in 1984.242 Although the latest revision took place 
quite recently, the current Patent Law of China is relatively young and still 
maintains many characteristics of the original version, which was enacted in 
the first few years of the Economic Reform and Opening up of China.243 
                                                
242
   The Patent law of China was adopted at the 4th Session of the Standing Committee of the 
Sixth National People's Congress on 12 March 1984. Amended by the Decision Regarding 
the Revision of the Patent Law of the People's Republic of China, adopted at the 27th 
Session of the Standing Committee of the Seventh National People's Congress on 4 
September 1992. Amended for the second time by the Decision Regarding the Revision of 
the Patent Law of the People's Republic of China, adopted at the 17th Session of the 
Standing Committee of the Ninth National People's Congress on 25 August 2000. 
Amended for the third time by the Decision Regarding the Revision of the Patent Law of 
the People's Republic of China, adopted at the 6th Session of the Standing Committee of 
the Eleventh National People's Congress on 27 December 2008.  
243
   The Reform and Opening up policy was launched at the Third Plenary Session of the 11th 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in 1978, with the leader Deng 
Xiaoping being the ‘chief architect’. The policy was designed to help China achieve the 
modernization of agriculture, industry, science and technology, as well as the military. It 
created a brand new era in Chinese history known as ‘Reform and Opening up’ to the 
outside world. For more information on the Chinese ‘Reform and Opening up’ policy, see 
101 
During the past two decades, science and technology were the major targets 
of Chinese modernization and were considered to be the first productive 
force.244 The Patent Law of China then, enacted under the circumstance of 
promoting technological modernization, was undoubtedly supposed to 
undertake the mission of encouraging and protecting the development of 
technology. It is clearly stated in the first article of the general provisions of 
the Patent Law of China that “this law is enacted to protect the legitimate 
rights of patentees, to encourage inventions-creations and to promote their 
applications, to enhance the ability of innovations and to promote the 
advancement of science and technology and the development of economy 
and society”.245 Apart from some explanatory and procedural rules on patent 
applications or patent examinations, the Patent Law of China focuses mainly 
on the protection of patent rights and remedies for infringing the protected 
patent rights. Throughout the whole passage of the current Patent Law of 
China with altogether 76 articles, there is hardly any article as regards how to 
regulate or restrict the exercises of patent rights except the rules of 
compulsory licensing. 246  It shows an inclination for Chinese legislators to 
encourage and promote technological development. Such a protective patent 
system may have promoted the advancement of technology, however, it 
tends to accommodate overexploitations of exclusive patent rights in the 
meantime.  
 




   “Science and technology are the first productive force.” The great leader of China, Deng 
Xiaoping, first came up with this statement during the conversation with the president of 
Czechoslovakia, Husak Gustav, in 1988. 
245
   See Patent Law of China, Article 1.  
       See translated text at: http://www.chinaiprlaw.com/english/laws/laws4.htm. 
246
  “Compulsory Licensing” is provided in Articles 48 to 58 in the Patent Law of China. The 
application of the “compulsory licensing” rules in patent licensing in standardization will be 
explored in detail in Chapter III.2.3.  
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As shown by the DVD patent fee case discussed previously 247, the lack of 
pertinent regulations in respect of the proper boundary of exercises of patent 
rights could facilitate ambitious patentees to unreasonably exploit their 
exclusive patent rights. When patentees could obtain profits through their 
unrestricted patent exploitations in excess of their patents’ contributions to the 
society, the substantial effectiveness of the patent systems will be 
compromised. When exercises of patent rights actually stall technological 
development or restrict fair competition or harm social welfare, it is time for 
patent laws to become more restrictive while less protective.  
 
Actually, the necessity of controlling the exploitation of patent rights within an 
appropriate boundary was brought to legislators’ attention during discussions 
of the third amendment of the Patent Law of China from 2005 to 2008. The 
balance between interests of patent right holders and the public, as well as 
proper restrictions that may be imposed on the exercises of patent rights were 
extensively discussed among legal scholars, practitioners from various 
institutions, government or judicial authorities and social agencies during a 
series of seminars organised by the State Intellectual Property Office of China 
(“SIPO”) 248 for the third amendment to the Patent Law of China.249 Based on 
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   See Chapter I.5.2 from pages 23 to 25.   
248
   The former body of SIPO is the Chinese Patent Office, founded in 1980. In 1998, during a 
reform to the governmental bodies, the name of the Chinese Patent Office changed to 
SIPO, which is directly subordinated to the State Council. Now, the Patent Office is 
affiliated to SIPO. The SIPO bears mainly the following responsibilities: to draft proposals 
of and amendments to patent-related legislations; to receive and examine patent 
applications for invention, utility model and design, to grant patents, to deal with requests 
for reexamination and invalidation, and to receive and examine applications for registration 
of layout designs of integrated circuits; to coordinate and harmonize international affairs in 
IP field; to administer nation-wide patent affairs; and to instruct local governmental 
agencies in administrative enforcement of the patent law. For more information, see 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo_English/. 
249
   According to the online interview with SIPO, the third amendment of the Patent Law of 
China mainly follows three basic principles: First, it has to appropriately balance the 
interest between patent holders and the public. Second, it should comply with international 
norms by referring to other countries’ successful experience; meanwhile, comprehensively 
take into consideration of China’s specific situation. Third, it should assure the legal 
consistency and applicability of the Patent Law of China. See the Latest Contents of the 
Draft of the Third Amendment of the Patent Law of China (consolidated in the Special 
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available experience from patent laws of foreign countries, several specific 
rules were proposed to be added to the new Patent Law of China in order to 
control the exploitation of exclusive patent rights. Among the suggestions 
such as the doctrine of patent misuse 250 , equitable estoppel 251 , patent 
prosecution laches,252 etc.,253 the doctrine of patent misuse is probably the 
most pertinent rule with regard to enforcing SSOs IP policies. As will be 
discussed in Chapter II.2.2, the doctrine of patent misuse and an SSO IP 
policy share the same goal of restricting the exercises of patent rights. Even 
when there is no SSO IP policy, the doctrine of patent misuse is still 
applicable in regulating patent holdups in standardization.254 It is the major 
strength of applying patent laws to regulate exercises of patent rights in 
standardization, compared to contract laws which are only applicable when 
there are explicit SSOs IP policies. Chapter III.2.3 discusses the applicability 
of compulsory licensing provisions in the current Patent Law of China in 
relation to the patent holdup problems in standardization, especially when a 
patentee refuses to license his essential patent. 
 
The thirdly revised Patent Law of China which came into effect from 1 
October 2009, does not eventually incorporate the ‘doctrine of patent misuse’ 
                                                                                                                             
Subject of the Third Amendment of the Patent Law of China and its Implementing Rules), 
at: http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo/ztxx/zlfjqssxzdscxg/200701/t20070119_127871.htm. 
250
   Doctrine of patent misuse will be discussed in detail in Chapter III.2.2. 
251
   Estoppel is a common law principle that prevents a person from asserting or denying 
something in court that contradicts what has already been established as the truth. It is 
generally applied to complement the requirement of consideration in contract law. 
Equitable estoppel is a type of estoppel that bars a person from adopting a position in 
court that contradicts his or her past statements or actions when that contradictory stance 
would be unfair to another person who relied on the original position. 
252
   Patent prosecution laches doctrine is a defense in the patent arena typically involving a 
situation in which a patent owner sues an alleged infringer and the alleged infringer 
contends that the owner’s delay in bringing suit was unreasonable and inexcusable, 
resulting in material prejudice to the alleged infringer. 
253
   These suggestions were proposed during the discussion of the third amendment of the 
Patent Law of China. See the Latest Contents of the Draft of the Third Amendment of the 
Patent Law of China (consolidated in the Special Subject of the Third Amendment of the 
Patent Law of China and its Implementing Rules), at: 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo/ztxx/zlfjqssxzdscxg/200701/t20070119_127871.htm.  
254
   As regards ‘patent holdup’, see supra note 94 and the texts accompanying it on page 45. 
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as discussed during the preparation of the third amendment. According to an 
SIPO officer in a press conference in response to why there is no provision 
added to the Patent Law of China in respect of prevention of patent misuse, 
the officer explained that the legislators are currently inclined of perfecting the 
system of patent protection first before focusing on preventing the patent 
rights from being misused.255 Although the ‘doctrine of patent misuse’ was yet 
to be introduced to the current Patent Law of China, it doesn’t mean that the 
same is without legislative merits.  Chapter III.2.2 below is a discussion on a 
normative basis, trying to analyze whether there should be such a doctrine, 
and if so, what should the said doctrine specifically require in the context of 
Chinese patent laws and how it could be applied in the exercises of patent 
rights in standardization.  
 
III.2.2   Doctrine of Patent Misuse 
III.2.2.1 The Originality of the Doctrine of Patent Misuse – Lessons 
from the US 
 
The patent misuse doctrine originally developed as a common law equitable 
affirmative defense to an infringement claim, similar to the traditional ‘unclean 
hands’ doctrine in tort law.256  Simply speaking, only those patent holders 
having ‘clean hands’ should be legally supported to enforce their patent 
rights. In its most general terms, the patent misuse doctrine has come to 
                                                
255
   See news release, There Is No Provision on Prevention of Patent Misuse in the Newly 
Amended Patent Law of China, 27 December 2008, at http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2008-12 
27/164616932758.shtml. 
256
   See Mark A. Lemley, The Economic Irrationality of the Patent Misuse Doctrine, 78 
California Law Review, 1990, at 1608. 
 Unclean hands, sometimes clean hands doctrine, is an equitable defense in which the 
defendant argues that the plaintiff is not entitled to obtain an equitable remedy on account 
of the fact that the plaintiff is acting unethically or has acted in bad faith with respect to the 
subject of the complaint—that is, with "unclean hands". 
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mean that “if a patent owner exploits his patent in an improper manner by 
violating the antitrust laws or extending the patent beyond its lawful scope, 
the courts will withhold any remedy for infringement—even against an 
infringer who is not harmed by the abusive practice.”257  There are some 
disagreements as regards when the misuse doctrine was first identified. 
Some believe it was first applied by the Supreme Court of the US in 1917 in 
the Motion Picture Patents case.258 In that case, the patentee attempted to 
enforce tying259 arrangements, which required that a prospective licensee of a 
patent also agreed to purchase unpatented products from him. The Court 
rejected the license restriction based on the fact that the patent license was 
imposed beyond the scope of the patent.  It was held that the patent law 
could not justify such a restriction, nor would it permit the patent rules to be 
extended by contracts.260 Some believe that the patent misuse doctrine was 
originated by name in the US Morton Salt case. 261  In Morton Salt, the 
defendant who allegedly copied the patent holder’s machine submitted to the 
court a contract with a tie-in between the patentee and a licensee. The 
Supreme Court thus held that such a misuse rendered a patent 
unenforceable against anyone—even an outright infringer not to the license—
until the improper practice has been abandoned and the consequences of the 
misuse of the patent have been dissipated.262 Chief Justice Stone stated in 
Morton Salt: 
                                                
257
   See Robert P. Merges, Note, Is the Patent Misuse Doctrine Obsolete?, 110 Harvard Law 
Review, 1997, at 1923. 
258
    See supra note 255, at 1609. See also Stephen Calkins, Patent Law: The Impact of the 
1988 Patent Misuse Reform act and Noerr-Pennington Doctrine on Misuse Defenses and 
Antitrust Counterclaims, 38 Drake Law Review, 1989, at 180. See Motion Picture Patents 
Co. V. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917). 
259
   Tying, simply speaking, is the practice of making the sale of one good (the tying good) to 
the customer conditional on the purchase of a second distinctive good (the tied good). In 
the US, some kinds of tying, especially by contract, have historically been regarded to be 
anti-competitive, since consumers are harmed by being forced to buy an undesired good 
(the tied good) in order to purchase a good they actually want (the tying good). 
260
    See Motion Picture Patents Co. V. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 513 (1917). 
261
    See Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488(1942). 
262
    Id. at 493. 
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 “The public policy which includes inventions within the granted 
monopoly excludes from it all that is not embraced in the invention. It 
equally forbids the use of the patent to secure an exclusive right or 
limited monopoly not granted by the Patent Office and which it is 
contrary to public policy to grant”.263 
 
No matter when it was legally recognized, the patent misuse doctrine in US 
patent laws was gradually applied to many other types of licensing practices 
and was broadly interpreted to cover a wider range of activities.264 Lower 
courts of the US subsequently relied on broad language concerning misuse in 
the Supreme Court cases to create new misuse categories.265 In addition to 
tying, which is the area where the patent misuse doctrine first developed, 
there are several other conducts that have been recognized to constitute 
misuses of patents. The examples, not necessarily exhaustive, include ‘total 
sales royalties’ 266 , ‘post-expiration royalties’ 267 , ‘extension beyond patent 
term’, ‘resale price maintenance’, ‘price discrimination’, ‘noncompetition 
agreements’, etc. 268   Briefly speaking, a patent misuse behavior is often 
characterized as exerting patent rights beyond the lawful scope stipulated by 
patent laws or restricting free competition protected by competition laws.269 
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   Id. at 494. 
264
   See supra note 257, at 1923. 
265
   See Dianne Brinson, Patent Misuse: Time for a Change, 16 Rutgers Computer & 
Technology Law Journal, 1990, at 368. 
266
   ‘Total sales royalties’ means ‘insistence by a patent owner on royalties on total sales or 
conditioning payment of royalties on items not covered by the claims of the patent’. See 
James B. Kobak, Jr., The Misuse Defense and Intellectual Property Litigation, 1 Boston 
University Journal of Science & Technology Law, 1995, at 13. 
267
   ‘Post expiration royalties’ means royalties that continue to accrue after the patent expires.  
268
   See Stephen Calkins, Patent Law: The Impact of the 1988 Patent Misuse Reform act and 
Noerr-Pennington Doctrine on Misuse Defenses and Antitrust Counterclaims, 38 Drake 
Law Review, 1989, at 187. 
269
   Most of the US literature on the doctrine of patent misuse holds the similar idea that patent 
misuse usually means to improperly exploit patent rights either beyond the lawful scope or 
violating the antitrust or competition laws. See, e.g., supra note 257, at 1923; supra note 
266, at 13. 
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III.2.2.2  Discussions of Patent Misuse in Context of Chinese 
Patent Laws 
 
Although there is no official legislation, the concept of ‘patent misuse’ has 
been introduced to patent practice in China. In the aforementioned DVD 
patent fee dispute270, Chinese scholars alleged that there had been patent 
misuse 271 behaviors since the patentee attempted to implement an invalid 
patent in China. On 4 December 2005, Professor Zhang Ping from Law 
School of Beijing University personally requested invalidation of a Chinese 
patent owned by Philips in the DVD patent pool.272 On 4 January 2006, other 
four professors who are also intellectual property experts respectively 
requested invalidation of the same patent in front of the Patent 
Reexamination Board of SIPO.273 Philips actually was uncertain about the 
validity of its Chinese patent being challenged. Instead of facing the risk that 
its patent might be totally invalidated by Chinese patent authority (SIPO), 
Philips began to negotiate with the professors. After near four-month’s 
negotiation between Philips and the five professors, a Joint Statement was 
agreed and published on 10 December 2006. In the statement, Philips agreed 
to withdraw the challenged Chinese patent from the patent list of the DVD 
patent licensing agreement and promised to never claim rights of this patent 
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   See page 23 to 25 of this paper. 
271
   See subsequent discussions in relation to what is patent misuse defined in China.  
272
   The patent was applied in China and owned by Philips. It is a patent of “transmitting and 
receiving method of code data, and its transmitter and receiver”, CN95192413.3.  
273
   These professors are Tao Xinliang from Intellectual Property Institute of Shanghai 
University, Shan Xiaoguang from Intellectual Property Institute of Tongji University, Zhu 
Xuezhong from Intellectual Property Institute of Zhongnan University of  Economics and 
Law, Xu Jiali from Intellectual Property Centre of China University of Political Science and 
Law. 
       The Patent Re-examination board of SIPO takes charge of examining the request for 
invalidation of patent rights, re-examining patent applications which are rejected by SIPO, 
etc. 
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in China. That means the challenged patent owned by Philips is actually 
ineffective in China since it cannot be put in a patent pool for joint license any 
more, neither can it be separately licensed. Philips waived a great portion of 
its exclusive rights, only for the purpose of maintaining the validity of its patent 
in issue. Correspondingly, the five professors withdrew their requests for 
invalidation since they had achieved their major aim of preventing the patent 
of Philips from charging Chinese patent users royalties.  This personal 
request for invalidation of a patent is not merely targeted to a single patent 
but more importantly to arouse the awareness for Chinese legislators to 
establish a set of IP rules to prevent patents from being misused, especially 
by foreign patentees, according to Professor Zhang Ping.274  
 
Since there is no formal legislation, ‘patent misuse’ has various definitions in 
Chinese legal scholarship. Some scholars theoretically define patent misuse 
as an inappropriate exploitation of patent rights, which exceeds the legitimate 
scope or a proper limit and harms others’ even the whole society’s 
interests.275 Some believe patent misuse generally means that a patentee 
inappropriately exercises his patent rights by refusing to license or leveraging 
his superior position, thus unreasonably restricting trade or unfairly affecting 
trade.276 During the discussion of China’s third amendment of Patent Law, it 
was summarized that patent misuse in China mainly arises in the forms of 
questionable patents, duplicated grants, inappropriate warning letters for 
patent infringement and so on.277  
 
                                                
274
    See Zhang Ping, Liu Chao, Review and Consideration on the Philips DVD/3C Patent In-
validate Commonweal Case, 05 Electronic Intellectual Property, 2007. 
275
    See Liu Shuhua, the Antimonopoly Regulations of Patent Misuse in Standardization, 07 
Lanzhou Academic Journal, 2006, at 21. 
276
    See Xu Lifeng, Li Ning, the Research of Antitrust Issues in the Patent Area—A Discussion 
of the Misuse of Patent Rights, 04 Journal of Nanjing University, 1998, at 146 to 154. 
277
    See pages 100 to 104 of this paper. 
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From the above discussions of Chinese practitioners and scholars, we may 
note that ‘patent misuse’ is defined more broadly in context of Chinese law 
than it was in the US. Not only exerting patent rights beyond the lawful scope 
is considered to be patent misuse (the same as the US) but also taking 
advantages of the loopholes of the patent system, such as exercising 
questionable patents, is also considered to constitute a patent misuse 
behavior. In other words, patent misuse in China includes not only misuse of 
a patent itself but also misuse of the patent system. The former misuse is 
characterized as exceeding the lawful scope required by either patent law or 
competition law. The latter derives from the flaws of the patent system.  
 
I think it is unwise to mix these two kinds of misuse behaviors into one 
concept. Actually, the latter form of misuse—taking advantages of a faulty 
patent system—could only be prevented or regulated through improving the 
patent system of the country. The major question is not about exceeding a 
lawful scope but the patent being exploited is actually questionable or invalid 
due to the low standard of patentability required by patent laws. In Japan, the 
exploitation of invalid patents is considered to be ‘abuse of patent right’, which 
specifically means that a patentee claims his rights based on obviously invalid 
patent rights.278  In my opinion, it is necessary to differentiate these two kinds 
of misuse and to stipulate different regulations in Chinese patent laws. The 
most obvious difference is that the patent in ‘patent misuse’ is valid while the 
patent in ‘misuse of the patent system’ is questionable in respect of its 
effectiveness, quality or even validity. 
 
                                                
278
    See Japan’s Kilby Case, 1998(O) No. 364, Supreme Ct., 11 April 2000. 
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III.2.2.3 Proposed Patent Misuse Regulations in Chinese Patent 
Laws and Their Applications in Standardization 
 
During discussions of the third amendment of Patent Law of China, ‘patent 
misuse’ was not specifically discussed on its applications in technical 
standardization.  However, we may infer from the above proposed definition 
of ‘patent misuse’ to conclude that a patent involved in standardization is 
considered to be misused if the patentee exploits his legally granted patent 
rights beyond a lawful scope or beyond reasonable limits, resulting in harming 
others’ even the whole society’s public interest or restricting fair competition 
protected by competition law.279 Below is a discussion on how should the 
doctrine of patent misuse, if adopted by Chinese patent laws, be applied in 
regulating ‘patent holdups’ in standardization.  
 
During the process of standard setting, standard implementing or standard 
revising, a patentee may manipulate his legally granted patent right beyond 
the limits required by SSOs or against the ultimate aim of standardization in 
order to control the proposed standards in pursuit of benefits he cannot 
achieve in open competition. The manipulative behaviors always arise in the 
context of patent disclosure and patent licensing. In formulating the technical 
specifications of a standard, a patentee may deliberately hide the information 
that his patent covers the proposed standard and later allege his exclusive 
patent right when the standard has been officially adopted. Or a patentee may 
disclose his essential patent but refuses to license or charges commercially 
unreasonable royalties to the standard adopters. Actually, a patentee’s 
nondisclosure of his patent or refusal to grant license to others are perfectly 
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ordinary conducts under normal circumstances. Whether a patent should be 
made known by the public or who is eligible to obtain the license to use a 
patent are up to the patent owner’s unilateral decision. However, when it 
comes to standardization, a patentee’s exclusive rights should be narrowed in 
the sense that the exercise of a single patent could affect the exercises of 
other patents involved in the final standard.  Because of the competitive 
necessity for potential adopters to practice the final standard, particularly in 
industries characterized by network effects, the exclusive power of a patent in 
standardization will be amplified, compared to when it is individually 
exercised.280  
 
A patentee’s failure to disclose his essential patent to the SSO causes 
uncertainty to the proprietary extent of a technical standard. Regardless of 
whether the SSO has required patent disclosure obligations in its IP policy, 
the intentional nondisclosure of essential patents is contradicted with the 
open and transparent nature of standard aiming at widespread industry 
access. When such undisclosed patents are leveraged in the licensing phase, 
the standard thus could be easily captured by a few industry participants as a 
hostage against the whole society. If an SSO is not fully informed of the 
proprietary extent of the technologies under consideration for adoption due to 
a patentee’s willful nondisclosure, especially when there are alternative 
nonproprietary technologies for the SSO to choose, it is reasonable to expect 
that the undisclosed patent should not be exploited as the malicious patentee 
wishes.  
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   See Janice M. Mueller, Patent Misuse Through the Capture of Industry Standards, 17 
Berkeley Technology Law Journal, 2002, at 623. 
112 
The intentional nondisclosure of an essential patent is not a real ‘use’ of 
patent rights, not to mention exceeding the lawful scope required by patent 
law, yet it still could be regarded as a kind of patent misuse behaviors since it 
negatively affects free and fair competition.281  The justification lies in the 
origin where the doctrine of patent misuse first developed. The patent misuse 
doctrine is a doctrine of equity originally created by courts in the US to further 
the public interest. 282  It can be broadly applied to prevent a patentee’s 
actions or inactions contrary to the public interest. Only patent holders with 
‘clean hands’283 are eligible to be protected by patent laws to enforce their 
patent rights. In standardization, when an essential patent holder intentionally 
fails to fulfill his disclosure obligation required by the SSO IP policy, the patent 
misuse doctrine should be applicable to deprive the patentee of any remedy, 
injunctive or monetary, for use of his patented technology. Even when the IP 
policy is not clear about the disclosure obligation, if there is adequate 
evidence to prove that the patentee does conceal his patent for the sake of 
capturing the proposed standard, the doctrine of patent misuse could also be 
applied as an affirmative defense to the patentee’s allegations of 
infringement. If a patentee does not intentionally conceal his essential patent, 
e.g., due to the practical difficulties of figuring out his entire patent portfolios, it 
would be unreasonable to deprive his right to enforce his patent altogether. 
Under such circumstances, we may first resort to negotiations of licensing 
possibilities instead of directly applying the doctrine of patent misuse since 
the patentee does not intend to exploit his patent rights with ‘unclean hands’. 
The above analysis of the applications of patent misuse doctrine as regards 
                                                
281
   As discussed, patent misuse generally means that a patent holder exploits his patent in an 
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nondisclosure of essential patents, is based on the existing doctrine of patent 
misuse from the US and is also applicable in Chinese practice. 
 
Even after a patentee has disclosed his essential patent, he could still capture 
the proposed standard by setting licensing obstacles to potential standard 
adopters. He may either charge unreasonably high licensing fees or refuse to 
grant a license at all. Due to the inseparable nature of a standard as a 
package of a set of correlative technologies, potential licensees could be 
denied the access of using the standard only because one licensor’s refusal 
to license. Originally, the doctrine of patent misuse in the US developed in a 
tying license case. For a long time, the doctrine was applied in the US most 
frequently in the context of patent licensing. Actually, there were always 
dissenting opinions contended that the doctrine of patent misuse in the US 
was too broadly defined that the legal rights of patentees might be 
unreasonably restricted. Some judges or scholars believed that excluding 
competitors from the use of a patent “may be said to have been of the very 
essence of the right conferred by the patent”.284 People valuing the exclusive 
rights and legal monopolies granted by patent laws believe that a patentee 
has unquestioned rights to refuse to license his patent at all and to impose 
whatever conditions he desires on the license.285 In 1988, the US Congress 
placed substantial restrictions on an infringer’s right to defend by adding two 
subsections to the three then-existing patent misuse safe harbors.286  This 
1988 Patent Misuse Reform Act provides that: 
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“No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or 
contributory infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed 
guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by reason 
of…having ‘refused to license or use any rights to the patent’ or 
‘conditioned the license of any rights to the patent or the sale of the 
patented product on the acquisition of a license to rights in another 
patent or purchase of a separate product, unless, in view of the 
circumstances, the patent owner has market power in the relevant 
market for the patent or patented product on which the license or sale 
is conditioned.”287  
 
Read literally, it seems that the safe harbors would permit a patentee to freely 
exercise his licensing right without being afraid of patent misuse defenses. In 
the context of standardization, it appears to permit a patentee holding an 
essential patent of the proposed standard to refuse to license or charge any 
amount of royalties to potential licensees who must use his patent in order to 
conform to the standard. That would be very upsetting for all the industrial 
participants who are interested in adopting technical standards. Actually, the 
safe harbor of refusals to license should not be interpreted so broadly as to 
exempt any such refusals from patent misuse scrutiny, especially when 
standardization is concerned. Due to the amplified power a standard would 
confer to an involved patentee’s exclusive patent right, a patentee’s 
unrestricted right of refusal to license to any standard adopters could pose 
much bigger threat than he solely exercises his patent rights without the 
platform of standardization. Standards, characterized as open, free access 
and widespread adoption, could not afford the risk of being captured by a 
single or a handful of industrial participants. The manipulative patentee could 
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deny others’ access of using the standard by simply refusing to grant licenses 
or charging expensive royalties. The market monopoly or the unreasonably 
high benefits achieved from these behaviors actually exceed the lawful scope 
of the benefits a patent is supposed to bring to its owner. Therefore, the 
patent misuse defense should not be so circumscribed to preclude any 
assertion of a patent misuse defense in respect of standards capture. It can 
still be raised in cases of truly unreasonable refusals to license or 
unreasonably high royalties that harm the public’s welfare.288 Especially when 
a patentee intentionally fails to disclose his patent in the standard-setting 
process and then attempts to manipulate his licensing right against the 
following standard adopters, it is reasonable to expect that the doctrine of 
patent misuse should be applicable to prevent the evil patentee from 
exploiting his patent unrestrictedly. When determining whether a patentee’s 
exercise of patent right in standardization constitutes a misuse,  courts may 
refer to general guidelines such as whether the exercise of patent rights has 
exceeded the lawful scope; whether fair and free competition is restricted or 
whether the public interest is harmed. Besides, the following factors are also 
important for courts in determining patent misuse in standardization: whether 
the patentee’s exploitation of his patent has stalled the wide adoption of the 
standard; whether the patentee has manipulated the standard as a tool for 
achieving high benefits far beyond the lawful scope he could normally 
achieve; whether other industrial participants even the whole society has 
suffered economic loss due to the patentee’s exercise of his patent rights; 
whether technical competition and innovation are retarded. All of these could 
be referred to decide if a patentee has misused his patent right. The 
sensitivity of the patent misuse doctrine to the public policy concerns permits 
courts to consider whether a patentee in standardization extends his patent 
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right beyond the statutory patent grant and propels his conduct into the realm 
of actionable patent misuse.289 It is reiterated that the above discussions on 
the proposed application of patent misuse doctrine in standardization, 
although based on US precedents or experience, are similarly applicable in 
practice in China.  
 
III.2.2.4  The Strengths and Limitations of Doctrine of Patent 
Misuse in Standardization 
 
The most remarkable strength of the doctrine of patent misuse in dealing with 
the exercise of patent rights in standardization is that people using patent 
misuse defense need not to have prior interactions with the patentee. The 
patent misuse defense, justified on public policy grounds, supports the 
proposition that it should be potentially available to any entity denied a license 
to practice a patent on an industry standard.290 In other words, the regulation 
of a patentee’s exercise of patent rights in standardization is not limited to 
what the SSO IP policy has required and is not limited to only those standard 
adopters who actually participate with the patentee in the standard-setting 
process. In contrast to considering the SSO IP policy as a contract and 
relying on a patentee’s commitment to patent disclosure or RAND licensing, 
the patent misuse doctrine could benefit a wider scope of interested standard 
adopters. Even without an IP policy, the patent misuse doctrine may still 
function to regulate the exercises of patent rights in standardization and 
achieve the ultimate goals that the IP policy tries to realize. 
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Notwithstanding the above strengths, the patent misuse doctrine as 
discussed has inevitable limitations due to its equitable nature when it was 
first developed in the US. As a doctrine derived from the notion of equity, 
patent misuse could only be applied as an affirmative defense against alleged 
infringement. The rationale behind it is that courts merely wish to avoid aiding 
a misuser, rather than affirmatively to sanction him. 291  Therefore, people 
cannot actively sue a patentee for misusing his patent; instead, they can only 
use the patent misuse doctrine to defend themselves until they are involved in 
patent infringement cases. Besides, the remedy of patent misuse is also 
restricted to the equitable nature of the doctrine. In a US case, upon finding 
patent misuse, the court just refused to enforce the patent against the alleged 
infringer.292 Sometimes such an equitable remedy is not enough to punish evil 
patentees who maliciously exercise their patent rights in standardization in 
order to capture standards and achieve unreasonably high profits.  
 
From a personal viewpoint, I believe that the concept of patent misuse will, 
and shall be officially introduced into the Chinese patent laws in the near 
future. Given that ‘compulsory licensing’ being the only rules in the current 
Patent Law of China restricting the exercises of exclusive patent rights has 
limited scope of application (which will be discussed in the following context of 
Chapter III.2.3), there is great a need to include rules in Chinese patent laws 
to ensure that exclusive patent rights are exercised within a lawful scope.  As 
to whether the patent misuse doctrine proposed to be included in the Chinese 
patent laws could be applied more aggressively than mere an affirmative 
defense, I believe this may be adopted at an even later stage after the 
introduction of the doctrine. If patent misuse doctrine were provided in 
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Chinese patent laws allowing people to actively sue a patentee’s ‘misuse’ 
behavior, it would definitely invite concerns that such a doctrine might be 
abused and patent rights might be unreasonably restricted. After all, the 
Chinese patent system currently is still inclined to protect patentees’ exclusive 
rights so as to promote technological development.   
 
III.2.3   Compulsory Licensing 
 
III.2.3.1 A General Introduction of Compulsory Licensing 
 
Compulsory licensing is not a new concept which was included in important 
international IP conventions and treaties and in many national IP systems that 
comply with those international treaties. The Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial Property (“Paris Convention”) of 1883 provides that 
"Each country of the Union shall have the right to take legislative measures 
providing for the grant of compulsory licenses to prevent the abuses which 
might result from the exercise of the exclusive rights conferred by the patent, 
for example, failure to work."293 The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPs”) also sets out specific provisions to be 
considered if the subject matter of a patent is authorized by the government 
for use by the government or third parties without the authorization of the 
patent holder.294 Essentially, a compulsory license is “an involuntary contract 
between a willing buyer and an unwilling seller imposed and enforced by the 
state.”295 Although the specific terms of compulsory licensing are provided 
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differently in various patent systems of different jurisdictions, the three most 
prevalent compulsory licensing provisions are applicable where 1) a 
dependent patent296 is being blocked, 2) where a patent is not being worked, 
or 3) where an invention relates to food or medicine. 297  These three 
provisions are derived from the prevalent international conventions and 
treaties as mentioned above. 
 
Not exceptionally, compulsory licensing was provided in the Patent Law of 
China since the law was first enacted in 1984 and was retained with certain 
revisions through the three amendments of the law in 1992, 2000 and 2008. 
In the latest Patent Law of China implemented from 1 October 2009, there are 
altogether 11 Articles provided in the compulsory licensing section, compared 
to 8 Articles in the previous version. Generally, in the latest Patent Law of 
China, the circumstances under which compulsory licensing may be granted 
are basically the same as the three prevalent types as mentioned above. The 
new Articles or amendments adopted in the third amendments of the Patent 
Law of China regarding compulsory licensing are to incorporate more specific 
principles required by TRIPs. For example, the new Article 57 (amended 
based on the previous Article 54) specifies that the amount of royalties 
regarding compulsory licensing (if granted) should refer to the relevant 
provisions provided in those international treaties or conventions of which 
China is a member. 298  In addition, the new Article 50 regarding the 
compulsory licensing of patented medicine for the purpose of public health is 
also newly added so the compulsory licensing regime in China is more in line 
with international conventions. This paper will not elaborate on compulsory 
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licensing with regards to a dependent patent being blocked or a patent not 
being work or a patent relating to food or medicine since those situations are 
not relevant to the subject of this paper. In other words, the behavior of 
refusing to license or charging unreasonably high royalties of an essential 
licence in a technical standard falls in none of the three prevalent categories 
where compulsory licensing may usually be granted as mentioned above.  
 
III.2.3.2  Applicability of Compulsory Licensing Provisions in the 
Patent Law of China 
 
One of the noteworthy new provisions introduced to the Patent Law of China 
in its latest amendment is sub-section (2) of Article 48, which provides that 
when the exercise of patent right is determined pursuant to relevant laws to 
be a monopolistic activity, compulsory licensing may be granted to eliminate 
or reduce the adverse effects caused to market competition by such 
activity. 299  Furthermore, the newly added Article 52 provides that the 
implementation of compulsory licensing concerning inventions involving 
semiconductor technologies is limited to public interest purpose or subject to 
the abovementioned Article 48 (2). 300  That means, if a semiconductor 
technology-related patent is in subject of compulsory licensing, the 
compulsory licensing may only be implemented when such implementation is 
for public interest purpose or to remedy an adverse anti-competitive practice. 
Both of these two new provisions are introduced in compliance with Article 31 
of TRIPs which sets out the restrictions on grant of compulsory licensing.301 
The restriction of “public interest purpose” or “public non-commercial use” 
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appearing in the abovementioned Article 52 of Patent Law of China or Article 
31(c) of TRIPs is not applicable to the subject matter of this paper since it 
virtually refers to extreme circumstances such as national disasters, public 
health emergencies, etc. Therefore, the only compulsory licensing provision in 
the Patent Law of China that may be applicable to the subject matter of this 
paper, namely, a patent holder’s refusal of licensing his essential licence or 
charge of unreasonably high licensing royalties in a technical standard, is the 
new Article 48 (2), that is, to grant compulsory licensing as a remedy to anti-
competitive patent exercises. Such provision or the spirit of it is also 
commonly accepted in many other jurisdictions.302  
 
The reason for the latest Patent Law of China to incorporate this new Article 
48 (2) after its third amendment is because the Antimonopoly Law of China 
has just came into effect from 1 August 2008. Prior to this date, there is no 
relevant law in China that can be applied in deciding what kind of activities 
would constitute a ‘monopoly’ and how to determine to what extent is the 
market competition aversely affected. After the promulgation of the 
Antimonopoly Law of China, the Patent Law of China therefore introduces 
such a provision in accordance with international practice that compulsory 
licensing may be granted as a remedy of antimonopoly violations.  
 
This Article 48 (2) of the Patent Law of China or its equivalent provisions in 
other countries’ patent laws (where applicable) is not a standalone provision 
per se therefore cannot be applied independently. For compulsory licensing to 
be granted pursuant to this Article 48 (2), one should always apply the 
                                                
302
  See also §48A(1)(b)(ii), Patents Act of 1977 (as amended), UK, which provides that 
compulsory licensing may be ordered if the refusal to grant a patent license unfairly 
prejudices “the establishment or development of commercial or industrial activities in the 
United Kingdom.” 
122 
antimonopoly law first to determine whether the exercise of patent rights 
constitutes a ‘monopoly’ that affects market competition adversely. The 
antimonopoly law in China and how it is applied when deciding whether 
refusal of licensing essential patents or charging unreasonably high royalties 
in technical standardization constitutes a breach of antimonopoly law are 
discussed in Chapter III.3. Theoretically speaking, as long as the exercise of 
patent rights is considered by analyzing antimonopoly law to constitute a 
prohibited “monopoly” which adversely affects market competition and needs 
to be sanctioned under antimonopoly law, compulsory licensing can be 
granted as a remedy of such antimonopoly violation.   
 
What needs to be born in mind and also the same reason why I use 
“theoretically” in the last sentence of the above paragraph is that in practice, 
compulsory licensing was granted very rarely. In China, there is no 
compulsory licensing case at all even though the compulsory licensing 
provisions in its patent law have been in existence for over twenty-five years. 
In the US, compulsory licensing has occasionally been implemented through 
judicial action motivated by a concern for the public welfare.303 In the US case 
Image Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 304 the court had found 
“no reported case in which a court has imposed antitrust liability for a 
unilateral refusal to sell or license a patent or copyright.”, which shows that 
compulsory licensing was rarely implemented even as an antitrust violation 
remedy in practice. 
 
Such a gap between theoretical provisions and real life practices with respect 
to compulsory licensing is derived from the long lasting opposing opinion that 
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compulsory licensing would diminish the purpose of the patent system by 
reducing inventors' incentive to develop new technologies and encouraging 
inventors to keep inventions secret. 305  Take the US patent system for 
example, it has generally been hostile toward the practice of compulsory 
licensing and the absolute right of the patent owner to prevent others from 
using his invention is statutorily protected.306 Even though courts in the US 
have suggested compulsory licensing be applied to prevent a use of the 
patent right that is against public policy, in practice it has only been limited to 
be used as a remedy for antitrust violations.307 A patent as a legally justified 
monopoly grants exclusive rights to its holder so he can recoup his intellectual 
investments from exploring the invention he created. Such incentive created 
by patent rights is the ultimate drive for promotion of innovation and 
technology. In this regard, compulsory licensing which is against the very 
nature of the exclusivity of a patent and “strikes at the very foundation of the 
patent system”308, although widely adopted in various patent systems in the 
world, was applied very cautiously in practice. Unless absolutely necessary 
and in absence of fraudulent patent, compulsory licensing is inclined to be 
regarded as a theoretical safeguard that can only be granted in practice under 
extreme situations such as national defense, public health or emergencies.   
 
Technical standardization discussed in this paper has nothing to do with 
national defense or public health for most occasions. It is not very difficult to 
foresee that there still won’t be many compulsory licensing cases even after 
the latest Patent Law of China has recognised compulsory licensing as a 
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lawful remedy of antimonopoly breach. Because currently in China, the 
promotion of technological advancements is still the foremost priority of 
Chinese patent laws and the least situation the Chinese government would 
want to see is that compulsory licensing is inappropriately applied that the 
incentive to invent is discouraged in China. Even if compulsory licensing 
would be implemented in China as a remedy of antimonopoly violations, 
specifically in technical standardization discussed in this paper where there is 
a refusal of licensing of essential patents or the patent holder charges 
unreasonably high royalties impairing the fair market competition or 
significantly affecting public interest, it is advisable that such licensing refers 
to the RAND licensing terms as discussed in Chapter II.2.3.3. The key point is 
to ensure that compulsory licensing is granted only when it is truly necessary 
to promote the public interest, while not significantly reducing the incentive to 
develop new technologies.309 
 
III.3  The Application of Antimonopoly Law in 
Standardization 
 
The law mainly dealing with market competition is differently named in 
different jurisdictions. The US call it ‘antitrust law’, which is more commonly 
known as ‘competition law’ in Europe and many other countries around the 
world. There are also some civil law countries that call it ‘antimonopoly law’, 
such as Japan and China. Despite different callings and different inclinations 
of regulatory objectives, these laws are mostly the same in nature. Therefore, 
I will use ‘antitrust law’, ‘competition law’ and ‘antimonopoly law’ 
interchangeably in the following discussions. Unless referred to a particular 
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jurisdiction, each of the three terms means a law system specially designed to 
protect the integrity of market competition.  
 
As regards standardization, the antitrust enforcement agencies have shown 
considerable interest in the activities of SSOs and their participants because 
of the recognized procompetitive benefits that standard-setting can provide as 
well as the potential for its misuse in connection with exclusionary and 
collusive practices that have resulted in antitrust liability. 310  There are 
occasional circumstances in which SSOs may act as a front for a cartel.311 
After all, an SSO assembles a group of competitors in certain industries and 
functions as a platform for all these competitors to negotiate future 
cooperation and sometimes price arrangements, which are all very sensitive 
topics to antitrust authorities. However, it is very rare today that SSOs are 
merely set up for collusion purposes. SSOs specifically aiming at naked price-
fixing or other anticompetitive conducts barely exist. As long as SSOs stick to 
the selection of ‘essential patents’ when formulating their technical standards, 
it is relatively safe to say that an SSO as a whole and the cooperation 
involved in the standardization won’t arouse antitrust attention.  
 
More commonly, the anticompetitive patent issues arise in standardization in 
the form of monopolistic patent exploitations, which tend to attract more 
attentions from antitrust authorities. Ambitious patentees usually attempt to 
obtain competitive advantages in the relevant market by misleading SSOs to 
adopt standards covered by their patents. They either intentionally conceal 
their proprietary technologies and refuse to license their patents to standard 
                                                
310
  See Antitrust Division Endorses Ex Ante Disclosure of Maximum Royalty Rate and 
Licensing Terms in Context of Standard Setting, Client Memorandum of Willkie Farr& 
Gallagher LLP. 
311
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adopters or manage to incorporate their patents in the standard and charge 
unreasonably high royalties. Ultimately, these patentees try to achieve market 
monopolization or at least high profits they could never gain without the 
platform of standardization. As previously discussed, we could apply the 
contract theory to enforce the SSO IP policies or the doctrine of patent 
misuse or compulsory licensing to regulate the exploitation of patents in 
standardization. Even if neither the theory of contract nor the doctrine of 
patent misuse is applicable, as long as free and fair competition is negatively 
affected, we could rely on competition law to control the exercise of patent 
rights within a procompetitive boundary.  
 
III.3.1 A Brief Introduction of Antimonopoly Law of China  
 
On 30 August 2007, after thirteen years on the drawing board, the 
Antimonopoly Law of China was adopted at the 29th session of the tenth 
National People’s Congress of China. Although it aroused considerable 
concerns on its reasonableness and applicability, the Antimonopoly Law still 
constitutes a significant milestone in competition legislation in China. The so-
called ‘Economic Constitution’ of China contains many features that are 
basically consistent with international norms, including provisions that create 
a modern merger review regime, proscribe abuses of a dominant position, 
and prohibit joint conducts such as price fixing and market allocation.312 That 
means China has finally owned her powerful weapon to achieve the purpose 
of “preventing and restraining monopolistic conducts, protecting fair 
competition in the market, enhancing economic efficiency, safeguarding the 
interests of consumers and social public interest, promoting the healthy 
                                                
312
    See H. Stephen Harris, Jr. The Making of An Antitrust Law: the Pending Anti-Monopoly 
Law of the People’s Republic of China, 7 Chicago Journal of International Law, 2006, at 
172. 
127 
development of the socialist market economy”.313 Among the altogether fifty-
seven articles, the one article addressing the relationship between the 
Antimonopoly Law and IPRs has received more attention from both domestic 
and foreign innovators than any other provisions. In Article 55, it is stipulated 
that “this law is not applicable for undertakings exercise intellectual property 
rights according to laws, administrative regulations related to intellectual 
property rights; however, this law is applicable for undertakings abuse 
intellectual property rights to eliminate or restrict competition.” 314 On the one 
hand, it means China officially stated her attitude towards the interaction 
between antimonopoly law and IP law. That is, the exercise of IP rights 
granted by IP law is generally excluded from the scrutiny of antimonopoly law 
unless such an exercise hurts competition. On the other hand, however, this 
article is too general to provide any specific norms determining what 
constitute ‘abuse’ of IP rights and to what extent should competition be 
eliminated or restricted in order to apply the Antimonopoly Law. Neither is 
there any specific rule regarding the particularity of the exercise of IP rights in 
the way it affects competition, compared to other ordinary conducts. 
Therefore, when it comes to exercises of patent rights in standardization, we 
need to refer to other general articles besides Article 55 of the Antimonopoly 
Law to decide whether the exploitation of patent rights in standardization has 
negatively affected competition thus should be prohibited or not. Specifically 
speaking, whether a patentee’s nondisclosure of his essential patent or 
refusal to license should be regulated by Antimonopoly law depends on 
whether the patentee’s behaviors eliminate or restrict competition.  
 
                                                
313
    See Antimonopoly Law of China, Article 1. 
314
   An ‘undertaking’ in this law refers to a legal person, other organization or natural person 
that engages in businesses of commodities (hereinafter “commodities” include services). 
See Article 12 of the Antimonopoly Law of China. 
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The Antimonopoly Law of China condemns three categories of monopolistic 
conducts: 1) monopolistic agreements among undertakings; 2) abuse of 
dominant market positions by undertakings and 3) concentration of 
undertakings that eliminates or restricts competition or might be eliminating or 
restricting competition.315 Such an arrangement shares great similarities with 
other jurisdictions’ competition policies in spite of distinctive wording. For 
example, the US antitrust law prohibits agreements in restraint of trade; 
monopolization or attempted monopolization and anticompetitive mergers.316 
The EU competition law also mainly regulates cartels or collusions; abuse of 
dominant positions and mergers, acquisitions and joint ventures.317  
 
As for a patentee’s exercise of his exclusive patent rights in standardization 
mainly discussed in this paper, it is a unilateral behavior which rules out the 
application of the Antimonopoly Law in the aspects of ‘agreements’ and 
‘concentration’. A patentee’s nondisclosure of his essential patent or his 
refusal to license his patent to other standard adopters does not constitute a 
‘monopolistic agreement’, nor does it suffices a ‘concentration of 
undertakings’. Therefore, among the three kinds of monopolistic conducts 
expressly stipulated by the Antimonopoly law of China, the second one—the 
abuse of dominant market positions—is comparatively the most pertinent rule 
for regulating patent exploitations by manipulative patentees in 
standardization. 
                                                
315
   See Article 3 of the Antimonopoly Law of China. 
316
   See the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act and the 1997 Merger Guidelines of the US. 
317
   See Articles 81 & 82 of the Treaty of the European Community and the Merger Regulation 
(Council Regulation 139/2004 EC). 
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III.3.2  Condemning Monopolistic Exercises of Patent 
Rights as ‘Abuse of A Dominant Market Position’ 
III.3.2.1 The Identification of ‘Dominant Market Positions’ by 
Chinese Antimonopoly Law 
 
A ‘dominant market position’ in Antimonopoly Law of China refers to the 
ability for one undertaking or several undertakings as a whole to control the 
price, quantity or other trading conditions of products in the relevant market, 
or to hinder or affect other undertakings in entering into the relevant 
market. 318  This definition generally tracks the EC competition law in the 
assessment of unilateral conducts and collective dominance. 319  The 
European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) defined a dominant position under Article 
82 of the EC Treaty as “…a position of economic strength enjoyed by an 
undertaking which enables it to hinder the maintenance of effective 
competition of the relevant market by allowing it to behave to an appreciable 
extent independently of its competitors and customers and ultimately of 
consumers.”320 The parallel concept in the US antitrust law is ‘market power’, 
which is described as “the ability of a single seller to raise price and restrict 
output, for reduced output is the almost inevitable result of higher prices.”321 In 
China, undertakings are forbidden to abuse dominant market positions to: 1) 
sell commodities at unfairly high prices or buy commodities at unfairly low 
prices;…3) refuse to trade with counterparties without legitimate reasons;…5) 
tie products or require unreasonable conditions for trading without legitimate 
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   See Article 17 of the Antimonopoly Law of China. 
319
   See supra note 312, at 195. 
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       See also Michelin v Commission, Case 322/81, 1983 ECR 3641, 3503, 9 November 1983; 
United Brands v Commission, Case 27/76,1978 ECR 207, 277, 14 February 1978; 
Hoffman-La Roche v Commission, Case 85/76, 1979 ECR 461, 520, 13 February 1979. 
321
   See Fortner Enters, Inc v US Steel Corp, 394 US 495, 503 (1969). 
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reasons; 6) apply dissimilar prices or other transaction terms to equivalent 
counterparties; 7) other conduct identified as abuse of a dominant position by 
antimonopoly authorities. 322  A patentee’s refusal to license his essential 
patent in standardization would suffice ‘refuse to trade’ (the above 3)). 
Moreover, a patentee’s failure to license his patent on RAND terms might 
suffice ‘require unreasonable conditions for trading’ or ‘apply dissimilar terms 
to equivalent counterparties’ (the above 5) and 6)). As for a patentee’s 
nondisclosure of his essential patent, he conceals his patent in the first place 
so that he could manipulate his licensing rights at a later stage, such as 
refusal to license or license on unreasonable or discriminatory terms. Such a 
nondisclosure could be covered under ‘other conduct identified as abuse of a 
dominant position by antimonopoly authorities’ (the above 7)). When we try to 
apply the Antimonopoly law of China to decide whether a patentee’s exercise 
of his patent rights in standardization should be prohibited or not, we need to 
determine whether such an exercise constitutes ‘abuse of dominant market 
positions’. Furthermore, we need to determine whether the patentee is in a 
‘dominant market position’ in the first place.  
 
When determining if an undertaking is in a dominant market position, the 
Chinese Antimonopoly Law would take the following factors into 
consideration: 1) market share and competition situation in the relevant 
market; 2) ability to control sales or purchase market; 3) financial status and 
technical conditions of the undertaking; 4) the degree of dependence of other 
undertakings in trading with the undertaking; 5) the difficulty of entering into 
the relevant market by other undertakings and 6) other factors related to find 
a dominant market position.323  
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   See Article 17 of the Antimonopoly Law of China. 
323
   See Article 18 of the Antimonopoly Law of China. 
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Among all factors bearing on the ability to control price or output, market 
share is widely acknowledged in different jurisdictions as one of the most 
important one. The EC competition law recognizes that “the existence of a 
dominant position may derive from several factors which, taken separately, 
are not necessarily determinative but among these factors a highly important 
one is the existence of very large market share.”324 Under the US antitrust 
law, the defendant’s market share is the conventional proxy and usually the 
starting point for assessing the existence of market power.325 In principle, 
unilateral conducts give rise to competitive concerns only when such 
conducts are carried out by undertakings with a significant degree of market 
power or control. The theory goes that if there are substitutes on the market, 
no company can raise prices substantially above competitive level without 
losing market shares to its rivals.326 A monopolist with market power or an 
undertaking in a dominant position usually has the power over prices and can 
engage in exclusionary trading thus excluding free competition. 327  A low 
market share virtually precludes a finding of market power, whereas a high 
market share indicates the possibility that market power exists.328  Market 
shares in the range of 70%~90% are sufficient to establish a prima facie case 
of monopoly power, provided that they are held over a significant period of 
time.329  
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   See Hoffman-La Roche v Commission, Case 85/76, 1979 ECR 461, 520, 13 February 
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The Antimonopoly Law of China expressly presumes a dominant market 
position based on market shares. 330  It provides that undertakings could 
directly be assumed to have a dominant market position if: 1) the market 
share of one undertaking in the relevant market accounts for 1/2 or above; 2) 
the joint market share of two undertakings as a whole in the relevant market 
accounts for 2/3 or above or 3) the joint market share of three undertakings 
as a whole in the relevant market accounts for 3/4 or above. Consequently, if 
an undertaking’s market share in the relevant market falls within the 
aforementioned scopes, unless there is enough evidence to prove that the 
undertaking does not occupy a dominant market position331, the refusal to 
trade or discriminatory transaction terms of the undertaking will be 
condemned to be abuse of a dominant market position. In the context of 
standardization, if a patentee is successful enough to possess certain 
percentage of market share and dominants the relevant market, it could be 
expected that his exclusive exploitations of his patent right would be strictly 
restricted by the Antimonopoly law of China. This must be very upsetting for 
those undertakings which have attained substantial market shares through 
their successful and legitimate business strategies.   
 
The presumption of ‘dominant market positions’ by Chinese Antimonopoly 
Law is criticized by commentators for its inconsistency with international 
norms. 332  The percentages stipulated in Article 19 determining dominant 
positions preclude considerations of other factors that may justify an 
undertaking’s remarkable market share through its legal and reasonable 
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effort. It is obviously incompatible with the universally acceptable theory that 
antimonopoly law is to protect competition instead of competitors.333 Take the 
US antitrust law for example, it has been admitted that the possession of 
market power, or dominance, does not itself constitute an abuse.334  In a 
speech delivered before an international symposium on China’s draft 
Antimonopoly Law, the General Counsel of the US FTC once pointed out two 
key principles of US law on monopolization, which should be highlighted for 
China’s consideration of ‘abuse of dominant market positions’.335 First, it was 
stated that the US antitrust law “does not condemn the mere possession of 
monopoly power, but punishes only misuse that results in a substantial injury 
to competition… Innovation, economic growth, and vigorous competition 
would be stifled if the competition law were to punish successful market 
participants who achieve a dominant or monopoly position.”336 Second, in the 
sense that a more efficient firm may carries out competitive conduct which 
“frequently looks like exclusionary conduct” “at the expense of its less-efficient 
competitors” without harming competition, “even firms with monopoly power 
are permitted to compete aggressively on the merits”.337 In other words, less 
efficient businesses are not protected from “legitimate, vigorous competition, 
even where a firm holds a dominant or monopoly position.” The competition 
law only prohibits “a firm with monopoly power from engaging conduct that 
has no legitimate business justification other than to control prices or exclude 
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competition” because such kind of conduct injures competition.338 From the 
above speech, we may note that a certain degree of market share or market 
power is just a helpful and direct reference in determining a ‘dominant market 
position’ or ‘monopolization’. There are other important factors that may 
indicate a ‘dominant market position’, for example, the difficulty for others to 
enter into the relevant market (“barriers to entry”) and other determinants 
stipulated in Article 18 of the Antimonopoly Law of China. The justification of 
prohibiting ‘abuse of dominant market positions’ lies in the fact that the 
abusive conducts may pose harm to competition, not that they simply achieve 
dominance or monopoly in the relevant market. 
 
III.3.2.2 The Relationship Between IP Law and Competition Law – 
Discussions and Analysis Mainly from the US 
 
The identification of ‘dominant market positions’ by antimonopoly law would 
be more complicated when IP rights are involved. As mention previously, the 
newly enacted Antimonopoly Law of China is too general to specify its 
appropriate relationship with IP law. 339  The following discussions on said 
relationship, therefore, are mainly based on other countries’ experience and 
analysis. Although most of the ideas below are from US scholars, it is 
stressed that those conclusions drawn from years of sophisticated 
discussions are also applicable in context of Antimonopoly Law of China. 
 
The relationship between competition law and IP law has proved to be a 
subject of perpetual controversy since the coexistence of the two legal 
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systems. The complex interaction arises out of the seemingly inherent 
conflicts between the two laws, regardless of different jurisdictions. 
Intellectual creations, which are called ‘public goods’ by economists, are 
much easier and cheaper to copy than they are to produce in the first 
place.340 Without certain extent of exclusive control over the creations, few 
people will have the interest to innovate. Therefore, IP rights thus are a 
‘solution’ to the ‘public goods’ problem because they privatize the public 
goods, giving potential inventors an incentive to engage in research and 
development.341 By granting inventors the right to exclude others from using 
their ideas, IP laws necessarily limit the diffusion of those ideas and prevents 
people from free-riding on them. 342  In economic terms, IP rights prevent 
competition in the sale of the particular invention covered by the IP right, and 
therefore may allow the IP owner to raise the price of that invention above the 
marginal cost of reproducing it.343 In order for IP law to succeed in giving 
authors and inventors an incentive to create, the law must give them at least 
some power over price, though not necessarily monopoly control.344 On the 
other hand, however, competition law is specially designed to ensure that 
markets are not unfairly dominated by a single or a few firms and potential 
competitors do not collude together to avoid free competition, which usually 
best achieves efficient allocation of resources. The economic basis for 
competition law is that firms in competition will produce more output at a 
lower price than monopolists.345 Monopolists not only take money away from 
consumers by raising prices, but they impose a ‘deadweight loss’ on society 
by reducing their output below the level which consumers would be willing to 
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purchase at a competitive price.346 In the sense that IP law may enable the 
holders of exclusive rights to charge monopoly prices or limit competition, IP 
rights appear to run counter to free market competition protected by 
competition law.347 On several occasions in jurisdictions having both IP and 
competition law, scholars and courts historically considered the two laws to 
be in conflict. For example, in US v Westinghouse Elec. Corp., it was 
contended that “there is an obvious tension between the patent laws and 
antitrust laws. One body of law creates and protects monopoly power while 
the other seeks to proscribe it.” 348 
 
Nowadays, people have realized that competition law and IP law actually can 
be reconciled in the sense that they share common goals in the long run. It 
was widely accepted that both antitrust law and patent law have a common 
central economic goal of maximizing consumer welfare, though they try to 
achieve this in different and seemingly conflicting ways. 349  The limited 
monopoly granted by IP laws in exchange of efficiencies and incentives to 
innovate is quite different from the monopoly that antitrust law is interested in. 
Competition law and IP law are recognized to be complementary rather than 
conflicting with each other in encouraging innovation and promoting an 
efficient marketplace and dynamic competition.350  
 
Furthermore, IP rights do not necessarily establish market power or 
dominance. The Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property 
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(“AGLIP”) issued in 1995 by the US antitrust agencies proclaimed that they 
would not presume that IP rights confer market power and that such rights are 
essentially comparable to any other form of property.351 The European Court 
of Justice adopts the same approach. It was once held that the exercise of 
exclusive distribution rights under national legislation does not automatically 
mean to occupy a dominant position; there must be some further showing 
such as a right holder’s power to impede the maintenance of effective 
competition over a considerable part of the relevant market.352 Similarly, the 
mere ownership of IP rights, without more, does not establish dominance.353  
 
The hands-on conclusion of the complementary relationship between IP and 
competition law as well as the recognition that IP rights do not necessarily 
confer market power provide valuable guidance to Chinese Antimonopoly 
Law in identifying ‘abuse of dominant market positions’. 
 
III.3.2.3   Determining Whether A Patentee’s Manipulative 
Exploitation of His Patent Right in Standardization 
Constitutes ‘Abuse of Dominant Market Positions’ in 
Context of Chinese Antimonopoly Law 
 
Since IP rights do not necessarily establish dominance, we should consider 
other factors determining whether the patentee participating in 
standardization has occupied a dominant position in the relevant market, and 
if so, would his manipulative exercise of his patent right constitute an ‘abuse’.  
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In the sense that a ‘dominant market position’ usually refers to the ability to 
control price or build up barriers to entry,354 chances for an essential patent 
holder in standardization to occupy a dominant market position are very high 
taking into consideration of the characteristics of standardization. The 
particularity of standardization lies in the fact that it usually assembles a 
series of technologies, proprietary or nonproprietary ones, into one technical 
specification of a final standard. Those originally separate, unrelated patents 
thus are bundled together as a whole for industrial participants to implement. 
Most of the time, the patents, especially the essential ones covering the final 
standard are inseparable in achieving the designed function of the standard. 
Therefore, one patentee’s exercise of his exclusive patent right in 
standardization is no longer his individual freedom since his single refusal to 
license may deny the access of potential licensees to use the final standard 
including many other technologies. In this regard, when analyzing the 
dominant extent or the market power of a single patent which covers a 
standard, we may consider applying a stricter set of rules taking into 
consideration of the amplified market power a standard could confer to a 
patent. 
 
If a patentee’s patented technology takes up a substantial market share in the 
relevant market, for example, most of the downstream manufacturers need to 
apply his patent to make a certain product, it would be relatively easy to 
determine whether he has abused his dominant market position. But for 
standardization, the technical specifications of the final standards sometimes 
include hundreds even thousands of essential patents, none of which alone 
takes up considerable market share in the relevant market. In such a case, 
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when analyzing the factors that may infer dominance, we may not merely 
consider the market power of the patent itself. We cannot preclude the 
analysis of ‘dominant market position’ based on the fact that a single patent’s 
market share is comparably minor in the relevant market. Instead, we should 
consider the dominant extent of the whole standard which includes not only 
the patent in question but also many other patents held by different owners. 
Take a patentee’s refusal to license for example. When exercised individually, 
the exclusive licensing rights granted by patent laws generally confer the 
patent holders the freedom to “choose their business partners”. 355  These 
certain extent of exclusivity of IP rights is justified as a tradeoff in exchange of 
incentive to innovate. When it comes to standardization, however, a 
patentee’s refusal to license his essential patent actually denies not only the 
access of using his patent but also the accesses of other technologies 
integrated in the whole standard. In this regard, the ‘relevant market’ of a 
patent which is essential to a standard should be the market of the standard 
as a whole. That is, when deciding the market share or the market power of 
an essential patent in a standard, the relevant market should be defined in the 
sense that whether there are other substitute technologies in the market to 
compete with the subject standard in realizing similar technological functions 
(e.g., DVD standard and other technologies which are applicable in producing 
DVDs). It is stressed that patents involved in the final standard are explored 
together, therefore, competition takes place in the market of the standard 
instead of the market of the patent itself. 
 
Sometimes, industrial participants have to adopt standards in order to be 
competitive in the relevant technical competition. That means standard 
adopters do not have a choice to refuse the unreasonable licensing fee 
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charged by one patentee because they cannot afford to lose the opportunity 
to implement the standard as a whole. Interested standard adopters have to 
make sacrifices of paying unreasonable royalties in exchange of the access 
to other technologies in a standard. This factor would further enable an 
ambitious patent holder to manipulate his essential patent to control the price 
(licensing royalties) or set barriers to entry (denying others’ access by 
refusing to license) in the relevant technological market. That is also why 
ambitious patentees by all means manage to capture the standard by their 
essential patents. Because they can achieve much more profits using the 
platform of standardization than simply exercise their patent rights when 
potential licensees have substitute technologies to choose from once they 
find the royalties at issue are unreasonable. Obviously, a patent holder 
shouldn’t be granted such a powerful exclusive right, which unreasonably 
exceeds the legally justified boundary.  
 
In addition to market share, other factors such as competition situation, ability 
to control the sales market and set barriers to entry, degree of dependence of 
other competitors, etc.,356 should all be considered in context of the whole 
standard when analyzing the dominant extent of a single essential patent. 
Even if a patentee’s individual market share falls within the safe harbor of less 
than 1/10 of the relevant market, 357  it is still possible that the patentee 
occupies a dominant market position as long as the standard covered by his 
essential patent is dominant in the relevant market. In like manner, if a 
standard as an integration of many patents doesn’t even possess substantial 
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market power in its relevant market, the individual patents involved in the 
standard surely won’t be condemned to be in dominant market positions.  
 
Identifying dominance is just a prerequisite. When we try to regulate a 
patentee’s manipulative exercise of his patent right in standardization 
applying the antimonopoly law, we have to further prove that the identified 
dominance has been abused. Article 17 of the Antimonopoly Law of China 
provides some typical examples of conducts that constitute an ‘abuse’, for 
example, predatory pricing and refusal to trade without legitimate reasons, 
tying, differentiated treatment, etc.358 These listed conducts are by no means 
exclusive. Due to the limitation of written law, it is impossible for an article to 
enumerate all abusive conducts. That’s why the final subpart of Article 17 
provides “other conduct identified as abuse of a dominant position by 
antimonopoly authorities”. However, in absence of any assurances on what 
exactly might constitute an ‘abuse’ or how such a conclusion may be arrived, 
359
 it is extremely difficult for this vague provision to render meaningful 
guidance. In this sense, it is advisable to clarify the meaning of ‘abuse’ in the 
future Implementing Regulations of the Antimonopoly Law of China. 
Meanwhile, even if the alleged conduct is not expressly identified in the list of 
abusive conducts, we could analyze it on a ‘case by case’ basis. The key 
point of whether there is an abuse of a dominant market position depends on 
whether the alleged conduct ultimately eliminates or restricts competition. The 
modern economics-based and effects-based analysis could be conducted to 
see if free and fair competition is harmed by the alleged conduct. With regard 
to standardization and a patentee’s manipulative exercise of his patent right, 
once dominance is proved to exist, the rest of the investigation would be to 
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what extent is the relevant technological competition affected and whether the 
consumers’ welfare is substantially reduced by the patentee’s refusal to 
license or charge of unreasonably high royalties.  
 
Some terms used in Article 17 even in the whole passage of the 
Antimonopoly Law of China, such as ‘unfair’, ‘unreasonable’ and ‘legitimate 
reasons’, are highly subjective, which suggests that there must be further 
specific implementing rules to clarify the vagueness and uncertainty. We 
might consider referring to international norms and other jurisdictions’ 
experience, for example, defining ‘legitimate reasons’ in a manner generally 
consistent with the EC’s use of ‘objectively justified’ grounds.360 Even if it is 
impossible to literally define what is ‘unreasonable’ or ‘unfair’, we still could 
rely on courts to fulfill the task of clarified interpretation, especially in the 
context of determining what are reasonable royalties charged by patentees 
holding essential patents to a standard. Courts are considered to have 
accumulated a fair bit of experience in determining reasonable royalties in the 
patent aspect because they have done so in a large number of patent 
damages cases.361 In a US case, Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood, Inc., 
a multi-factor test was applied to determine the appropriate patent royalty, 
which could provide valuable reference for Chinese patent laws with no 
official stipulations on reasonable patent royalties. It was stated in the US 
case that the following factors (not exclusive) are pertinent to determine a 
reasonable royalty for a patent license: the royalties received by the patentee 
for the licensing of the patent, proving or tending to prove an established 
royalty; the rates paid by the licensee for the use of other patents comparable 
to the patent; the nature and scope of the license, as exclusive or non-
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exclusive or as restricted or non-restricted in terms of territory or with respect 
to whom the manufactured product may be sold; the duration of the patent 
and the term of the license; the established profitability of the product made 
under the patent, its commercial success, and its current popularity and so 
on. 362  When it comes to patent licensing regarding a technical standard, 
courts should take the particularity of standardization into consideration and 
put extra emphasis on the requirement that the royalty be reasonable in both 
commercial and technological context.363 For example, a patent royalty set 
should be one that is reasonable ex ante, before the standard is selected, not 
one that might be obtainable after the industry has been locked into the 
patented standard.364 A reasonable royalty should also consider the available 
alternatives at the time the decision was made to adopt the standard, not the 
value that an IP owner might be able to extort by virtue of the SSO’s adoption 
of the standard. 365  These suggestions, although provided by American 
scholars, are also applicable in Chinese practice.  
 
III.3.2.4 The Proposed Application of Antimonopoly Law of China 
in Patent Disclosure in Standardization – Lessons from 
the US 
 
Apart from leveraging patent licensing rights in standardization, another 
notorious manipulative exploitation of patent rights is for a patentee to 
intentionally conceal his essential patent thus capturing the final standard by 
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surprise. By willful failure to disclose his essential patent, the patent holder 
would mislead the SSO into adopting a standard considered to be free to use, 
but which in fact is exclusively controlled by certain people. By this way, the 
patentee could enjoy the competitive advantages the final standard would 
grant to his essential patent. If there is no clear SSO IP policy, or if the policy 
doesn’t require but just encourage participants to disclose their essential 
patents, it will be difficult to condemn the willful patentee’s nonfulfillment of 
obligations. The theory of ‘patent misuse’ seems inapplicable here too, since 
the patent in question has yet to be used. Moreover, the mere failure to 
disclose an essential patent could not suffice an ‘abuse of a dominant market 
position’ in a strict sense. Unless coupled with the subsequent exercise of 
licensing rights, the nondisclosure alone is an incomplete ‘abuse’ since the 
dominant market position has not been proved to be established. In other 
words, the manipulative patentee just attempts to achieve a dominant position 
by hiding his essential patent from the SSO. Does this mean that we could 
not enforce antimonopoly law merely against the malicious nondisclosure of 
essential patents in standardization?  
 
In the newly enacted Antimonopoly law of China, there is no stipulation as 
regards whether behaviors probably leading to monopolization should be 
prohibited or not. In the US antitrust law, the ancestor of antitrust or 
competition legislation, the corresponding term is ‘attempted monopolization’. 
According to Section 2 of the Sherman Act, “Every person who shall 
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other 
person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among 
the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a 
felony….”. That means the US antitrust law regulates not only monopolization 
but also attempted monopolization, the latter of which is the perfect attack 
145 
against efforts to control the standard-setting process by deliberately failing to 
disclose the essential patent. Although currently there is no such a term as 
‘attempted monopolization’ in the Antimonopoly Law of China, it is proposed 
that the same be included in the revised law or in the implementing 
regulations of the law.  The following discussions in relation to ‘attempted 
monopolization’ are mainly theories from the US and the proposed application 
of ‘attempted monopolization’ in Chinese standardization stays in a theoretical 
level. 
 
Attempted monopolization in the US generally includes three elements: a 
specific intent to monopolize; anticompetitive conduct in furtherance of that 
intent and a dangerous probability of successful monopolization.366 Of course, 
market power or a dominant market position is indispensable in proving 
monopolization, whether attempted or realized one. That means, in the 
context of standardization, the final standard the patentee attempts to 
manipulate must have certain extent of influence on the relevant market. If the 
finally adopted standard has no market power at all, the manipulative 
conducts to control the final standard thus would not sustain an attempted 
monopolization.  
 
In the aforementioned cases Dell and Rambus, both of the plaintiffs have 
similarly alleged that the defendants persuaded the SSOs to adopt their 
proposed standards by misrepresenting their IP status. 367  This 
misrepresentation sometimes appears as an omission, such as failing to 
publicly assert ownership in the standard until after it is adopted, and 
sometimes appears as an affirmative falsehood such as signing a statement 
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indicating that the party has no IP rights in the proposed standard.368 Anyway, 
the misrepresentation of a patentee on his patent right aims at manipulating 
the process of standardization in the way that enables him to achieve market 
power or dominant position he might not have attained in an open 
competition. Such a competition risk justifies the antitrust scrutiny against the 
willful nondisclosure of essential patents in the context of standardization.  
 
When proving attempted monopolization by misrepresentation in 
standardization, it is very important to assure that the adoption of the 
proprietary standard is necessarily caused by the misrepresentation. In other 
words, the misrepresentation only affects competition and should be punished 
under competition law when the SSO would not have adopted the standard in 
question if it was fully aware of the IP status. If an SSO had no alternative 
nonproprietary technologies and would have approved the proprietary 
standard even it had known about the patent right, 369  the future 
monopolization would be irrelevant with misrepresentation, instead, it is 
resulted from the patent right and its market power itself. In the sense that fair 
competition is not affected by anticompetitive conduct, competition law should 
not interfere alleging attempted monopolization. The reason is because the 
monopolization would be achieved anyway, with or without 
misrepresentations. In a word, when condemning a patentee’s intentional 
nondisclosure of patent right in standardization as attempted monopolization, 
it is necessary to prove that the misrepresentation of the patentee directly 
causes the SSO to adopt a proprietary standard while it has the option to 
choose an nonproprietary one if it were fully informed. Besides, the 
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misrepresentation would enable the patentee to achieve market power or 
dominance he would not otherwise have obtained, which unreasonably 
affects free and fair competition.  
 
Besides market power (or a dangerous probability of its acquisition) and an 
anticompetitive misrepresentation that helps acquire or maintain the power,370 
another important aspect in proving attempted monopolization is that the 
patentee’s failure to disclose his essential patent in standardization is 
intentional and not an oversight. If a patentee is not fully aware of his huge 
patent portfolio thus failing to declare that he owns an essential patent 
covering the proposed standard, it is no longer justified to enforce competition 
law and condemn attempted monopolization for there is no willful conduct in 
an effort to monopolize. 371  Although sometimes a malicious intent to 
monopolize is difficult to prove, it can still be inferred from the practical 
conducts of the patentee. For example, in the Rambus case, the district court 
held that Rambus clearly knew of its disclosure obligations and knowingly 
abrogated them based on strong evidence and analysis.372  Moreover, the 
court identified the intent to mislead from evidence showing Rambus’ plan to 
bring patent infringement suits arising from the SSO—JEDEC. 373  It was 
contended that: 
 
 “Rambus, through its executives, sought to patent the technology 
being discussed at JEDEC so that it could later bring patent 
infringement suits. Furthermore, e-mails written by Richard Crisp 
(Rambus’ representative in JEDEC) show that, rather than informing 
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JEDEC about its issued and pending patents, Rambus intentionally 
decided to keep these secret.”374 
 
In the later investigations, through analyzing the factual conducts of Rambus 
and JEDEC’s IP policy, the US FTC also concluded that “Rambus understood 
that knowledge of its evolving patent position would be material to JEDEC’s 
choices, and avoided disclosure for that very reason.”375 Although the latest 
judgment of the Rambus case issued by the US Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit denied FTC’s allegation of monopolization376, it 
does not mean that all future non-disclosure of patents or misrepresentations 
in standardization will be precluded from antitrust scrutiny. As long as there is 
sufficient evidence to show that the non-disclosure or the misrepresentation 
ultimately assists in achieving monopolization or leads to attempted 
monopolization, these behaviors are very likely to be prohibited by 




The patent-related issues in standardization, such as ‘essential patents’, 
‘patent holdups’ in respect of patent disclosure and licensing, are both private 
problems facing standard adopters and public policy problems. 377  In the 
private sense, those who are interested in adopting the final standard do not 
want to be manipulated or overcharged by essential patent holders of the 
standard. While publicly, the downstream consumers will ultimately pay for 
the unreasonably high royalties caused by ‘patent holdups’, if any. The 
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market competition will be disturbed by collusive standard-setting or by 
monopolization through misuse of patent rights in standardization. That is why 
these patent-related issues are not merely private contracting problems or 
simply misuses of individual exclusive rights. That is also why it is necessary 
to apply antimonopoly law in dealing with the patent-related issues, in order to 
help preserve or repair the affected competition which cannot be effectively 
protected by either contract or patent laws. Antimonopoly law could be 
considered as a safety valve in protecting healthy standardization, in the 
sense that it may be applicable even in the absence of an explicit SSO IP 
policy or the conduct of patent misuse, as long as free and fair competition is 




Without standardization there wouldn’t be a modern economy. 378  Without 
patented technologies there wouldn’t be high-tech interoperability 
standardization. Patents equipped with technical superiority guarantee the 
quality of standards and promote technical innovation and competition. 
Exclusive patent rights, if manipulated by ambitious patentees, would pose 
serious threats to standardization and to competition in the relevant market. 
The patent-related issues generally arise in standardization in two major 
aspects: collusive interactions between more than two patents and 
monopolistic exploitations of individual patents. Properly addressing these 
two forms of patent-related issues that arise in the process of standardization 
is crucial to both technical development and market competition. Through 
discussions of the previous three chapters as regards patents in 
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standardization and the private and public regulations on their exploitations, it 
is not difficult for us to come to the following conclusions:  
 
A. Including only ‘essential patents’ in the technical specifications of a 
standard is a prerequisite of procompetitive standardization 
 
Standardization is acknowledged for its procompetitive benefits such as 
technical efficiency, convenience and promotion of innovation and 
competition. However, that does not mean that we should preclude 
standardization from the examination of competition law. It is necessary that 
we balance the procompetitive virtues of standardization against the risks that 
it may facilitate collusion. 379  After all, the process of standard-setting 
gathering a group of competitors in the relevant market to discuss future 
cooperation has always been a sensitive topic in the eyes of antitrust 
authorities. An SSO, as a platform formulating the technical specifications of a 
standard, may arouse antitrust concerns in the sense that it may act as a 
cartel with the power of eliminating potential competition in favor of the 
standard-setting participants. One way of preventing standardization from 
inducing antitrust liability is to strictly restrict the patents included in the 
technical specifications of the standard to ‘essential’ ones. That is, to only 
include ‘essential patents’ for which there are no economically feasible 
substitutes and will be inevitably infringed when implementing the standard.380 
The inclusion of only ‘essential patents’ in a standard would greatly reduce 
the possibility of a group of competitors, holding competing proprietary 
technologies, colluding with each other. There is no collusion among all 
essential patent holders since their patents are essential to the proposed 
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standard and there is no other option available except for including all the 
essential patents in order to realize the proposed technical function of the 
final standard. The preclusion of non-essential patents in a standard ensures 
that standardization does not facilitate collusion to avoid supposed 
competition. Competition is not eliminated among non-essential patent 
holders nor is restricted between essential and non-essential patent holders. 
It is stressed that the idea of ‘essential patents’ is applicable in 
standardization conducted by SSOs of any scale regardless of different 
jurisdictions. 
 
B. Implementing private SSOs IP policies to regulate monopolistic patent 
exploitations (‘patent holdups’)  in standardization 
 
The requirement of ‘essential patents’ is only a prerequisite to ensure that 
standardization would not be considered to be collusive or anticompetitive per 
se. The patent-related issues actually arise more commonly in 
standardization in respect of monopolistic exploitations of the above essential 
patents. The essential patent holders in standardization are able to ‘hold up’ 
other potential standard adopters, either by precluding competitors from using 
their essential patents in the standard based on their legally granted exclusive 
rights, or by demanding supra-competitive licensing royalties far out of 
proportion of their true economic contribution.381 A patent holder is supposed 
to enjoy exclusive rights on the exploitation of his patent, however, the 
exclusive patent rights, once being manipulated beyond a proper boundary, 
will pose great threat to procompetitive standardization and ultimately will 
harm free technology competition and consumer welfare.  
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Since the whole process of private standardization is conducted through a 
special SSO, it is advisable that the organization establishes a set of clear 
and consistent internal bylaws for its participants to comply with, in order to 
clarify rights and obligations ax ante and to avoid the above patent holdup 
problems through the effort of the private organization itself. The bylaws of an 
SSO for the purpose of preventing patent holders from manipulating their 
patent rights in standardization generally take the form of an IP policy. Taking 
into consideration of the potential patent holdup problems that could emerge 
in standardization, it is necessary that an SSO IP policy require the two major 
obligations of its participating patent holders: patent disclosure and patent 
licensing. A disclosure obligation required by an SSO IP policy would deter 
patent holders from hiding the existence of their patents in the proposed 
standard and subsequently trying to exercise their exclusive rights after the 
standard has become widely adopted. 382  By explicitly requiring all 
participants to disclose their published patents and patent applications as 
early as reasonably possible, an SSO IP policy will leave few opportunities for 
patentees to capture the standard and explore their exclusive rights by 
surprise. A licensing obligation requires that essential patent holders in 
standardization agree to grant licenses to all interested standard adopters to 
use their patents on RAND terms. 383 In this way, there would be no room for 
ambitious patentees to demand unreasonable royalties for the use of their 
technologies embedded in the standard. The combination of patent disclosure 
and licensing obligations forms the most powerful part for an SSO IP policy to 
restrict the exclusive exercises of patent rights in standardization. Such an IP 
policy in the private sector is both flexible and effective in avoiding or solving 
the patent holdup problems in standardization. When analyzing the proper 
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SSOs IP policies in private sectors, existing international SSOs IP policies 
and lessons from the US were mainly referred and consolidated, for the 
purpose of providing guidance for Chinese SSOs in drafting their own IP 
policies. 
 
C. Respectively applying public laws to enforce private SSOs IP policies and 
to regulate patent-related issues in standardization 
 
SSOs IP policies are private regulations which are effective only to the extent 
that they are enforceable. When there is noncompliance with the policy or 
there are disputes regarding the policy itself, such a policy in the private 
sector will need help from more powerful authorities to ensure its 
enforceability. These more powerful authorities are public laws and 
regulations, which have their own merits in preventing and resolving the 
patent-related issues in standardization, compared to private SSO IP policies. 
 
Generally speaking, an SSO IP policy regarding IP ownership or IP 
management can be treated as a kind of implicit contracts between members 
(participants) of the SSO. These members or participants agree to abide by 
the policy the moment they join in the ongoing standardization. Therefore, 
noncompliance with the IP policy might result in the liability for breach of 
contract. The general principles of contract laws could be applied to interpret 
the contract-like SSOs IP policies when there are disputes. However, contract 
laws (regardless of different jurisdictions) tend to be inapplicable when there 
are no relevant IP policies regarding the dispute or when there is no IP policy 
at all. Besides, contract laws are also unenforceable beyond the boundary of 
the organization since an SSO IP policy is at most a contract binding the 
relevant SSO members or participants.  
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Since the patent-related issues in standardization mostly take the form of 
monopolistic exploitations of patent rights, these issues may be directly 
regulated by IP laws. The doctrine of patent misuse is specifically proposed to 
regulate exploitations of patent rights that exceed the lawful scope or affect 
competition. 384  With regard to standardization, that means manipulative 
exercises of exclusive patent rights in pursuit of unreasonably high profits 
(beyond the lawful scope stipulated by patent laws) could be condemned as a 
misuse of patent rights.  Interested adopters of a standard in China thus could 
apply the proposed doctrine of patent misuse against the infringement claims 
brought by patent holders. Furthermore, the compulsory licensing provided in 
the Patent Law of China is theoretically applicable in front of refusal to license 
in standardization. However, it is highlighted that such compulsory license 
needs to be applied very cautiously and only when the refusal to license in 
standardization has greatly affected the public interest.385 
 
Last but not least, competition law can be relied on as a safety valve to 
prevent all anticompetitive behaviors in standardization. When fair and free 
competition is threatened in the process of standardization, regardless of 
whether there is an applicable SSO IP policy or a patent misuse behavior, 
competition law can always be applied to protect competition within or beyond 
the proposed standard. One of the patent-related issues in standardization, 
refusal of licensing or unreasonable licensing royalties, could be regulated 
under the newly enacted Antimonopoly Law of China in context of abuse of a 
dominant market position. Prior to condemnation of an ‘abuse’, it is necessary 
to first identify the presence of monopolization or dominance. It is widely 
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acknowledged in different jurisdictions that market share (as stipulated by the 
Antimonopoly Law of China) or market power (as stipulated by the US 
antitrust laws) is the most important and direct reference when determining 
dominance in the relevant market. 386  It is worth noting that, when it comes to 
standardization, the market power of a single patent essential to a standard 
should be evaluated based on the market power of the whole standard.387 
The reason is quite obvious: the final standard is applied as a whole, which 
includes many patents bundled together to achieve the final function. One 
essential patentee’s refusal to license could deny potential standard adopters 
the access to use the whole standard, which also includes other patentees’ 
technologies. In this regard, the patentee’s exclusive rights actually are 
expanded to the whole standard instead of his patent only, therefore, the 
market power of his essential patent should be evaluated on an expanded 
basis to take in to account the market power of the whole standard too. Once 
dominant market position is proved, further modern economics-based and 
effects-based analysis should be conducted to decide if the patentee’s 
exploitation of his patent rights constitutes an abuse of that dominant position, 
thus resulting in harming competition and consumer welfare. The 
condemnation of abuse of dominant market positions cannot similarly be 
applied when it comes to nondisclosure of an essential patent. The reason is 
because it is still too early to determine an ‘abuse’ and the presence of 
dominance by the mere conduct of nondisclosure. On this point, the theory 
from the US antitrust laws, ‘attempted monopolization’, is of great referential 
value and is suggested to be included in Chinese Antimonopoly Law.  When 
identifying attempted monopolization as regards nondisclosure of an essential 
patent in standardization, it is very important that the patentee fails to disclose 
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intentionally and the SSO would not have chosen the patent if it were 
disclosed in the first place. Furthermore, there must be a probability that the 
final standard will possess certain extent of market power in the relevant 
market. 388  Without satisfying these conditions, it is unlikely to regulate 





The significance of standardization in the 21st century has been widely 
acknowledged by policy makers, legal practitioners, scholars and 
technological industry participants. Although it has been brought up to the 
level of a national strategy, standardization is still new in China. Fortunately, 
the activities of standard-setting in this high-tech era are relatively 
international, which means they would not be restricted by jurisdictions and 
they share the essential features regardless of their scales or purposes. The 
existing SSOs IP policies and public laws discussed in this paper, some of 
which are extracted from the sophisticated experience accumulated through 
years of worldwide standardization practice, are mostly applicable to 
standardization in China. In addition, the following extra attentions have to be 
paid to better serve the Chinese characteristic standardization.  
 
1. Acknowledging interoperability standardization and its patent-related issues 
in the specific standardization law 
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The present law of standardization in China came into effect on 1st April 1989. 
The twenty-six articles of this standardization law only provide general 
guidelines for Chinese standardization. It can be shown from the whole 
passage of the law that standardization back that time merely refers to 
standards for conformity, safety or quality.389 There are no such terms like 
interoperability standards or intellectual property in the law, let alone relevant 
regulations on patent exploitations in standardization. Clearly, the current 
standardization law of China is too outdated to cater to standardization in the 
21st century. There is a great need for a new standardization law which could 
be used as guidance for dealing with the patent-related issues in 
standardization.  
 
The new standardization law may include guidance for private 
standardization, such as formalizing the basic private standard-setting 
procedure, the operation of SSOs, the requirement of IP policies in 
standardization, etc. The law may cover all the international norms like 
‘essential patents’, ‘patent holdup’, ‘patent disclosure’ and ‘RAND licensing’, 
in respect of patent exploitations in interoperability standardization. It does not 
mean that the standardization law will take the place of private SSOs IP 
policies and stipulates the whole procedure of standardization 
comprehensively. The law needs just to establish the basic principles, such 
as early disclosures and reasonable royalties for wide adoptions of standards, 
so that potential standard setters or standard adopters would have basic 
guidance for their conducts in standardization. There is no doubt that 
standardization law is in perfect position in regulating issues arising in 
standardization, including patent-related ones.  
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2.  Implementing a universal SSO IP policy for private standardization  
 
Although private standardization in China is not as prevalent as it is the US or 
EU, it is playing a gradually important part in Chinese standardization. 
Therefore, it might be advisable to formulate a universal set of IP policy for all 
private SSOs or standard-setting joint ventures to adopt. This template-like IP 
policy could be very specific in respect of the patent exploitations in 
standardization. For example, it could require patent disclosure specific 
enough to cover the requirements of what, when, how, to whom to disclose 
the patents in standardization. It could also stipulate the consequences for 
noncompliance with the policy. With the reference of the readily available 
SSOs IP policies of the international organizations as discussed in Chapter II, 
it is not that difficult for China to come up with the proper IP policy for 
standardization. All private SSOs are required to enact their internal bylaws 
referring to the template IP policy and they are encouraged to adopt stricter 
rules than the template IP policy requires, in order to appropriately address 
the patent-related issues in standardization. This may sound a little bit 
extreme, to require a one-size-fits-all policy. However, as far as I see, taking 
into consideration of China being a huge stage for all scales of 
standardization, it is better that private SSOs in China apply a universal set of 
IP policies when conducting standardization, compared to the chaos without a 
settled policy. After all, private IP policies are more flexible in dealing with the 
patent-related issues, which should always be considered first before we 





3.  Improving the current patent system of China 
 
A lot of patent related disputes arise in the process of standardization due to 
the imperfectness of the patent system, either technologically or legally. Many 
‘questionable’ patents existing in the current system, e.g., patents which are 
in fact invalid or include too broad claims, have posed great threat to the 
seriousness of the intellectual property framework. The overflow of 
‘questionable’ patents which contain little technological value undoubtedly 
would affect technical standardization, whose effectiveness relies very much 
on the technological merits of the patents involved in its technical 
specifications. Apparently, raising up the threshold of patentability in order to 
filter out ‘questionable’ patents as many as possible is one of the possible 
ways to ensure the effectiveness and the procompetitiveness of technical 
standardization. Besides quality control of the patents accepted for protection, 
it is necessary that Chinese patent laws are sophisticated enough to be able 
to handle disputes particularly in the fields of patent exploitations and patent 
licensing. As discussed in Chapter III, it is necessary to add specific rules 
such as the doctrine of patent misuse into the Patent Law of China to 
guarantee that the exclusive patent rights be exploited within an appropriate 
boundary. Besides, it is also very important that patent laws could provide 
relatively clear guidance to patent licensing issues, e.g., how should license 
royalties be calculated, what is a reasonable licensing rate, how should patent 
licensing work when it comes to multiple licensers and licensees, etc. A clear 
set of licensing rules stipulated by patent laws would be an efficient way in 
resolving disputes arising during the implementation of RAND licensing 




4. Formulating appropriate public laws in regulating the patent-related issues 
in standardization 
 
A universal private IP policy for SSOs to adopt cannot be comprehensive 
enough to avoid any disputes. Therefore, it is necessary that public laws and 
legal principles are applicable when private policies fail to deal with all the 
patent-related issues in standardization. As discussed in Chapter III, contract 
law, patent law and antimonopoly law have their respective strengths in 
resolving the patent-related issues in standardization. While contract law has 
the most sophisticated legal principles and guidelines in dealing with 
noncompliance and disputes relating to SSOs IP policies, its applicable scope 
is restricted within the boundary of standardization members and participants. 
The proposed patent misuse doctrine, which could fill in the gap where 
contract law is incapable and at the same time avoid the ponderous 
machinery of antimonopoly, however, lacks of a clear applicable scope since 
it has not been officially introduced to Chinese patent laws. Antimonopoly law, 
although applicable and effective in regulating all patent-related issues which 
may harm competition in standardization, generally tends to realize its legal 
function at the cost of complicated and time-consuming investigation 
procedures. In addition, the Antimonopoly Law of China has just come into 
effect less than one year and its articles are too general to be applied in 
practical antimonopoly examinations and to tackle the patent-related issues in 
standardization. Under current circumstances, it is advisable to apply a 
combination of the rules and principles of standardization law, contract law, 
patent law and antimonopoly law, on a case by case basis, to effectively 






Adam Smith, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, 
Oxford University Press, 1976. 
 
American Bar Association (ABA) Section of Antitrust Law, Antitrust Law 
Developments, 5th edition, 2002. 
 
Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark D. Janis, Mark A. Lemley, IP and Antitrust: An 
Analysis of Antitrust Principles Applied to Intellectual Property Law, Aspen 
Law & Business, 2002. 
 
Josef Drexl, Research Handbook on Intellectual Property and Competition 
Law, Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2008. 
 
Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, the Commercial Press, 1998. 
 
Steven D. Anderman, The Interface Between Intellectual Property Rights and 
Competition Policy, Cambridge University Press, 2007. 
 
Ward Bowman Jr., Patent and Antitrust Law: A Legal and Economic 
Appraisal, University of Chicago Press,1973. 
 
Shen Tong, Xing Zaoning, Standardization Theory and Practice, Jiliang 
Press, China, 2007. 
 
Wang Liming, The Research of Civil and Commercial Law, Law Press China, 
1999. 
 
Zhang Ping, Ma Yao, Standardization and Intellectual Property Strategy, 







Cf. Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust and Intellectual Property: Unresolved Issues at 
the Heart of the New Economy, 16 Berkeley Technology Law Journal, 2001. 
 
Daniel G. Swanson & William J. Baumol, Reasonable and Nondiscriminatory 
(RAND) Royalties, Standards Selection, and Control of Market Power, 73 
Antitrust Law Journal, 2005. 
 
David Alban, Rambus V. Infineon: Patent Disclosures in Standard-Setting 
Organizations, 19 Berkeley Technology Law Journal, 2004. 
 
David S. Bloch and Scott S. Megregian, United States: The Antitrust Risks 
Associated With Manipulating The Standard-Setting Process, Mondaq 
database, Anti-trust/Competition column, 2004. 
 
Dianne Brinson, Patent Misuse: Time for a Change, 16 Rutgers Computer & 
Technology Law Journal, 1990. 
 
Gianna Julian-Arnold, International Compulsory Licensing: The Rationales 
and the Reality, 33 IDEA: The Journal of Law and Technology, 1993. 
 
H. Stephen Harris, Jr. The Making of An Antitrust Law: the Pending Anti-
Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China, 7 Chicago Journal of 
International Law, 2006. 
 
James B. Kobak, Jr., The Misuse Defense and Intellectual Property Litigation, 
1 Boston University Journal of Science & Technology Law, 1995. 
 
Joseph A. Yosick, Compulsory Patent Licensing for Efficient Use of Inventions, 
University of Illinois Law Review, 2001. 
 
Joseph Farrell, John Hayes, Carl Shapiro and Theresa Sullivan, Standard 
Setting, Patents, and Hold-up, 74 Antitrust Law Journal, No. 3, 2007. 
 
Joseph Scott Miller, Standard Setting, Patents, and Access Lock-in: RAND 
Licensing and the Theory of the Firm, 40 Indiana Law Review, 2007. 
xix 
 
Katarzyna A. Czapracka, Where Antitrust Ends and IP Begins - On the Roots 
of the Transatlantic Clashes, 9 Yale Journal of Law & Technology, 2007. 
Leroy Whitaker, Compulsory Licensing - Another Nail in the Coffin, 2 Am. Pat. 
L. Ass'n Q.J., 1974. 
 
Mark A. Lemley, A New Balance Between IP and Antitrust, 13 Southwestern 
Journal of Law and Trade in the Americas, 2007. 
 
Mark A. Lemley, Economic Irrationality of the Patent Misuse Doctrine, 78 
California Law Review, 1990. 
 
Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting 
Organizations, 90 California Law Review, December 2002. 
 
Mark A. Lemley, Ten Things To Do About Patent Holdup of Standards (And 
One Not To), 48 Boston College Law Review, 2007. 
 
Michael J. Schallop, The IPR Paradox: Leveraging Intellectual Property 
Rights to Encourage Interoperability in the Network Computing Age, 28 
American Intellectual Property Law Association Quarterly Journal, 2000. 
 
Janice M. Mueller, Patent Misuse Through the Capture of Industry Standards, 
17 Berkeley Technology Law Journal, 2002. 
 
Naughton, Michael C., Wolfram, Richard, The Antitrust Risks of Unilateral 
Conduct in Standard Setting, in the Light of the FTC's Case Against Rambus 
Inc., Antitrust Bulletin, 22 September 2004. 
 
Nicos L. Tsilas, Toward Greater Clarity and Consistency in Patent Disclosure 
Policies in a Post-Rambus World, 17 Harvard Journal of Law &Technology, 
2004.  
 
Robert A. Skitol, Concerted Buying Power: Its Potential for Addressing the 
Patent Holdup Problem in Standard Setting, 72 Antitrust Law Journal, 2005. 
 
Robert P. Merges, Note, Is the Patent Misuse Doctrine Obsolete?, 110 
xx 
Harvard Law Review, 1997. 
 
Stephen Calkins, Patent Law: The Impact of the 1988 Patent Misuse Reform 
Act and Noerr-Pennington Doctrine on Misuse Defenses and Antitrust 
Counterclaims, 38 Drake Law Review,1989. 
 
Chen Yu, Yao Yuqin, Research on the Change Process of Curved Roof of 
Chinese Ancient Architecture by System Dynamics, Nanjing Academy 
Journal, China, 2005. 
 
Gu Minkang, Another Discussion of the Nature of Companies’ Articles of 
Association, China Civil and Commercial Law, 2006. 
 
Jiang Tingting, A Brief Discussion of the Nature of Companies’ Articles of 
Association, 2 Journal of Jining University, 2008. 
 
Liu Shuhua, the Antimonopoly Regulations of Patent Misuse in 
Standardization, 07 Lanzhou Academic Journal, 2006. 
 
Sun Yuguo, The Nature of Companies’ Articles of Association, 4 Co-operation 
Economy, 2007. 
 
Xu Lifeng, Li Ning, the Research of Antitrust Issues in the Patent Area—A 
Discussion of the Misuse of Patent Rights, 04 Journal of Nanjing University, 
1998. 
 
Xu Lingjie, The Nature of Companies’ Articles of Association, 20.11 Journal of 
Sichuan College of Education, 2004. 
 
Zhang Ping, Liu Chao, Review and Consideration on the Philips DVD/3C 










American Society of Mechanical Engineers v. Hydrolevel, 456 U.S. 556, 571 
(1982). 
 
Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir.1990). 
 
C-O-Two Fire Equip. Corp. v. United States, 197 F.2d 489 (9th Cir.1952). 
 
Dell Computer Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616 (1996). 
 
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 481 
(1992). 
 
Fortner Enters, Inc v US Steel Corp, 394 US 495, 503 (1969). 
 
Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood, Inc., 318 F. Supp.1120 (1970). 
 
Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 27 (1912). 
 
KMB Warehouse Distributions, Inc v Walker Mfg Co, 61 F3d 123, 129 (2d Cir 
1995). 
 
Koefoot v. Am. Coll. Of Surgeons, 692 F.Supp.843, 860 (N.D.III.1988). 
 
Motion Picture Patents Co. V. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917). 
 
Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488(1942). 
 
Michelin v Commission, Case 322/81, 1983 ECR 3641, 3503 (Nov 9, 1983). 
 
Radiant Burners v. People’s Gas Co., 364 U.S. 656, 659-660 (1961). 
 
Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 164 F.Supp.2d. (E.D. Va. 2001). 
 
Rambus. Inc. v. Infineon Techs, AG. 318 F.3d 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
xxii 
 
Sony Elecs., Inc. v. Souncdview Techs., Inc., 157 F.Supp. 2d 172, 183 (D. 
Conn. 2001). 
 
Synovus Bank of Tampa Bay v. Valley National Bank, 487 F.Supp.2d 360, 368 
(S.D.N.Y.2007) (quoting BDG Oceanside, LLC v. RAD Terminal Corp., 14 
A.D.3d 472, 473, 787 N.Y.S.2d 388, 390 (2d Dep't 2005)). 
 
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d. Cir. 1945). 
 
U.S. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 648 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1981). 
 
 
Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft mbH v. Metro-SB-GroSSmarkte GmbH 
& Co. KG, 1971 E.C.R. 487. 
 
Hoffman-La Roche v Commission, Case 85/76, 1979 ECR 461, 520 (Feb 13, 
1979). 
 
Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Independent Television Publications Ltd. 
(ITP) v. Commission of the European Communities, 1995 E.C.R. I-743. 
 
United Brands v Commission, Case 27/76,1978 ECR 207, 277 (Feb 14, 
1978). 
 
CONFERENCE PAPER AND REPORTS 
 
China Digital TV Market Operation Report, 2006-2007.  
(Downloadable at: http://www.hdcmr.com/article/english/03/8629.html) 
 
Deborah Platt Majoras, Chairman, FTC, Recognizing the 
Procompetitive Potential of Royalty Discussions in Standard Setting, 
Remarks at Conference on Standardization and the Law: Developing 




German Institute for Standardization along with the German Federal 
Minister of Economic Affairs and Technology, The Economic Benefits 
of Standardization, 1997. 




Intellectual Property Institute, London, Raising the Standard? The 
Interaction of Intellectual Property Rights with Competition Law in the 
Context of Standard Setting in the Software and Telecommunications 
Sectors: A Seminar Report, 2000. 
 






The Introduction of China DTV Industry Analysis and Investment 
Consultation Report, 2007- 2008.  
(Downloadable at: http://www.ocn.com.cn/reports/2006124shuzids.htm.) 
 
William Blumenthal, Presentation to the International Symposium on 






























OTHER PRIMARY SOURCES 
 
Guidelines for Implementation of the Common Patent Policy for ITU-T/ITU-




Joint Hearings of the United States Department of Justice and the Federal 
Trade Commission regarding Competition and Intellectual Property Law and 
Policy in the Knowledge-Based Economy, especially in relation to Standard 
Setting Practices: Competition, Innovation and Consumer Welfare, 
Washington, D.C., 2002.  
(Relevant materials are available at: 
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/index.htm) 
 
Patent Group, American National Standards Institute, Intellectual Property 
Rights Policies in Standards Development Organizations and the Impact on 
Trade Issues with the People’s Republic of China, 2004.  
(Downloadable at: http://www.law-gun.com/Article_Show.asp?ArticleID=3450) 
xxv 
 
William F. Dolan and Geoffrey D. Oliver, United States: Department Of Justice 
Issues First Patent-Pool Business Review Letter Since Issuing 2007 Antitrust 
& IP Report, 30 October 2008. 
(Downloadable at: http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=68770) 
 
US DOJ and FTC, Antitrust Guidelines for the licensing of Intellectual 
property, 1995. 
 
